Marine Corps Gazette



DECEMBER 1960
FIFTY CENTS

MARINE CORPS BASE
29 PALMS

BGen L. J. Fields
CG, ForTrps, Pacific
and MCB, 29 Palms

MCB, 29 Palms, this month's cover, is not the home of FMFPac, subject for this month's *Report from the Ready Forces* (page 40). The Base is, however, a major link in FMFPac's far-flung chain of combat commands. It is headquarters for ForTrps, Pacific, home of Marine missile battalions, training ground for tanks, heavy artillery, other support units.

One of three ground-to-air missile ranges in US, 29 Palms recently added Hawk to its missile arsenal.

Rugged desert terrain is ideal for tank training exercises.

HEADQUARTERS, FMFPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH



Portrait of Gen H. M. Smith, WWII FMFPac commander, decorates lobby of FMFPac headquarters in Hawaii.



Entrance to Camp H. M. Smith, home of FMFPac

Marine Corps 1960

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest of news of interest to our members

Stability: It's Coming

The "personnel problem" got started at Tun Tavern. Planners have been trying to replace losses ever since, seldom catch up.

But today there's a revolution in personnel management. The Marine Corps "stabilized input" system works. It's drawing much interest in DoD. The program is being expanded just as rapidly as possible.

Key to the system is to establish a cycle for a unit. At the beginning the unit gets a complete set of Marines who have enough obligated service to last at least half way. At the halfway point, 50% are transferred out, and new Marines provided. Thereafter, mass transfers at regular intervals keep the unit personnel situation stable. Benefits in morale, discipline, and particularly training are immense. The system provides for higher true combat readiness; it also saves Marines.

Just revised and overhauled by MCO 1300.17, the program has passed with flying colors. Not only were all 'bugs" worked out, but personnel savings helped to man the six BLTs and two Hawk Bns added to the FMF.

These were the key changes:

• 2dMarDiv is now on a 24-month cycle. This saves Marines. The 30-month cycle in FMFPac is tied to the new 13-month overseas tour.

• Assignment of officers will be more flexible. This gives more a chance to serve in BLTs.

• More junior Marines will be provided from outside stabilized units. This lets more ITR graduates serve an FMF tour during their first enlistments, ups promotion chances in the non-FMF billets, and makes tours in the non-FMF jobs longer, more usable.

To achieve the even flow between FMF and non-FMF (called "lateral exchange") was a major chore. It required equalizing some 700 sets of billet criteria, establishing training programs, and generally providing for infantrymen to be used outside a BLT.

The current program gobbled up nearly one-third of the average 32,000 Marine Corps boots each year. With these adjustments, in each coming year additional Marines from both ITR and "lateral exchange" will become available to stabilize new units.

On the list with a high priority are artillery, force troops, and RLT headquarters.

Stabilized input is a revolution in personnel management. It definitely works. Planners wish only that there were some way to expand it more rapidly. There isn't, not without damaging combat readiness of the non-stabilized units.

But planners aren't through. Big results are also expected from General Weller's Long-Range Enlisted Personnel Planning Board, which reported out 18 Oct. Highly technical, here are its main recommendations (now approved in principle):

• A new battery of classification tests. These will measure eight basic aptitudes, which can be related to eight basic types of jobs.

• A new, five-digit MOS. This will provide more information. The first three digits will show present information, the fourth and fifth will show added MOS or Category "B" Skill designations. (See 2dMAW *Report*, GAZETTE, Mar'60).

• A reorganization of the present 37 occupational fields into 15 basic groups. This will help equalize promotion chances between OFs. It will also give Marines a broader background before they qualify for promotion to MGySgt.

(Continued on page MCA—2)

No Risk on Retainer Pay

About risking less retainer pay if transferring FMCR on 19 and 6. It just isn't so. Comptroller General has ruled fractional year of six months or more may be counted as a full year in computing retirement rights of Marines (and Navy). In a letter to SecNav, Comptroller General said: "Nothing said in our decision of 19 Jul 60, was intended as a modification of 35 ComGen 612 . . . or as meaning that a fractional year of six months or more of actual service should not be considered a full year in computing basic pay factor under 10 US Code 6330."

Christmas Cheer

Promotion boards now in session are expected to finish their Christmas shopping early.

MSgt (E-8) board should announce an estimated 700 selections by 12 December, closely followed by results of board selecting 1,800 GySgts (E-7).

An ALMAR detailing who will get P2 pro-pay was reported in the last stages of staffing as the GAZETTE went to press. It was expected to be released before you get this issue.

Christmas leave again on half and half basis: two 10-day periods starting 17-18 Dec or 28-29 Dec.

Note: Individual Combat Trainees assigned February replacement battalions have option of taking leave after finishing ICT training in early December or of waiting until holiday period, taking leave after reporting to CamPen or El Toro for overseas processing.

HAWK in Reserve

It's official. HAWK units are planned for the Organized Reserve. Marine Reservists won't receive their first missile right away (actual date is classified). They will begin to get the required technical training courses. This will be supplemented by OJT with regular units at 29 Palms during summer training. For further details, see BGen Fairbourn's column, page 46.

Dollars & Dependents

As the GAZETTE went to press, these were the latest developments in the bring-the-dependents-back furor:

• The initial White House announcement was that 284,000 of the 484,000 armed forces dependents overseas would be brought home to save dollars, preserve balance of payments and gold supplies. That's a cut of about 58 percent.

• DoD announced that the program would begin 1 January, continue for 19 months. Military departments were to work out plans based on DoD-supplied *interim* monthly figures as follows: Army, 7,710; Air Force, 6,120; Navy and Marine Corps, 1,170; total, 15,000 per month. The interim monthly quotas are about 3 percent of total dependents overseas, listed as: Army, 248,788; Air Force, 197,438; Navy and Marine Corps, 37,837; total 484,063.

• A DoD spokesman said there were 2,297 Marine Corps dependents overseas. (U.S. Possessions or states such as Hawaii, Alaska don't count.) In the "hard-currency" areas of major concern, he listed these figures: Japan, 687; France, 101; Germany, 87; and United Kingdom, 93. A cut of 58 percent would eventually bring back 1,348 Marine dependents; a 3 percent monthly rate would amount to 71.

• SecDef told military commanders "Exhaustive discussions . . . at the highest level determined that the interest of the nation permitted no alternative," called for "personal leadership" to minimize any "adverse impact."

• SecNav said 'It is imperative that command action be taken to impress on all Navy and Marine Corps personnel that these actions are vitally important to the welfare of our country." He said reduction will be "gradual," will come mainly from ending overseas tours a few months early, letting fewer dependents go overseas hereafter. He also emphasized the importance of the "Buy American" provision for overseas units, especially in fuel oil and maintenance. (Overseas PXs, clubs can no longer stock foreign items without permission.)

As previously reported here, the Marine Corps has the lowest percentage of dependents of any service and a very small percentage of dependents overseas.

HQMC, in the first stages of developing plans, wasn't ready to talk, except for one pertinent comment:

Asked what effect the moves would have on Marine Corps morale, a spokesman said, "We don't know of a case when a Marine became demoralized by having to carry out the orders of his government."

Stability, Cont'd

• An improved skill control system. This involves standardizing reports and requests. Records, forecasts, and other written data will make maximum use of new data processing installations. More important, major personnel management procedure will be integrated within the 15 new occupational groups.

Summing up: There's a new look in Marine Corps personnel management. Hard work is beginning to pay dividends. The payoff should come in rapidly increasing combat readiness during the next five years.

Study By Mail

Extension School has revised its by-mail version of Junior Course. There are two major changes:

• Updated material which reflects new T/O, TE, and latest MCS doctrine.

• A series of phased reviews and exams (open-book), replacing formerly complete-in-themselves subcourses.

Phase I reviews organization and employment of Marine units, principles of leadership, training, and combat, and their application.

Phase II emphasizes staff operations. Phase III takes up supporting arms and services. Phase IV covers the BLT and RLT in detail through map exercises.

Finally, Phase V comes to grips with amphibious operations, including the planning and execution of BLT and Brigade (map) exercises.

Phases I & II are ready. New students will begin getting them about 1 Jan. The other phases are being printed. Students enrolled in the old course will be transferred automatically and notified as soon as possible. Note: Letters asking transfer are NOT required.

Two By Two

T/Os of Reserve Staff Groups are about to be cut by 50 per cent, and the number of groups doubled. There are now seven, each with 24 officers in 24-drill pay status. There are to be 14, each with 11 officers.

This will provide two per district. Two groups will also participate in each Air-Ground exercise during annual field training. There'll also be a greater capability to coordinate combined reserve exercises such as Operation SCORE.

Renaming Battalions

CMC has told CG FMFPAC that transplacement battalions will be redesignated, come 1 Jan. Change would come when a battalion joined a division. For example, units of 9thMar would always be called 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 while on Okinawa.

CG FMFPAC was to consolidate division recommendations on how to handle details, forward to CMC by 24 Nov.

Epitaph

CMC TO ALMAR. MCO 1500.13A. I HAVE JUST OBSERVED A COMPARISON DEMONSTRATION OF 8-MAN AND LPM DRILLS AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT EITHER DRILL CAN BE USED TO DEVELOP LEADERSHIP QUALITIES, ALERTNESS, AND THE NECESSARY DISCIPLINARY STANDARDS. MY DECISION IN THIS MATTER IS AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 15DEC60 CANCEL MCO 1500.13 AND ALL EXCEPT SECTIONS V, XI, XII, AND XIII OF CHAPTER 3, MARINE CORPS DRILL MANUAL. 8-MAN DRILL ABOLISHED FOR MARINE CORPS USE . . .

GOD PERMITTING, THERE SHALL BE NO FURTHER VIBRATION IN RESPECT TO CLOSE ORDER DRILL DIRECTIVES FOR AT LEAST 3 YEARS, ONE MONTH, AND 12 DAYS. THIS ORDER APPLICABLE TO THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE.

See also *What You Can Do About Drill*, page 20.

Marines at Work

The 185th Anniversary of the Marine Corps barely slowed the tempo of training essential to maintaining the amphibious force-in-readiness.

• Last complete exercise honors of the old year went to Southern California Reserves in Operation SCORE at Camp Pendleton, 5-6 Nov.

• First new exercise (PACKBOARD) kicked off promptly the morning of 11 Nov at Okinawa, featuring RLT-3 and MAG-16.

• 2dMarDiv worked through the occasion, as BLT 1/2 was due to relieve 1/8 at Majorca on 16 Nov and *Boxer*-borne 3/8 resumed operations at Vieques. 1/8 made last Med landing in Turkey.

The exercise was to end 22 Nov.

PACKBOARD was a Brigade-sized LEX, commanded by Col T. F. Beeman. RLT-3 splashed ashore at Kin Beaches and, with the help of MAG-16 from simulated LPH, hit Northern Okinawa for "anti-guerrilla operations."

Marines at Play

Seldom have Marines on liberty drawn the attention won by Col B. R. Bisceglia's 8th MEU at Guantanamo Bay.

After extensive operations at Vieques, 3/8 (LtCol R. C. Peck) and Prov MAG-40 (LtCol J. N. Cupp) were ready for R&R. At Gitmo they landed and spent one night ashore. Movies, refreshment, riding, swimming, boating were objectives. There was no maneuver. The next day they returned aboard *Boxer*, steamed for more exercises at Vieques. The maneuver was to end 28 Nov after the usual "round trip" assault of Onslow Beach. Next liberty: Jacksonville.

• LtCol D. W. Price's Potomac River command, 2/8 exercised as a unit for the first time last month. Marines of MCS, Quantico's SDT Bn and Basic School joined with one company from MB, 8th&Eye, took over Quantico's Combat Village after a three-day tussle against agressor forces (SDT's Tracked Vehicle Co, commanded by Maj E. J. Baker, Jr.). MajGen J. P. Berkeley, CG, 2dMarDiv, watched the show, observed "I'm confident . . . the battalion . . . will perform on a par with other units of 2dMarDiv."

• Capt F. N. VanZant, nine enlisted Marines of CamPen's Tracked Vehicle T&E Unit flew to Alaska, settled down for a long, cold wait while their test gear caught up. Bringing up the rear are two LVTPs with new power plants, transmissions for cold weather weather trainig, two Marines riding "shot gun." These are aboard a barge being towed by tugboat with top speed of 2½ knots per hour. Helping ease the slow ride north: a seabag full of Dramamine.

• Returning to Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii 15 December, after two months low-level navigational training in the states: 11 pilots, 70 aviation technicians of VMA-214. Ten FJ4-B jets made the trip to mainland via *USS Breton*, were flown to flat country needed for exercises at MCAAS, Yuma, Ariz.

• 2dMarDiv Marines (2/2) helped test capabilities of Army amphibians, helicopters in a joint assault on Onslow Beach. Teamed up were soldiers and Marines, LVTs and Army DUKWs and BARCs. Over-the-beach attack was followed by assault via helicopter. Troop commander: LtCol F. F. Eubanks, CO, 2/2.

• In Operation PACK MULE, 3 (3) /5 diverted to San Clemente Island off CamPen's coast, quickly silenced nuclear missile launcher threatening 8,500 Marines of Col J. F. Dobbins' 3dMarExBrig moving inland over Red and Green Beaches. MAG-36 helicopters added vertical dimension to exercise.

New techniques tested:

Underwater fuel lines from off-shore tankers to beach supply points.

Underwater telephone lines augmenting ship-to-shore communications.

The Old Breed

As promised, pre-Pearl Harbor service counted with promotion board that selected 204 top Marines for promotion to SgtMaj/MGySgt. Nearly all of the 37 Marines picked for SgtMaj, 167 picked for MGySgt started their careers at least 19 years ago. The Board kept well within the 10 percent limit of selecting Marines with less than average time in service.

Thirty SgtsMaj, 140 MGySgts will be appointed in January, the remaining 34 in April. According to lineal precedence, first SgtMaj appointment in FY '61, will be E. L. Hurley; first MGySgt appointment will be W. R. Senior.

Breakdown of MGySgt selections by OF:

OF		OF		OF		OF	
01	7	15	1	32	0	55	4
02	6	18	5	33	10	57	0
03	8	21	5	34	3	64	9
04	6	27	3	35	17	65	0
07	4	23	1	31	1	66	8
08	1	25	14	40	7	67	0
11	0	26	3	41	5	68	2
13	0	30	21	43	4	70	5
14	2	31	0	46	0	71	2

A Rainy Day

Start saving for a rainy day now. Price tag on the new nylon raincoat will read $13.50 after it's brought into the supply system next May. Marines joining during FY '59, get it free, have priority issue. Those joining since 30 Jun59 also can expect a free raincoat. MX will start selling approved nylon raincoats before they reach supply system but store-bought coats are for liberty wear only, will not be worn in troop formations.

More Fuel Tanks

Firestone is making more portable fuel tanks for USMC. New contract calls for delivery of five TAFDSs, each having 60,000-gallon fuel capacity. (A system is composed of six collapsible, 10,000-gallon rubercoated fabric tanks, hoses and pumps. See MCA Newsletter: GAZETTE Oct '60.) Features:

• Six fighter or attack planes can refuel at the same time at the rate of 675 gallons per minute.

• Tanks fold into compact packages, entire system fits helicopter or transport plane.

Nutshell News

Now that Marines below the rank of Cpl may apply, MCI enrollment topped 50,000 in Oct, is still climbing.

HQMC has been asked to contribute items for CMC's Jan 1961 message. Prediction is that suggested wording may be revised to make it "Shoup-shape."

Reserve Score

Operation SCORE (Southern California Organized Reserve Exercise) ended on a rainy 6Nov as **LtCol Robert Walter's** 15th Infantry Bn (USMCR, Santa Monica) seized Horno Ridge.

A major training effort, the problem banded together for a two-day drill six companies, two gun batteries, and a staff group; total strength—approximately 85 officers and 950 men. The units assembled in Las Pulgas Canyon early 5Nov, simulated a helicopter landing and jumped off in the attack at 1100.

Early Aggressor resistance hit the 15th Rifle Co (Seal Beach, **Capt W. B. Sammons Jr.**) and the 82nd Rifle Co (Compton, **Capt H. M. Stewart**). A Co, 15th Infantry Bn (Santa Monica, **Capt Raymond Ceragioli**) provided the extra punch to dislodge the enemy. Elements of the 5th Communication Co (Seal Beach, **Major John W. Lazur**), acting as infantry, provided flank and rear security. The balance of this unit operated major portions of the communications network.

A Provisional Aggressor Bn, commanded by **Major W. D. Flagg,** USMCR, added realism and resistance. It included: 4th Reconnaissance Co (San Bernardino, **Capt John W. Hews**); 5th 155 Gun Btry (Whittier, **Capt W. B. Cook**); 7th 75mm AAA Btry (Pasadena, **Capt T. D. Burnette**)

The 12th Staff Group (Los Angeles, **Colonel J. A. Hefti**) provided operational planning, Regimental Headquarters, aggressor and umpire control, and critique.

The 8th 105mm Howitzer Bn (Los Angeles, **LtCol Vincent Harris**) furnished forward observer teams and a Bn FSCC. This unit conducted live firing on a nearby range.

G-o-i-n-g Up

Short, short report on fitness reports: unsatisfactory.

MCO 1611.3A reached the field via A1Mar early in Feb '60. Its impact was felt on officer fitness reports for six month period ending 28Feb60; only a little more than seven percent were marked "outstanding." There was another drop in July when only 6.8 percent of junior officers got the high mark.

Since then percentage of officers considered outstanding has been going up, 8.6 percent in August, 13.2 percent in September. Is the increase justified? HQMC doesn't think so, is returning more and more reports that lack specific facts as to why an officer is considered outstanding. Example: "This is the most outstanding major I've met in 18 years service."

The facts, Marine. Colorful adjectives won't do. Outstanding reports must be justified by pointing out acts and deeds that brought the high rating. "General statements without explicit details are considered insufficient justification." This is the word attached to returned reports.

Any marking for item 17 (h) also needs justification. It was put in there mostly to cover combat situations. "The ability to think and act promptly and effectively in an unexpected emergency or under great strain" would not normally in these halcyon days rate a mark, high or low.

Forces Afloat

A reinforced 1/2, 2dMarDiv has relieved 1/8 for Mediterranea duty with Sixth Fleet. Battalion, commanded by LtCol S. N. McLeod, includes units from 10th Marines, MedBn, AntiTkBn, ReconBn of 2dMarDiv; elements of ForTrps, 2dAmTracBn, 2dANGLICO, 2d 8-in HowBtry, 8thEng.

Also a helicopter unit from HMR-262, detachments from 2dFSR, HqBn, MCB, CamLej, 2dMarDiv.

Grenade Launcher, Nothing More

Now that the XM-79 Grenade Launcher has been declassified, G-4 would like all hands to call it just that. Code name "Shotgun" was used in unclassified troop test directives. The launcher isn't a shotgun and planners feel supply agencies already have enough trouble with confusing nomenclature, don't want to add more.

(See Troop Test, page MCA—8 back of magazine.)

You Read About It Here

National press attention was focussed on new Marine Corps physical readiness program during November. You read about here last May (if you were a member and got the Association Newsletter.)

Rehash—News Warmed Over

Last April it was reported here that CMC wanted annual physicals for SNCOs over 30 years old. Also that MCS, Quantico had already started giving physicals to its top pay-graders on the anniversary of their month of birth. Last month BuMed issued the directive: SNCOs serving at MCBs, Recruit Depots, MCASs, MCS, Quantico, or with FMF units will be examined each year within 30 days of the anniversary of their date of birth. Reason: Physical fitness for combat readiness at all times.

Last three of six paper battalions will be reactivated in Jan and Jun, 1961.

In January, 3/4 and 3/1 will form, expected to be at full strength by June.

During June, 3/9 will be formed and at full strength within a year.

1stTkBn ceased firing long enough during PACK MULE (See Marines at Work) to observe its birthday. Bn CO LtCol S. R. Jones, cut the cake holding 19 candles. Sharing the cake: former privates of 1stTkBn in its early days, CWO G. M. Tedesco, now OiC of tank maintenance, 1stSgt A. J. Zielinski, H&S Co, GySgt J. A. Cavalluzzi, Bn police sergeant.

Extending EAD

More releases than expected, less input of new blood are causing a minor officer shortage. To help keep billets firm, reserve officers nearing end of their first obligated service tour are being encouraged to extend. Periods of extension may be less than one year. About 1,000 officers, mostly lieutenants, are eligible to ask for up to seven months more EAD. MCB-1001 is the reference.

Underwater blast set off by EOD Marines of 1stMarBrig resulted in a safe channel 55x130 yards through coral reef for use of LVTs at MCAS, Kaneohe. Cost of explosives: nothing. An estimated $37,000 was saved by using ordnance items salvaged from a nearby Naval Ammunition Dump.

Far in the frozen North...



Bell Telephone engineers are putting together the nervous system for BMEWS ... Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

The eyes of the U. S. Air Force BMEWS will be massive, far-seeing radars located in Alaska, Greenland and Great Britain. The brain is at the Continental Air Defense Center in Colorado Springs. Between the eyes and the brain there will be a vast network to provide instantaneous, highly reliable communications in the event of enemy missile attack.

The Bell System's manufacturing and supply unit, Western Electric, heads a team of 30 private firms and government agencies from three countries which is constructing this communications system.

Work is going ahead at full speed, right on schedule. All of the arts of long distance communications are being used to conquer the stern, hard-bitten terrain of BMEWS—line-of-sight and over-the-horizon radio, cables on land and under water.

Several forms of transmission are being employed. Newly designed high-speed data channels will feed information to the BMEWS computers. Voice and teletypewriter links will also be available.

One important reason the Bell System was given this assignment was its demonstrated capacity to handle such a challenging task. The resourcefulness and skill shown in this and other defense projects are significant assets contributing to our country's readiness.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

DECEMBER 1960

VOLUME 44

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Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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

If you had to— could you afford to replace your personal property at today's costs?

If you took an inventory of all the personal and household goods you own, you would probably be amazed at the large sum you have invested. And most of the things that you own would probably cost a great deal more than when you bought them. Since this property represents so great a share of your worth, it deserves to be adequately protected from damage and loss.

The USAA WORLD WIDE HOUSEHOLD GOODS & PERSONAL EFFECTS FLOATER covers personal property owned by you, your wife and dependents. There are no restrictions as to geographical location . . . your premium remains the *same* — regardless of where or how often you move —anywhere in the world.

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The cost is so low — you cannot afford to be without this insurance. Like other USAA policies the cost has always been reduced at year end by a liberal dividend.

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*Membership in United Services Automobile Association is limited to active and retired Regular officers, midshipmen, cadets and warrant officers of the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey; Foreign Service Officers of the Department of State; Reserve and National Guard officers when ordered to extended active Federal duty for a period of six months or longer; the widows of such officers and warrant officers so long as their status is not changed by remarriage. Reserve and National Guard officers who retire, or who are released to inactive status and retain their commissions or warrants, may continue their insurance or renew their insurance with the Association at any time, provided membership in USAA was established while such officers were on extended active duty.

"Serving the Services Since 1922"

Charles E. Cheever
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MC-15

TYPE OF COVERAGE

COVERAGE 1. — Fire, Lightning, Windstorm, Hail, Explosion, Riot & Civil Commotion, Smoke or Smudge, Damage by Vehicles or Aircraft; Accidental escape of Water, and Transportation.
Minimum Coverage: $1,000 — Maximum: $25,000

COVERAGE 2. — Theft, Pilferage, Larceny, Burglary, Robbery, Holdup, and Embezzlement.
Minimum Coverage: $1,000 — Maximum: $12,500

The MINIMUM policy written is a combination of $1,000 Coverage 1 and $1,000 Coverage 2.
NEITHER COVERAGE WILL BE WRITTEN ALONE. Either coverage may be written for higher amounts.

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Insurance commences the postmarked time of an order. Policy will be dated the day following postmarked time unless a later effective date is requested.

Issue policy effective _____ (date)
for Coverage 1 $_____
and Coverage 2 $_____
} fill in amounts of coverage desired

Rank Name (please print) Serial No.

Address

Signature

Complete this column if you desire information only

Send information on the Household Goods Floater (no insurance desired at this time)

Rank Name (please print) Serial No.

Address

Signature

Please check military status for either column ▶ ☐ Active — Regular ☐ Retired — Regular ☐ Retired — Reserve† ☐ Extended active duty ☐ Widow of eligible officer ☐ Inactive but retaining commission†

†Membership in USAA must have been established while on extended active duty.

MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words. Rates: up to $20.

Daily Pushups

. . . Anyone who has even a passing acquaintance with the Reserve program knows the majority of reservists could not pass the new physical readiness tests described on page MCA—1 in the October issue of the GAZETTE. Yet these reservists are expected to go into the field immediatly upon mobilization without any further conditioning. Remember Inchon?

What's the answer? The problem lies in the lap of the unit CO.

If he will put his Marines through 15 minutes of calisthenics described on page 80, TM 21-200, each drill period and daily at camp, in addition persuade all hands to give five minutes daily to the "isometric tension" exercises outlined by Capt Otott's Are You a 227 Pound Weakling (GAZETTE: Oct '60), he could bring his unit up to CMC's standard of fitness in about six months.

LtCol W. P. J. Drakeley, Jr.
2005 Concord Pike
Wilmington, Delaware

Easy Payment Plan

. . . I can recall not many years ago when MESSAGE CENTER was devoted to letters based on methods, systems, forms and ideas for the betterment of the Marine Corps.

Alas, today it has become a vehicle for everyone and his brother to turn an extra ten or twenty dollars for liberty, by pointing out errors in another's worthwhile endeavors, chastising the GAZETTE for an erroneous caption, and generally agreeing or disagreeing with the theory of the past month's articles.

Let's keep MESSAGE CENTER for constructive suggestions, and give them their just monetary reward. As for the rest of our readers, if they desire to see their opinions of someone else's efforts in print badly enough, let's also establish a "Letters to the Editor" column for that specific purpose—sans reimbursement.

MSgt Edward A. Hulbert
Filed Supply Analysis
MB, USFA, Navy 3923
FPO, San Francisco

Ed: We prefer, and pay higher for constructive suggestions. Our mission is to provide a forum, which Webster defines as "a medium of open discussion." Accordingly, the primary limit on *Message Center* is length. We'll continue to print, and pay for the best letters we get each month.

No Nose Fuse

. . . As a former EOD officer I know, as do all EOD Marines, that MSgt Driver knows a HEP round is not nose fused. I hope all of the good information presented by MSgt Driver in his excellent *Introduction to EOD* (GAZETTE: Nov '60) is not lost due to one faulty sentence.

Sentence in question: "He knows, for instance ,that a HEAT round is unlikely to have a delay fuse, and that a HEP round is fused in the nose."

Please correct this sentence.

Capt J. W. Terwilliger
Extension School
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Ed: Our unacquainted proofreader needs an introduction to EOD. In his original manuscript MSgt Driver wrote: "He knows, for instance, that a HEAT round is unlikely to have a delay fuse, or that a HEP round will have a nose fuse."

Dousing the Ire

. . . My letter (MESSAGE CENTER: Aug '60) seems to have aroused the ire of a great many faithful readers. In reply, I shall simply quote the late George Bernard Shaw, who once remarked: "In this world, if you do not say anything in an irritating way, you may just as well not say it at all, since nobody will trouble themselves about anything that does not trouble them. The attention given to criticism is in direct proportion to its indigestibility."

Since the end of the Korean War, when I put on a civilian suit, my work has required that I scan constantly most of the important military periodicals published both here and abroad. The GAZETTE continues to be one of the best. But excellence is not an objective which, once achieved, requires no further effort to hold.

William Wiseley
25154 West Malibu Rd
Malibu, Calif.

Ed: Dr. Wiseley holds the rank of Capt, USMCR; he is also a weapons analyst for RAND Corp.

Using the Top

. . . The SALTY SKIPPER article entitled "Use your 1st Sergeant" appearing in the August 1960 issue of the GAZETTE was undoubtedly written and published for the purpose of evoking comments from the field or merely filling space since the article fell far short of its intended purpose of advising "not so Salty Skippers" on how to best use their 1st sergeants.

The duties of a 1st sergeant, as laid down in the last paragraph not only sound simple but are simple. So simple in fact that a person of lesser rank and experience could effectively accomplish any or all of them with little difficulty.

Let's be realistic. 1st sergeants, be they ground, supply, or aviation, by virtue of their professional knowledge and experience can provide invaluable assistance to the commanding officer within every facet of his command. Normally this assistance is effected, but not limited to, direct and indirect supervision of areas known to be weak, and by providing facts which the CO can use in making decisions. As a link in the chain of command the 1st sergeant is in position to take care of many routine requests and minor details, thus allowing the CO time for more important matters. As senior enlisted Marine within the unit the 1st sergeant is the liaison factor between the CO and the enlisted men of the command.

The tasks performed by a 1st sergeant are many and varied. Close contact with troops requires a high degree of leadership ability. He must be forceful. He must have initiative. He should be able to supervise and instruct. He should know personnel administration inside and out.

The only portion of the article I am in complete agreement with is the title, "Use Your 1st Sergeant." By all means do so, but use him intelligently. Use him for what he has been trained to do. Use him to your advantage and for the betterment of your command.

IstSgt D. N. McKenzie
MB, USNAF
Navy 3867
FPO, San Francisco

. . . Permission is requested to reproduce the following article from the GAZETTE in not more than 50 copies for distribution to company commanders:

"Use Your First Sergeant" (SALTY SKIPPER: Aug '60).

SALTY SKIPPER has given me a great many ideas that I can use. I sincerely hope this feature will be continued.

LtCol C. C. Helena
AC/S, G-2
101st Airborne Div
Ft. Campbell, Ky.

Ed: Permission granted. **Also see p. 47.**

Short Rounds

. . . In Maj Meyer's article Malaya Jungle Patrols (GAZETTE: Oct '60), I must call to your attention the photo of the Red terrorist described as bearing a Russian carbine. The rifle is an Enfield Mk 1, No. 4; British, not Russian.

J. A. Marshburn, Jr.
Butner, N. C.

. . . I sincerely hope British ordnance designers believe in the age-old adage, "To err is human. . . . The weapon was, in all probability, liberated from British Colonial forces by the Communist terrorists since the Enfield was until very recently the standard British Army rifle.

Capt P. H. Westenberger
USMC Officer Selection Office
346 Broadway, N.Y., N.Y.

Overseas Mail

. . . Though I'm serving with the Federal German Army, close to today's "hot line," I feel that we not only talk the same language but are one great family. Therefore, I would never like to miss the GAZETTE or to lose contact with your Corps during the years ahead.

It is my frank opinion that the US Marine Corps is to be congratulated for this

Question of the Month

Many claims have been made for the XM-79, new grenade launcher described on page MCA—8. Designed as a squad weapon, it's reported capable of destroying enemy machine gun nests, bunkers, small troop concentrations. Who should carry it?

We'll pay $25 for best answer received by 10Feb61.

excellent periodical which thoroughly reflects the traditional and widely known attitude and esprit of the Corps. It also proves the statement by the Commandant of the Marine Corps: "Ours is a profession which calls for self-sacrifice, dedication and a deep sense of duty."

Maj Helmut Dürr

17 Schumannstrasse
Bad Godesberg, Germany

. . . I'm quite sure I have not read a finer professional magazine or periodical than the GAZETTE. I look forward to its arrival each month. Apart from its military value, it serves as a link with a Corps which we Australian soldiers respect and admire, and in which we made many close friends both in the Pacific and in Korea. May it continue to prosper.

Maj F. J. Ahern

3dInfBn
Royal New South Wales Regt
Hill St., Leichhardt
N.S.W., Australia

Consent and Advise

. . . I wholeheartedly agree with Maj Davis' statement in his two-part article *How to Build Up the "2"*: "the intelligence officer has become increasingly more important [and] must be one of the best trained battalion staff members." However, we part company on his suggested method of achieving this goal. His recommendation that the S-2 be eliminated as a separate staff member and the intelligence function be combined with operations under one staff member, the S-3/2, could only result in a totally inadequate intelligence effort and a loss of tactical efficiency as well.

Instead, if I were a battalion commander who thought that intelligence and the S-2 were important I'd do this:

1) Keep the young lieutenant with the rifle platoon where he belongs and assign a "number one" captain, preferably a Junior School graduate, as the S-2.

2) If necessary, make it clear to the S-3 (who Maj Davis says pretty much runs the battalion in the field) that he should confine his efforts to his own job and let me take care of the other staff sections.

3) Finally, start using the S-2 and his section.

An entire article could be written on ways to realistically employ the S-2 section in battalion level training.

This method of building up the "2" requires no change in T/O or TE. If changes are required, some of Capt Kelly's could be tried. (*Moment of Truth*, GAZETTE: Oct 60) Yes, let's build up the "2"—not annihilate him!

Maj B. B. DeWitt

USNA
Annapolis, Md.

No Russian Marines

. . . I fear Maj Roe, my predecessor in Moscow, is talking through his *furashka* in his September MESSAGE CENTER letter.

I have on my desk a copy of *Morskaya Pekhota*, the book he cites as authority for his statement that "Russian Marines are already a force in being." This book is a history of the Soviet naval infantry through WWII; nowhere is there any reference to a present day Soviet naval infantry organization.

I also have on my desk a copy of the Soviet Naval Dictionary published in Moscow in 1959. Under "naval infantry" are these unequivocal comments: "A special type of troops in foreign armed forces. In the Soviet armed forces, the naval infantry has existed as a special arm in the Navy, designated, in the main, for utilization in amphibious landings; this arm has been abolished."

Col L. J. Dulacki

Rewriting the Manual

. . . Having just received October GAZETTE and being in involved in testing M60 MG and M14 rifle with new T/Os and TEs, I read with interest your article "New M60 MG—How to Fire It."

Information on position and grip is not completely correct. I fired over 200 rounds left handed from prone, sitting, kneeling and off-hand positions with no difficulty. Other southpaws found this to be true.

Portsiders will also find the M14 rifle much easier to load than the M1.

2dLt R. J. Driver, Jr.

C/1/4
1stMarBrig

Ed: Our source was FM 23-67. Lt Driver's experiences with M60 MG again proves Marines are able to successfully "rewrite" field manuals in the field.

Flat and Neat—And Hard

. . . Thanks to a cartoon appearing on Page MCA-12 in the October issue of the GAZETTE my frustration is ended. Too many Marines I have observed over the period of my service, do not know that the buckle, service, *snaps* and thus gives the belt, service, fastened therewith, a *flat* and *neat* appearance.

My sincere appreciation to you and your staff for bringing this little known contribution to Marines who strive to present a neat and soldierly appearance.

Maj G. T. Dixon

1stMarDiv (Rein)
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Ed: Now does anyone know how to make the new, narrow belt fit the old, wide buckle? (We need more cartoon ideas.)

Killing the Enemy

. . . A hearty "Amen" to Col West and Capt Smith for their timely article *To Kill the Enemy* (GAZETTE: Oct '60). For any Marine who has had experience in live firing combat ranges, the positive results prove the argument. Varied courses excite imagination, inspire motivation, build team play, and add necessary spice to our training schedules.

I completely agree with the authors in all respects but please don't place sea-going Marines in the category of post and station Marines. Our training schedules are loaded with combat infantry subjects; we organize and train ship's landing parties and are ever ready to carry our flag ashore in distant corners of the globe.

And we have in our armories a full package of infantry weapons ready to use.

Let us in on this program for live firing training ranges, too!

Capt J. C. Hergert

CO, MD
USS Independence
FPO, New York

Jungle Patrols

. . . October GAZETTE is superior to many previous issues. Of particular interest was *To Kill the Enemy*. I wholeheartedly agree with the authors, Col West and Capt Smith. Having sreved the past 21 months as an infantry platoon commander I feel a dire need for more emphasis on live firing.

Also of interest was the article by Maj Meyers on jungle patrols. Our unit recently received training by an Army Special Forces unit on jungle patrols and guerrilla warfare which was very similar to the text of the article.

1stLt J. W. Scott

C/1/7 3dMarDiv
FPO, San Francisco

Would Dan Care?

. . . In the November issue of the GAZETTE, page 28, was an excellent write-up and invitation to become an active member of MCA.

I picked up my shears, started to clip the coupon. As you were! On the reverse page was that outstanding article *Dan Daly —Reluctant Hero*. I am reluctant to destroy that article or any other article in the GAZETTE. I have taken time to reproduce the application blank and am forwarding it herewith.

Others may not be able to or willing to take this time so I would suggest that future issues carry application blanks placed so that they could be clipped without destroying contents of magazine.

GySgt D. M. Bruce

CWTC, Bridgeport, Calif.

Ed: Hmm, who snaffled the postpaid application card out of that Troop copy? Hereafter, we're putting in a card in triplicate. Your unit representative also has applications.

Present and Accounted For

. . . It seems to me they always name ships after states, counties, dead heroes or great names of the past. Why not name a few after great names of the present? I can appreciate that there were great names in our past, but why not give the same respect and honor to some of those that are still living?

SSgt P. F. Johnson

ASD Bn, 1stFSR
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Keeping the Troops Happy

. . . My troops do read your magazine;
From November issue got a laugh
For on page 15 in boldface type
Their top sergeant is a "Staff"

P.S. The important thing is that my correct rank did appear on the check.

1stSgt L. R. Anderson

MB, USNAS
Brunswick, Maine



Sixty-four fully equipped paratroopers can jump from the C-130 Hercules' two aft side doors in 32 seconds. Heavy equipment drops can be made with pin-point accuracy from the huge 9-foot by 10-foot rear door.

20 tons of critical military cargo can be loaded or unloaded in 40 seconds, using Lockheed's Lightning Loader system. This time-saving feature of the giant C-130 assures maximum airlift in minimum time.



The increasing importance of AIRLIFT

Even in peacetime, airlift plays a vital role in supporting our missile bases, airborne combat forces, and strategic and tactical operations throughout the world. In wartime, the airlift burden would increase a hundredfold. America's airlift capacity must keep pace with other top-priority projects so that it can provide the support needed to keep them in operational readiness.

Three years of world-wide service with the U. S. Air Force have demonstrated conclusively that the Lockheed C-130 prop-jet HERCULES transport will provide the most Jet Age airlift per dollar.

LOCKHEED GEORGIA

WORLD HEADQUARTERS FOR AIRLIFTERS AND CARGOLOADERS

The Extension School's CHALLENGE

BASIC SCHOOL LEVEL

1 In a *night* withdrawal, the portion of the "covering force" left in contact by the frontline platoon usually consists of:

a. The center squad of the platoon.
b. The squad which can best cover the entire platoon front from its present position.
c. One squad.
d. Automatic weapons which are attached for that purpose.

2 Control of the combat outpost is preferably delegated to the:

a. Reserve company commander.
b. Reserve battalion commander.
c. Frontline battalion commander.
d. Frontline regimental commander.

3 The organization of fires of the frontline rifle platoon always includes assignment of a principal direction of fire to:

a. Each automatic rifle.
b. Each crew served weapon.
c. Squads and fire teams.
d. Only those weapons covering gaps in final protective lines.

JUNIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

4 The responsibility for the breaching of obstacles on that portion of a beach which lies between the mean high water mark and the mean low water mark is:

a. Assigned to the Navy underwater demolition teams.
b. Assigned to landing force pioneer/engineer units.
c. Assigned to landing force reconnaissance units.
d. Resolved during the planning phase of the operation by the landing force and amphibious task force commanders.

5 Divisions/Wings and higher echelons normally summarize the intelligence situation daily in the form of the:

a. Unit Report.
b. Intelligence Annex.
c. Intelligence Estimate.
d. Periodic Intelligence Report.

6 Counterintelligence objectives are:

a. Denial and deception.
b. Reconnaissance and observation.
c. Propaganda and counterpropaganda.
d. Espionage and sabotage.

7 Commanders expect their intelligence officers to

a. Collect information by evaluation and interpretation.
b. Exploit all available sources and agencies.
c. Disseminate information in accordance with collection plan.
d. Keep them up to date on the latest enemy intentions.

SENIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

8 The decision to change a landing zone, when it involves a major approach route change, is usually made:

a. At landing force level.
b. By the helicopter transport unit commander.
c. By the commander of the helicopter-borne troop unit.
d. By the helicopter wave commander.

9 When, if ever, may the responsibility for the control of naval gunfire be passed to the Landing Force Commander?

a. When adequate facilities for control are established ashore.
b. When the assault commences.
c. The responsibility for the control of naval gunfire can never be passed to the landing force commander.
d. When the landing force commander and his staff are displaced ashore.
e. When the landing force is established ashore.

(Answers on page 62)

WHY NOT

Keep up to date?—You get the latest Marine Corps Schools texts when you are enrolled in *The Extension Course Program.*

THE SPEED OF A PHANTOM

** This record was formerly claimed by a Russian T-405 at 1298.7 mph.*

*** This record was formerly held by a McDonnell RF-101C at 8103 mph.*

The true value of a *combat* aircraft lies in the ability to *maneuver* at high speeds. On September 25 a Phantom II, piloted by Navy Commander John F. Davis, set a 100 km world closed-course record of 1390 mph * flying a circular path less than 20 miles in diameter. On September 5 a Phantom II, piloted by Marine Lt. Col. Thomas H. Miller, set a 500 km closed-course record of 1216 mph ** flying a triangular course 310 miles in length.

Setting these records requires a much higher straight-line speed capability. Military security permits only the statement that maximum speed for the Phantom II is "in excess of 1500 mph."

MCDONNELL

PHANTOM II AND F-101 FIGHTER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT • ROTORCRAFT • QUAIL DECOY MISSILES • TALOS AIRFRAMES AND PROPULSION SYSTEMS • PROJECT MERCURY SPACE CAPSULES • ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS • AUTOMATION

MCDONNELL AIRCRAFT • ST. LOUIS

POLARIS AND THE



"By 1970 the control of the sea is going to determine whether the free alliance will continue to exist. If the Free World does not control the sea, and use it, and can use it, the Communists will win. . . .If we haven't taken the premium out of the surprise attack by 1970 . . . we have not done our job."

VAdm John T. Hayward, USN
Deputy CNO (Development):
Testimony before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, March 16, 1960.

NORTH FLANK

By George Fielding Eliot

A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE basic concept of American national strategy is in the making. It is a change based on dawning realization of the overwhelming advantages which, in the nuclear age, are inherent in control of the sea. From that dawnlight over the Atlantic will presently appear the first rays of the sunshine of confidence renewed, dissolving the fog of confusion and latent defeatism in which we and our friends have wandered unhappily since the first shock of realization that the Soviet Union had broken our "monopoly" of nuclear weapons.

Our present discontent arises from our instinctive realization that, as the late Gen Malin Craig wrote in his last report as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939, "time is the one military commodity which can be irrevocably lost." We have an uneasy sense – and far too many people in other parts of the world have joined us in that anxiety – that the Soviet Union may be moving into a position of commanding superiority in nuclear-armed missiles, and that we may not have time to "catch up before the Soviets will be able to destroy our capability for nuclear retaliation in one surprise holocaust. Certainly the esteemed Mr. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev has done his best to assure us of the validity of this forecast, with a bouncy confidence that suggests that he believes it himself. The entire edifice of Soviet aggressive policy has this military concept – which amounts to nuclear blackmail – as its military cornerstone. Under the shield of nuclear threat, the gradual expansion of the Communist empire by peripheral enterprises and by subversion, even in the most distant parts of the world, supported by Soviet weapons, economic warfare and exported personnel, is foreshadowed. Among our allies as among the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa – some of them newly introduced to the unaccustomed responsibilities of independence—there is a growing doubt of American ability to resist the Communist colossus. This belief lies at the root of the troubles which have beset our foreign policy in recent years. We do not suffer from diminished prestige and from loss of confidence in our policies because of the U-2, or the Tokyo incident, or the Suez affair, or the alleged shortcomings of our information, or foreign aid policies, anywhere nearly as much as because of the deepening shadow of doubt of our military power and therefore of our national will (or ability) to stand firm against future challenge. This [illegible] students who r[illegible] ects of Tokyo a[illegible] ntual defense treaty may [illegible] had Communist leadership [illegible]



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the time-honored combination of fire and movement, with unchallengeable control of the sea as its pivotal element.

Control Factors for the '60's

During the critical decade of the 1960's, we shall find ourselves establishing and maintaining control of the sea, and using this control:

- To "take the premium out of surprise attack" by the deployment at sea of mobile nuclear weapons systems under conditions which deny the Soviet leadership any rational hope of escaping devastating retaliation should they embark upon nuclear war;
- To provide capabilities for swift, effective reaction to limited Communist initiatives in any part of the world, and for the pursuance of limited initiatives of our own devising; and
- To deny the Communist states the use of the sea for military or other purposes which threaten the security of the Free World.

In implementing this strategy, both time and geography are overwhelmingly on our side.

Geography Widens Our Lead

We have a very long lead indeed over the Soviets in the development of modern sea-weapons and techniques—notably in nuclear-powered submarines (both missile-firing and attack types), attack aircraft carrier forces, and our Navy-Marine amphibious warfare team. We have a long backlog of experience, too—indeed the Russian Navy has never fought a truly oceanic war. The flag and general officers of our Navy and Marine Corps today are men who held responsible rank in the greatest oceanic war of modern times. The Soviet Navy cannot produce one officer who has commanded at any level in any naval action of wider scope than a coastal or minelaying operation in Baltic or Black Sea waters. This alone is an advantage for us of transcendent proportions.

The facts of geography also urge us toward a sea-based strategy. One of the most notable geographic facts about the Soviet Union is its severely limited access to open water. (See map next page) Of its four widely separated maritime frontiers, unrestricted all-year access to oceanic areas is available chiefly from the bases of the Murmansk-Severomorsk complex on the Arctic Ocean, through stormy seas lying between the variable southern limits of the Arctic pack-ice and the northern shores of Europe. The exits of the Baltic and Black Seas are in the hands of states of the North Atlantic Alliance. In the Far East, the exits of the Sea of Japan are controlled by Japan and South Korea, backed by the U. S. 7th Fleet, while weather and ice conditions limit the use of the Soviet bases on the Sea of Okhotsk. Only at Petropavlovsk, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, does the Soviet Union have a continental base



facing the open Pacific—a base that is ice-bound part of the year and further handicapped by having no land supply route.

Well Geared for Shift

There is little comparison between this situation and the magnificent sea-frontiers of North America, Western Europe, and Australia, with their numerous island and peninsular outposts, their well-equipped naval bases in direct contact with industrial resources, and their command of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and of connecting waters such as Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas and the Panama Canal.

Little of this is really new. The factual basis of our advantages at sea is well known, almost taken for granted. In all logic, the very existence of these advantages should long ago have made them the basis of our national strategy. But fundamental decisions of this sort are not quickly or easily reached by our decision-making processes. Perhaps that is just as well; indeed the fact that we are as well prepared as we are for a gradual shift in the direction of a sea-based mobile strategy is a tribute to the instinctive wisdom which has preserved the means for the expression and implementation of diverse opinions within our defense establishment. It is to this that we owe the very substantial lead which we now possess over the Soviet Union in the development of sea-based weapons systems.

An Answer to Red Missile Threats

Much that has been accomplished toward that achievement has passed almost unnoticed by the general public and been given scant attention in the press. Knowledgeable members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress have been stirring for several years with rising appreciation of the virtues of a mobile strategy, and an instinctive distrust of planting fixed targets for enemy nuclear missiles in our homeland—as attentive scanning of the pertinent hearings and reports reveals very clearly. So the money has been made available, and now these years of hard work, patience, and devotion are at last bearing visible fruit.

The logic of marrying nuclear striking power to sea-based mobility will be far more persuasive to public opinion when it is represented by power in being rather than by promises in blueprints. Once that logic is widely accepted as the decisive answer to the Soviet missile threat, the ultimate logic of control of the sea, with all its far-reaching consequences, becomes irresistible.

Control of the sea is, of course, a relative term—both in space and in degree. No naval force that could conceivably be created by the US, or any other power or combination of powers, could possibly exercise day-to-day control of all the seas of the world, covering 70% of the globe's surface. The best that can be done is to possess the capability of establishing zones of control, relative to a given opponent, wherever strategic circumstances may require. Even within the limits of such zones, control of the surface, the air above the surface, and the depths beneath it cannot be total; again, the best that can be done is to establish conditions under which friendly forces



A notable geographic fact about the Soviet Union is its limited access to open water.

can operate effectively, with acceptable risks, while enemy forces can operate, if at all, only under severe handicaps and at maximum risk. A known capability of establishing such conditions in a given sea-area may very well have a deterrent effect on the opposing side as to the possible use of that area in war, and therefore bring into question the development of weapons systems intended to operate there or which must pass that way to reach their operational objectives.

If, therefore, our seapower is to be a credible deterrent upon Soviet actions—either as to launching nuclear war or as to embarking upon limited ventures—we must firmly establish in the minds of the Soviet leadership our capabilities for exercising control of the seas in areas where we would have to operate in war, and of denying the Soviets any prospect of being able either to interfere seriously with such control, or of using the sea elsewhere for counter-moves or diversionary operations.

The calendar years 1961 and 1962 seem likely to be a period of critical importance in this respect—a period in which a new concept of national strategy takes tangible form and acquires stature at home and abroad.

There are several reasons for this:

- Our first Polaris-armed submarines will be at sea, with a due proportion deployed on their patrol stations. During 1961-1962 the total number will rise from two submarines (32 missiles) to at least nine (144 missiles).
- The number of other nuclear-powered submarines with the Fleet will rise to a total of 24 (22 attack, 1 reconnaissance, 1 guided-missile) by the end of 1962. We have done our homework with prototypes; now we start cashing in.
- The nucleus of our first nuclear-powered attack carrier task

group (*Enterprise, Long Beach, Bainbridge*) will also be at sea by the end of 1962. Attack carrier capability will be significantly extended by the commissioning of *Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation,* in 1961, and by deliveries of new aircraft.

• During this period, also, the number of ships armed with surface-to-air missiles will rise to 50: 11 cruisers, 20 frigates, 19 destroyers (besides the two new carriers last named). This marks a very significant rise indeed in the anti-air and anti-submarine defense of carrier task forces, as well as of ASW groups and amphibious forces.

• There will be much wider distribution to the Fleet of new anti-submarine gear which is now just becoming operational.

• Amphibious capabilities will be improved by the commissioning of the third of the new LPDs and the first amphibious assault ship (LPH) to be built as such.

Thus the power, the reach, and the sustained operating capability of the Navy will be markedly increased across the board.

Most important of all will be the deployment of Polaris at sea; for from this will follow not only a rising deterrent capability, but growing recognition of the requirements of our nuclear-age seapower strategy as a whole.

This is directly associated with the need for demonstrating our capability of establishing zones of sea control where they are needed, and of denying them to the enemy.

For the purposes of this discussion, certain assumptions will be predicated for the period under examination (1961-1962):

• The cold war confrontation will continue, with no nuclear war and no large-scale limited conflicts;

• The range of the deployed Polaris missiles will be limited to 1200 nautical miles;

• The Soviet Navy will not have operational nuclear-powered submarines in significant numbers.

The first of these, of course, is pure guesswork; the other two seem justified by available information.

If we are to get any real deterrence out of Polaris, the submarines on station must be assigned cruising areas within reach of sensitive targets in the Soviet Union. These cruising areas should be, ideally, in waters where we or our Allies normally exercise control of the surface and the air above it: i.e., waters where overt Soviet air and surface anti-submarine reconnaissance is not to be expected.

When designated targets cannot be reached from such waters, or can be taken under fire only at extreme range (with consequent disadvantages and uncertainties) the missile submarine may have to use evasion and concealment to operate in enemy-controlled or disputed sea areas.

Without trying to second-guess the target-designators, let us consider a list of *conceivable* Soviet targets and the areas from which a 1200-mile Polaris could reach them:

Target and Its Characteristics

Moscow—Capital; communications; industry

Leningrad—Naval base; ship and submarine yards

Gorky—Principal submarine-building yards

Sverdlovsk—Major heavy industry; missiles



Stalino—Major heavy industry

Magnitogorsk—Major heavy industry

Aral Sea region—Missile experimental center

Murmansk-Severomorsk—Naval base Northern Fleet

Baku—Oil production; industry; submarine training

Novosibirsk—Major heavy industry

Now let us consider the sea-areas from which these targets can be attacked by missiles with a range of 1200 nautical miles:

Target and Attack Areas

Moscow—Norwegian Sea; *off North Cape.*

Leningrad—*Norwegian Sea;* off North Cape.

Gorky—Norwegian Sea; *off North Cape.*

Sverdlovsk—Off North Cape (x); *Barents Sea*

Stalino—Eastern Mediterranean

Magnitogorsk—Barents Sea.

Aral Sea region—North end of Persian Gulf (x).

Murmansk-Severomorsk—*Norwegian Sea*; Atlantic Ocean outside barrier; Arctic ice area.

Baku—Eastern Mediterranean; *Persian Gulf.*

Novosibirsk—Kara Sea, close in (x).

Italicized attack area is closest to target. (x) Extreme range.

Study of this table indicates that several of these tentative targets (and others in their general vicinity) can best be reached by Polaris missiles from the Norwegian Sea and from the Arctic reaches between North Cape and Spitsbergen. Penetration of the Barents Sea and even of the Kara Sea is necessary in a few cases. Targets which can best be reached from the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf add up to something less in apparent detterrent weight than those which can be attacked from northern waters. It should be added that several of the latter (Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky) can be reached also from the Skaggerak and the North Sea; but waters where so great a density and diversity of traffice is normally encountered may be considered undesirable for the cold-war deployment of Polaris submarines.

Thus the Norwegian Sea and at least the western approaches to the Barents Sea become sea-areas of enhanced interest to us. They also become sea-areas of enhanced interest to the Soviet Union.

The almost pathological reaction of the Soviet leadership to the presence of American fixed air and missile bases near their land frontiers does not suggest that they are likely to accept calmly the presence of American sea-based nuclear weapons near their sea frontiers. They will seek diligently for effective countermeasures, both physical and psychological. As against our land bases, they have already created a very substantial armament of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, capable of taking most of our fixed overseas bases under surprise attack. It is for this reason, among others, that we are seeking relative immunity for our deterrent weapons against ballistic missile surprise by making use of the mobility and concealment enjoyed by sea-based systems.



We would, however, be guilty of seriously under-rating Soviet capabilities if we imagine that all we have to do is to send our Polaris-armed submarines to sea and depend thereafter solely on their qualities of evasion and concealment for their continued security against attack. These are valuable qualities indeed, but we can hardly afford to allow the Soviets to find comfort in an undisturbed and unthreatened search for the right counter-measures. The result of that would be a gradual erosion of the Polaris deterrent factor as the diligent Soviet technologists acquired more and more information and developed more and better ASW systems, while the Soviet leaders began to comfort themselves with the happy assurance that all they would have to do is to locate and track X number of submarines, all alone and unsupported in waters where the Soviets can control the surface of the sea and the air above it without let or hindrance.

The Soviets have, of course, seen the Polaris threat coming for several years. The nature of some of their counter-measures is fairly apparent by this time. They include:

- Intensive development of their ASW capabilities. ASW was once the orphan child of the Soviet Navy, since there was little reason to suppose that our torpedo-armed submarines would be any special threat to a country which, in war, would not be particularly dependent on sea-borne traffic. Submarines armed with 1200-mile ballistic missiles are something else again. Their ASW teams are, however, short-legged, as they have no carriers and must depend for their air element on shore-based planes. Destroyers, patrol craft and conventionally-powered submarines they have in plenty, and they can be counted on to make maximum use of mines—their best-

developed naval capability – wherever conditions permit.

• Increased interest—almost feverish, from some accounts, during the last year or two—in amphibious warfare. This suggests that they may be thinking of limited operations to extend their base system in northern waters by establishing themselves in such places as northern Norway, Iceland, or the western coast of Spitsbergen. This would greatly extend the scope of their ASW teams and minecraft, and would give them increased capabilities for contesting the control of the Norwegian Sea.

• Widespread covert activities by merchant ships, fishing vessels and submarines. Reconnaissance and hydrographic exploration may be the current missions of these elements, but readiness to carry out amphibious or mine-laying missions without warning cannot be ruled out. For example, the constant presence of large numbers of Soviet fishing craft off the Lofoten Islands, on the northwest coast of Norway, brings clearly into view what might happen if, one day, such an "innocent" fishing fleet might suddenly disgorge a load of 150 or 200 fully-armed Soviet soldiers per smack on the Norwegian coast. The highly competent job of mine-laying done in the harbor of Wonsan, Korea, by harmless-looking North Korean sampans, also ostensibly engaged in fishing, is another reminder of the possibilities; more recent nudges come from the cutting of the Atlantic cable off Newfoundland by a Soviet trawler, and from the presence of other Soviet trawlers off Long Island during the recent sea-trials of USS *George Washington*, our first Polaris submarine. The increase during the last year or so of unidentified submarine contacts in widely separated locations suggests that the Soviets may have embarked on a deliberate policy of keeping an increasing proportion of their long-range submarines constantly far out at sea, so they could produce a sudden concentration of offensive force without warning. They are of course well aware that any massive sortie of submarines from Murmansk toward the North Atlantic would be detected, and be a tip-off of offensive intentions.

• A constant barrage of threats and propaganda, with the plain object of disrupting the western alliance system by playing on the fears and anxieties of the peoples concerned, and imbuing them with doubts as to the reliability of American power as a deterrent of Soviet aggression. None of this is aimless. An immediate Soviet objective appears to be to frighten host countries into restricting the operational use of our overseas bases, as exemplified by Soviet threats at the time of the U-2 affair and after the shooting down in July 1960 of an American RB-47 over the Barents Sea. Another significant move was Khrushchev's declaration that Austrian neutrality would be considered violated if US missiles fired from Italy passed over Austrian territory. One has only to consider the geographical position of Sweden in connection with possible Polaris firing positions to see how this Soviet definition of neutrality could be applied in the hope of producing Swedish anti-Polaris

protests. Meanwhile the loud noises of Mr. K. regarding Soviet intent to support the Castro revolution in Cuba against American "imperialism" are doubtless meant, among other purposes, to impress all listeners with the length of the Soviet arm and Soviet willingness to challenge the US right in its own backyard.

If we are to have an effective sea-based deterrent force we must do more than merely deploy our Polaris submarines in the proper places. The next two years are likely to be a trial period in more senses than one. During those years the Norwegian Sea and adjacent waters will almost surely be a crucial maritime area. We must establish a capability for exercising control of those waters and of denying them to the enemy—always in those relative terms in which control of the sea can alone be seriously considered.

It must be made clear, not only to the Soviets but to our friends and our own folks at home, that we are maintaining a constant position of readiness in the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, from which we can swiftly and effectively develop whatever type of operation circumstances may require in and beyond the Norwegian Sea.

The instrument of this posture of readiness seems certain to be the Second Fleet; it is surely not mere coincidence that has caused this Fleet to be raised to full operational status as of July 1, 1960, with continuous command over all Atlantic Fleet ships suitable for operation with attack carrier forces and not undergoing overhaul or otherwise assigned. Its commander wears a NATO hat also, as commander under SACLANT of the Striking Fleet Atlantic, which essentially is the Second Fleet plus a British carrier strike group. It should, however, be noted that coordination with and support of the Polaris submarines is not a NATO responsibility in time of peace.

Suppose the mission of the Second Fleet—as a US force under CINCLANT command but with full recognition of its SACLANT responsibilities—is defined as including:

• Establishment of a capability for immediate reaction against any Soviet military enterprise—amphibious, mine-laying, ASW or whatever—in the Norwegian or Greenland Seas or the western approaches to the Barents Sea: including specific task force operations and exercises in these waters on occasion;

• Maximum possible protection and support of Polaris submarines deployed in northern waters;

• Cooperation according to plan with ASW forces engaged in containing or observing Soviet submarine activities;

• Establishment of a capability for all-out offensive operations in and beyond the Norwegian Sea, including use of carrier task forces for nuclear attack against designated targets—coordinated with Polaris operations according to the established target assignments.

Fulfilment of this mission would seem to require the continual presence in the northeastern Atlantic Ocean of a task force built around at least two attack carriers, with all necessary supporting elements in-

cluding an amphibious group (with an FMF component) and an ASW group.

But the north flank cannot be the only responsibility of the Second Fleet. It must also be capable of quickly supporting the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, or of meeting emergencies which may arise in, say, the Caribbean or the South Atlantic —as we are reminded while these words are being written by what is happening in Cuba and the Congo. Thus too much of the Second Fleet's strength cannot be permanently deployed in the northeastern Atlantic if a position of full readiness to meet any emergency within the scope of Atlantic Command's responsibility is to be maintained.

The Heart of the Fleet

Clearly the Commander Second Fleet needs two task forces—one for the northeastern Atlantic with primary responsibility for the mission above described, but available for emergency needs elsewhere; the other to remain more centrally located where it can be ready either to reinforce the north flank or perform any other required mission.

The heart of the second Fleet's sea-control capability will be its attack carrier striking groups. Existing limitations on operating strength allow six carriers (CVAs) for the Atlantic-Mediterranean area and eight for the Pacific. Allowing two for deployment to the Mediterranean and one undergoing overhaul or carrying out training exercises, this allows an average Second Fleet strength of only three CVAs: which means that one of its two task forces can have only one attack carrier. Without going into details of carrier operations, it is enough to mention the well-known carrier formula that two attack carriers working together are not just twice, but about four times as operationally efficient as a single carrier.

There is just one prospect of increasing the number of CVAs on active service during the next two years. This is to lift the operational ceiling and retain in service as attack carriers the three modernized Essex-class carriers which would otherwise be transferred to anti-submarine (CVS) configuration during 1961-1962 as the new *Kitty Hawk*, *Constellation* and *Enterprise* join the Fleet. The Second Fleet could then have an average available strength of five CVAs—two or three in each task force, a far more desirable situation. Additional aircraft would have to be ordered to provide the extra CVAs with air groups; pending delivery of new planes, a temporary expedient might be found in using a proportion of Marine Corps squadrons aboard these carriers. This would have the additional advantage of providing more efficient air support in emergencies requiring the use of landing forces; however, it would seem to require restoration of the recent cuts in the overall strength of the 2d MAW in order not to reduce the available level of combat air power at Cherry Point below acceptable limits.

Also, if an embarked FMF component is going to be required with the Second Fleet's north flank task force—as seems desirable to provide for swift reaction against (or deterrence of) any attempt by the Soviets to expand their present rather unfavorable base situation in the critical northern area under examination—then plainly the 2d Marine Division must go back to its full complement of nine BLTs. It would certainly be wise, in addition, to trv to negotiate with the Icelandic government for the return to Keflavik Air Force base of the infantry battalion of the Army recently withdrawn from that station. If this cannot be done at present, there is all the more need to have a Marine unit close at hand.

The operational concepts which will govern the activities and eventually the composition of the Second Fleet will naturally be developed through experience, including the reactions of the opponent. In the beginning, for example, the normal operating area of the north flank task force may well be the northeastern Atlantic Ocean up to the anti-submarine barrier zone along the line Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-Orkneys. Task units of varied composition may operate from time to time, for specific purposes, in and even beyond the Norwegian Sea. Only time can determine whether there is sound reason for the continuous presence of US surface forces in that sea—or whether the demonstration that they can get there quickly if required will serve all practical needs.

Polaris Deployment—Its Problems

The occasion for having to face these new requirements and establish new operational capabilities now is the Polaris deployment, which may well develop into our chief reliance for deterrence of nuclear surprise attack. This in itself presents problems that are complex enough. Adm Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, said in a statement recently submitted to a Congressional committee:

"In any area of the ocean where FBM submarines operate . . . . US and allied forces operating in the area must be carefully and continually coordinated. There must be defense against enemy action—including enemy submarines. The selection of operating areas must be carefully integrated with knowledge of friendly forces and intelligence of enemy forces. The system of havens and sanctuaries necessary to prevent mutual interference and insure safety is both intricate and important. . . . Further, the operational activity, on station assignment, and logistic support for these ships must

Mr Eliot, is a noted lecturer, military analyst and author. He has lectured at well known military schools such as US Naval War College, and Command and General Staff College; written articles for US Naval Institute Proceedings, Life, Look, Army Military Review, etc.; and published his first novel, "Caleb Pettengills, USN," in '56. Mr Eliot also writes a syndicated column, "The Military Scene" (30 daily newspapers).

be detailed and expertly coordinated. Logistic support of the submarines, sailing routes, support in case of casualty or malfunction of equipage while in operating area and return transit are some of the considerations which . . . . involve coordination with other similar ships and, as a practical matter, with all fleet elements."

In presenting this statement to the Congressmen, Adm Burke was making a case—to this writer's mind, an unchallengeable and self-evident one—for control of Polaris submarines by the naval commander whose overall responsibility includes their area of operations, instead of—as has been suggested in other quarters—by some sort of special "strategic" commander, or even by the Strategic Air Command of the Air Force. In making this case, the Admiral has however presented sufficient detail to make another point very plain indeed: the extension of naval responsibility and activity required for support of and coordination with the deterrent Polaris force cannot be just a question of local superiority; it involves control of adjacent waters, especially the approaches to Polaris operating areas.

It has already been pointed out that the Second Fleet, as the main offensive striking force of the Atlantic Command, cannot be wholly committed to north flank security; yet that security depends to some extent on the flexibility inherent in naval forces, so that the whole force of the Second Fleet can be made available in that sector if necessary. Sea-control in those far northern waters rests finally on sea-control in the North Atlantic Ocean as a whole. The Second Fleet represents the positive element by which that sea-control is exercised. But the challenge of hostile submarines in the North Atlantic must be countered by defensive measures of which the Antisubmarine Defense Force Atlantic (ASDEFORLANT) is the embodiment. The challenge of hostile land forces (and/or subversive activities directed toward military expansion) must be countered by readiness of the Fleet Marine Force and the Amphibious Force to react effectively. The challenge of hostile mine-laying must be countered by constantly improving our mine counter-measure capabilities—and so on.

All these elements of seapower are interdependent. The Fleet Marine Force, for example, cannot react against a Soviet landing in a Norwegian fjord unless the Second Fleet (and ASDEFORLANT) can see that it gets there; but all the gun, missile and air power of the Second Fleet may well be unable to dislodge or destroy that Soviet landing force, once it is ashore, without the coordinated efforts of the Marines. The Mine Force cannot clear an Icelandic harbor of mines unless protected against Soviet air interference by carrier planes; but the carrier cannot use the harbor until the Mine Force has done its job. We are here using the terms of active war; in the deterrent phase, the visible ability to do all these jobs, to do everything necessary to establish and maintain sea superiority in a critical area, adds up to the highest obtainable measure of total deterrence.



Obvious deficiency in any component of this total may open an escape-hatch in the enemy's calculations and impair the validity of the whole.

It has been pointed out by military students that the German success in Norway in 1940 was in large measure due to a single British shortcoming—their failure to develop the Royal Marines into a powerful, integrated Fleet Marine Force with adequate air support. This is doubtless true; it is also doubtless true that the existence of such a force ready to intervene in Norway might have deterred the Germans from the undertaking altogether—the balance of risk against advantage was delicately poised as it was. From another viewpoint, it might have enabled the British to get there first; the length of time required to make ready an Army landing force was one reason the British decision on Norway hung fire so long.

Political as well as military decisions are frequently affected by the visibility of one or another pertinent circumstance. It is not a simple matter to present a well-rounded military policy in all its complexity to the attention of the American public, any more than it is a simple matter to persuade all elements of our official decision-making processes that it would be a good idea to raise the personnel level of the Marine Corps to 225,000, or to provide eight hunter-killer groups for ASDEFORLANT instead of two, or to cut back on fixed-base ballistic missiles in favor of sea-based weapons—desirable and even essential as all these suggestions may appear to those directly concerned with the relevant problems.

What is here suggested is simply that the idea of the Polaris submarine-mounted missile as a deterrent does appear to have caught the public imagination, because of its obvious advantages: (a) of relative invulnerability to surprise destruction, and (b) of not attracting hostile nuclear attack to populated home territory. As reliance on Polaris as our main nuclear deterrent increases, the measures needed to insure its safe deployment and effective operation will become more "visible" to the public eye. Since these measures, in the final analysis, lead us directly to a policy of sea-control, such a policy becomes not only intellectually arguable, but politically and financially feasible. The manifold advantages of a sea-control strategy, going far beyond the realm of nuclear deterrence (though founded upon it, will then in turn gradually become visible and will take root in the popular consciousness. Implementation of these advantages in terms of weapons, vehicles, equipment, and above all trained personnel, thus becomes virtually assured.

The next two years may well be the trial-and-error period for a new American strategy which can, in its full flowering, bring the free world out of the wilderness of uncertainty in which we now wander. USMC

Five European NATO nations will produce the U. S. Army Hawk missile as the primary ground-to-air defense weapon in Western Europe. Raytheon, developer and prime contractor in the U.S. for the Hawk, is supplying technical assistance to manufacturers selected by these NATO countries.

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EXCELLENCE IN ELECTRONICS

WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT DRILL

By Lt James W. Rider



THROUGHOUT THE MARINE CORPS, officers and men alike complain about drill. "It's difficult," they say. "It isn't doing the job . . . it's a waste of time." And in many outfits this criticism is all too true.

Too many of us look for a cure in another "new" drill, or in the abolition of one of our present systems. Blame is foisted on the eight, nine, and 13-man squad drills. Granted, these drills do have their shortcomings. The real fault, however, lies elsewhere.

Drill has a long history. It evolved from the days when a unit was maneuvered in battle much the same way as a naval vessel. Neither discipline nor the intricate parade-ground maneuvers were then manifestations of pomp or military ritual. Both were functional necessities dictated by the weapons and technologies of that day.

But times have changed and so have weapons. The machine gun did away with straight battle lines and combat formations in which troops dressed right "come hell or high water." And the dispersion and flexibility made necessary by automatic weapons has been multiplied, squared, and remultiplied by the threat of nuclear warfare.

But today's drill is basically unchanged. It is a pre-machine gun type drill which, if used on a modern battlefield, would spell suicide. Why, then, is it still employed on the parade ground?

The book lists several reasons. As far as the 20th century Marine Corps is concerned, however, there is only one . . . the purpose of close order drill is the inculcation of discipline.

Drill—A Habit

Drill is habit-training. The idea behind it is to create an automatic response to given stimuli. The stimuli in this instance are orders. The response is immediate obedience to those orders. This theoretically provides a basic training situation from which immediate response to drill orders can be widened until unwavering obedience becomes the response to any sensible, lawful order.

There is little direct carry-over from the parade ground to the battlefield, however, because of their complete difference. Just because a man obeys the command "forward, march," does not mean he will move into enemy fire when someone says, "move out." But if parade ground habits are steadily reinforced in other situations, there will be a progressive carry-over of parade ground discipline until the Marine will (ideally) follow any order given, under any condition. This habit will carry over from the parade ground, to the police detail, to the field exercise, to a hundred different situations, and eventually to the battlefield. In short, parade ground discipline alone is not sufficient training for war. But it can provide the foundation needed for more complex disciplinary training.

Because habit, once impressed into a subject, is difficult to eradicate, we must instill only correct habits. Poorly performed drill instills bad habits of indiscipline and inaccuracy—habits we are trying to erase through drill, not reinforce.

Two things have changed since the era when troops fought in company mass formations, and executed right turns and left wheels under fire. One is the idea of battle as influenced by weapons, formations, maneuvers, etc. The other is the idea of drill. Anyone watching many

non-boot camp Marine unit drill today would laugh at its "discipline." In some units conversation is carried on by men marching next to each other—whenever the unit is out of earshot of its officers and NCO's. Men scratch their heads, spit in ranks, and horse around while they march. Even those who are capable of a really sharp performance are guilty.

Lt Rider is convinced "most Marines get little out of drill." The graduate of Cornell Univ, a sport parachuting enthusiast, gives some down to earth comments on the subject. His article, "Your Troops Want Better Training" (GAZETTE: Mar '60), was the Class IV GAZETTE Essay Contest Winner for '59. Commissioned via PLC in June '60, he is now PltCmdr, 2dPlt, L/3/8, 8th MEU. Also see MCO 1500.13A.

Discipline is the Point

These discrepancies are flagrant throughout the Marine Corps and the reasons are obvious. While paying lip service to the inculcation of discipline through drill, we have generally ignored this aspect of it. We concentrate instead on precision in the execution aspect of marching. To some this might seem to be the same thing. But it isn't. We drill our troops to instill self and group discipline, and to build teamwork. A Marine must be able to keep himself from talking, yawning, scratching his ear, or committing other little deviations from what is prescribed. This is where discipline enters in. The amount of snap an individual displays in doing a squads right has little to do with it. The former involves discipline; the latter, ability to learn a simple movement. We aren't trying to teach our men how to perform the various movements in drill. We're trying to teach them discipline. Performing every movement correctly is only a very small part of this discipline. A man may be able to execute every movement in the drill book with snap and precision, but he isn't worth a damn if he goofs off when your back is turned.

This discipline and indiscipline doesn't end on the parade field. It can be carried over, eventually, right into combat. The joker who has to brush that fly off his nose while drilling is the same one who will have a cigarette when the smoking lamp is out. The man who bop steps around a pivot point will be the same man who blows himself up with a booby-trap. The guy who talks in ranks may very well give your position away some night in combat.

Drill—With Combat Formations

This is what's wrong with our drill. We have neglected the most important aspect of it. We have concentrated on what shows at parades, inspections, and drill competitions. Maybe we're more interested in our own fitness reports than in the men we're readying for war. A Marine who never took a step in drill would be better off than one who has learned all of the tragic little indisciplines we reinforce through poorly disciplined drill.

Many Marines still dislike squad drill. But there's a reason for it. Squad drill bridges the gap between the parade field and the battlefield a little better than LPM drill. NCO's within the ranks give commands. Each individual must master his particular movements. He can't follow the man in front of him or daydream. But squad drill is so complex that the confused troops make more mistakes, thereby causing greater indiscipline and inaccuracy.

About six dozen people (maybe more) have a solution to this, a solution they think is completely original. Maybe you've even thought along these lines yourself. The solution incorporates a drill system in which units march in basic combat formations and execute changes to other combat formations. Troops would march in Columns, Wedges, Skirmish Lines, and in Echelon. A typical command would be:

"1. SQUAD COLUMN, FIRE TEAM WEDGE. 2. MARCH."

This drill, conducted at the fire team and squad level, would have all the advantages of eight-man squad drill. It would use the same

Drill was once important in battle



Why is the present drill still used on the parade ground?

formations used in battle, making those formations part of the individual Marine's "second nature." Such drill would eliminate the confusion that often occurs when switching from one formation to another. Deploying from a Column to a Line would be easier and more familiar than doing a Left Turn.

Due to space limitations the drill would be conducted with less distance and interval than would be used in the field. Troops would have to dress and cover more than they would in the same formaation in combat. The unit would march in step at normal cadence. After troops became more proficient at all levels of the drill, it could be conducted at double-time and, if room permitted, at more extended interval and distance.

The drill would be conducted at fire team and squad levels. Fire team drill would consist of

(1) Skirmishers Right (Left) into Wedge, Column, Echelon Right (left) and Skirmishers Left (Right).

(2) Column to Skirmishers Right (Left), Echelon Right (Left), and Wedge.

(3) Wedge to Column, Skirmishers Right (Left), Echelon Right (Left).

(4) Echelon Right (Left) to Skirmishers Right (Left), Wedge, and Column.

Squad drill would include these same formations and movements, plus additional movements to the "V" formations. Fire teams could drill in formations different from the squads. For example, a squad could be formed on a line, with all the fire teams in a wedge formation; or the squad could be in a wedge with the first fire team in echelon right, the second fire team in a wedge, and the third fire team in echelon left.

This is only a "Why don't you?" idea—an attempt to meet a problem. You might use this idea the next time you're teaching fire team and squad formations.

Just remember that any kind of drill is worthless unless properly executed. To get any real training value out of drill, Marines must be taught the correct way, and the real whys of drill. We must put the emphasis where it belongs—on discipline. Too many Marine units train as if they were high school marching teams, destined for the Rose Bowl parade.

You are the only one who can change this. Congress, the Commandant, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff can't do a thing about this situation. It's up to you.

You must shift the emphasis back to drill behavior, where it rightly belongs. Any deviation from correct behavior must be quickly squelched—by you.

The best way to start is the next time your unit, whether it's a squad or company, is scheduled for "troop and stomp." Take time out to explain why you're drilling, and why discipline is so important. Make sure your men understand the necessity of "iron discipline" before you start instilling it. When you do give it to them, make it in small doses with frequent breaks. You must be careful not to destroy morale. Long, boring periods of drill can be just as damaging to discipline and learning as lax standards of behavior. But to make drill worthwhile you must enforce the discipline in it.

So it's up to you. You can change everything right now. Just keep in mind why you're using drill—and you'll use it properly. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Sea Duty

IT WAS DURING KOREA. The orders prescribed the full series of shots for the Far East, then, "report to Commandant, 11th Naval District for transportation to such place as ComPhibPac may be . . ."

The bored duty officer at Com 11 stamped the orders and handed them back.

"Well, how about the transportation?"

"Transportation? Most folks just catch the Coronado ferry. It's Building 119 at the Amphibious Base."

Anonymous ($15.00 to Navy Relief)

To Protect the Innocent

AFTER MONTHS AT SEA an LST on Med patrol tied up at a sleepy Spanish port. Since close quarters aboard ship had precluded clothing/equipment inspections, the CO of troops acted fast. He ordered a clothing/equipment layout ashore. Blankets to be folded bunk-size on the wharf. After reading the bulletin board one lanky, Tennessee-born Marine drawled: "It never stops. Junk on the bunk in the States, gear on the pier in Spain."

1stLt J. F. O'Connor

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The RCA undersea recorder is a marvel of compact design (dimensions 20" x 20" x 100"). It nestles in a torpedo rack, and represents a 60% space reduction over existing video tape equipment.

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

THE MILITARY MIND: MYTH AND FACT

Is a trained Marine officer a danger to democracy?

By Maj T. H. Galbraith

ONE OF THE THINGS WE HEAR AND read about these days is the growing influence of America's military leaders on the country's policies. Our first impression is, "Well, fine. It's about time the civilian honchos in Washington began to give us our due."

But as we listen longer and read farther, our good feelings give way to ire if not outright disgust. We find that the people who are doing the talking and writing—mainly commentators and columnists—speak of this military influence with fear, contempt, or both. Military men have military minds, they say, and everyone knows military minds are the worst kind.

Surely we have all experienced that attitude at some time or other. We have run across it in newspaper columns, seen it in editorial cartoons, heard it in conversations with civilian acquaintances. And probably most of us have been bewildered by it. We figure we are pretty good Americans. We know the country would be in sad shape without us. Why, then, this public fear, this anxiety toward the kind of minds they say we have?

The answer has several parts, one of which is rooted 'way back in Colonial days. Those were the times when armies showed more loyalty to a person than they did to a government, and a tyrant could make life miserable for all hands at the slightest provocation. Armies were often the instruments of oppression. The less you had to do with one, the better off you were. Added to that was the fact that just before the Revolution, Americans were required to support British armies whose presence they neither welcomed nor felt necessary. The combined result was that the citizens of the new republic had a built-in distrust of standing armies and all things military. That attitude has survived to this day.

Another part of the answer has a more recent background. Many Americans still believe that both World Wars were the direct result of German militarism. To them a military man is a "militarist" whose thinking, if not downright evil, is so warped that his only desire is to plunge the world into war. These citizens are distrustful and afraid. The catch-all they use as the basis of their worry is this nebulous thing they call the military mind.

Of course, not all Americans view the military in this dim light. Recently, a number of serious scholars have delved into the question of civil-military relations. In their inquiries they have examined the character of military thought. They have tried to see what makes the military mind tick. Their consensus is that while the mind itself is not necessarily evil, it is beset with various faults that make it incompetent outside the sphere of "purely military" matters. If they are right, it is most unfortunate—because on the higher levels of decision-making, where military influence is of greatest importance, there are few if any purely military problems.

The result is that we find ourselves tagged with the possession of something we not only don't understand but are not even sure exists. Is there really such a thing as the military mind? Or is it just a fiction dreamed up by hostile politicians and publicists and sold to people who should know better? If there really is such a thing, what distinguishes it from the "civilian" mind? And is it good or bad? Should we be glad we have it, or should we make every effort to avoid becoming afflicted with it? If we can find answers to these questions, we will go far toward separating the facts from the myths that currently surround us. At the same time, we may gain a better understanding of our place in contemporary American life.

The answer to the first question—Is there really a military mind?—is yes. Definitely. Look at it this way. In our efforts to defend the United States "against all its enemies whomsoever," we have acquired the characteristics of a profession. These we share in common with the members of other professions. We, as they, must master a body of knowledge before we are admitted to our profession. We must meet certain standards that have been set by our predecessors and current leaders. We must constantly live up to these standards. As we become more deeply involved, we exchange ideas about new equipment, tactics, and techniques. In doing so we steadily increase the body of knowledge upon which our profession is based. In short, we grow with and become increasingly identi-

fied with our brothers in pursuit of a common goal, the security of our country.

Under the circumstances it would be impossible for us *not* to acquire a turn of mind based on our profession. Can you imagine a lawyer without a "'legal" mind, a teacher without an "academic" mind, or a minister without a "clerical" mind? Indeed, if we did not have military minds, we would not truly be members of the military profession.

At this point it appears that we have admitted our guilt to the offense of possessing military minds—and admitted it with pride. The charge, however, doesn't relate so much to the possession of military minds as to the character of the thought such minds produce. Specifications run the gamut from rigidity of thought and lack of imagination to conservatism, incompetence, and recklessness. But let's not talk about the spec as such. Instead, let's look at the factors that determine the character of military thought and then arrive at our own conclusions.

The very reason for our existence provides the first key to the character of our thought. We are dedicated to the security of our country and we are sworn to defend it from all its enemies. The key word is *defend,* which implies resistance to change, or conservatism. We may not think our government is perfect as it stands today, but we do believe that through the process of lawful change it will gradually approach perfection. Meanwhile, we are bound to see that it remains safe. In this respect our conservatism is a positive factor.

But there is danger in conservatism, too, because it is liable to impede progress. If we allow it to pervade our thinking too deeply, we will find ourselves unwilling to experiment, to develop new weapons, new equipment, new tactics. And if our leaders are unwilling to examine new strategic concepts in their dealings with high-level policy planners, they will provide grounds for the charge that the military mind is incapable of creative thought. These are the possible minus factors, inherent in conservatism, of which we must be ever watchful.

The next factor is positive all the way but gets very little play in discussions on the military mind. We can call it "national consciousness." Although each of us comes from a specific section of the country, once we become professionals we lose our sectionalism and take on a national outlook. We aren't Marines for the purpose of saving only West Texas, New England, or Greater Los Angeles. Home is where our current duty station is. When we retire, chances are good that we will settle somewhere other than where we were raised. Our thinking, then, is not influenced by concern for a particular area but rather by concern for the nation as a whole. While we labor on the lower rungs of the ladder, our lack of sectionalism may not mean much. But it is of considerable importance in the thinking of those who finally reach influential positions in high-level decision-making groups.

Maj Galbraith says there's nothing wrong with the "military mind." Studies showing concern over military influence in shaping American Foreign Policy prompted his explicit views. Commissioned in '47, Maj Galbraith holds a BS from the USNA, and earned a MA while assigned to Penn St Univ as an MOI from Jul '57 to Jul '60. He is presently studying at Junior School, MCS, Quantico.

Military Decision

Another factor we must include in our analysis is that of individual responsibility. Throughout his career, the military professional must make decisions for which he alone is held responsible. Often his decisions must be made quickly with a minimum of information. On other occasions he will have available the studies and recommendations of others. But always the decision will be his, as will the responsibility for its outcome. There is no room for decision by committee majority, and there can be no postponement of the decision for an indefinite period. In few, if any, other professions is there such demand for personal responsibility. It cannot help but influence the character of military thought.

The professional purity of the mind is another element that must be considered, and it is probably one of the most difficult to evaluate. One can say that the best military thought is that which encompasses only military matters. The contention is that the professional should not be concerned with political, social, economic, or moral factors. If his military knowledge is diluted by these alien aspects, he will be incapable of the highest caliber military thought. He should, therefore, be isolated from all non-military matters.

Indeed, there may be merit in that concept of the ideal military mind. On the lower levels of command the "purely military" mind is clearly best because the decisions it makes will affect only military matters. But what of the officer who finds himself charged with making recommendations on national policies? At that high level nothing is "purely" anything. The result is that if a planner limits his thinking to military matters alone, he will probably produce an unrealistic and infeasible plan. In order to come up with something that will have any chance of acceptance, he must be aware of its effects on non-military matters. At the same time, he cannot become so much involved with the non-military aspects that he loses his value as a military planner. Obviously, the line is hard to draw.

Although the mental capacity of the military mind is rarely, if ever, attacked by those who fear or belittle it, some of its attitudes are severely criticized. A good current example of this is our attitude toward the first principle of war—the objective. We are taught that the ultimate objective of war is to destroy the enemy's ability and will to fight. It makes sense to us. If we are going to keep from being clobbered ourselves, we've got to destroy our enemy's ability to clobber us. For battlefield tactics, the principle is not only logical but valid.

But how does the principle apply to brushfire strategy in the nuclear age? Is our strategic objective the

complete destruction of our enemy so he can fight no longer? Or is it opposition to some action he has taken, or is threatening to take, so that he will not gain whatever limited objective he has in mind? These questions pose a real problem for the military mind because an objective that is less than the complete destruction of the enemy is alien to our traditional definitions. In short, we have a mental attitude toward a particular principle of war which may have been invalidated by today's weapons. We cannot deny that unthinking retention of the attitude would justify criticism.

Of course, there are other attitudes we get from our military education and training that beget civilian criticism. For example, we still recognize the need for discipline, obedience, and order. Civilians, on the other hand, believe that these military necessities inhibit free thought and place obstacles in the path of traditional American freedom. The result is a mutual distrust that can hardly benefit sound civil-military relations.

What we have indicated so far is that there is a sort of universal military mind common to all men. This is true—to a point. It breaks down when we cross borders. We American military professionals today think differently from the way pre-WWI Germans did and from the way pre-WWII Japanese did. And we think differently from the way the French, Germans or Japanese do today. The reason for this is simply that military men are influenced not only by universal military factors, but also by the heritages from which they spring. To say, for example, that the famous German, Admiral von Tirpitz, and our own Admiral Mahan were both military men and, therefore, thought the same is asinine. There can be no doubt that their thought processes were triggered by some of the same factors. Nor can we doubt that many of Mahan's thoughts were known to von Tirpitz as a result of the exchange of ideas within the "naval section" of the military profession. But their cultural and national heritages were far too different for their thought processes to be identical.

Even within our own national group, basic differences occur in military thought. We all agree that Marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen are members of the American military profession. But we also know that the profession is divided into factions, or, to use a more acceptable word, "schools." Not only is this natural, it is essential. If our minds all worked the same way, we would lose the tremendous driving force of conflicting ideas, opposition, and competition. The strategic air people, for example, are experts in the employment of large bombers for strategic purposes. As such they can offer a few ideas that might not occur to us experts in amphibious warfare—and vice versa.

Unfortunately, civilians call this "interservice bickering." They say it leads to wasted time, money, materials, men, effort, talent, and a few other things. Surely their criticism has some merit, but not enough to outweigh the advantages of competition and the exchange of opposing and complementary ideas. But as long as politicians and publicists play up our essential rivalry as "bickering," the public will continue to view the military mind as a gift from the devil.

Is it really the devil's gift? I don't think so. Based on the facts presented, I think we are justified in stating the following conclusions about the military mind: First, it exists and it is necessary. Without it we would be amateurs playing soldier. With it we are a competent fighting force—ready, willing, and able to carry out the jobs we are assigned. Second, it makes us competent to advise responsible civilian decision-makers in matters pertaining to both our employment and the military aspects of national policies.

What it does *not* do is to qualify us as experts in non-military fields. We must recognize that we are technical military experts and that our opinions on non-military matters are not fully informed. Naturally, as we climb toward higher rank and greater responsibility, our thinking must encompass at least the fringes of several non-military fields. Otherwise we would be unable even to make sound military decisions. But as long as we are military professionals, our thinking will properly be the product of military minds. No other kind of mind is more essential to our nation's future.

USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Cut-a-way Coat

A MARINE OFFICER, resplendent in evening dress, was posing with a group of dignitaries for a news picture of an important civic meeting. Before clicking his shutter the obliging photographer stepped forward to whisper in the Marine's ear. "Major," he hissed, "this picture may get national coverage. Don't you think you ought to button your jacket?"

Maj E. S. Stallknecht

VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT... a new kind of beachhead—inland

Bypassing beaches and fortified positions, today's Marine assault forces strike at key inland objectives by helicopter. This vertical envelopment tactic, a product of remarkable air-ground teamwork, is the newest chapter in the story of a traditional Marine Corps capability—amphibious warfare.

The HUS (above) is the third generation of Sikorsky troop and transport helicopters to serve the Marines. It provides a troop capacity of 18, a litter capacity of eight, or a cargo payload of 4,000 pounds for a distance of 100 miles. More than 1,200 of these Sikorsky S-58 types—in military and civilian configurations—are now flying daily routes and missions all over the world.

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

INSPECTION...

INDEX TO READINESS

To be really useful, the author says, troop inspections must be used to determine whether the Marines we are inspecting are combat ready . Best way to do it: ask questions.

By BGen L. C. Hudson

DURING THE PARADE SEASON JUST ended, about 3,000 spectators a week looked with admiration on ceremonial inspections of Marines at the Marine Barracks in Washington. Grown-ups will remember these ceremonies as high-lights of their visit. Children will tell others of the twirling rifles, precision movements and interest of the spectacle. Aboard ship, the inspection of a Marine detachment in "blues" may mark one of the most colorful events of the visit of a dignitary. What purposes have been served?

Inspection of Marines serves many purposes. When part of a ceremony, it is reasonable to expect an inspection to be rather a show. Yet there are a number of other types of inspections that Marines may expect. The *Marine Corps Drill Manual* goes into detail on company inspections, inspections of personal field equipment in ranks, and inspection of quarters or camp. The *Marine Corps Manual* treats primarily of administrative inspections. One division lists inspections as general, tactical, training, technical, special, and working.

Our present concern is with the most common type of inspection—troop inspections held by commanders at various echelons, afloat or ashore. While the primary purpose of such inspections may be to insure that the troops and their arms are clean, neat, and present the best possible appearance, this need not be the sole purpose. *It should not be* if the greatest benefit is to be gained by both officers and men. Ideally, the purpose of an inspection should be to assist in determining the battle readiness of Marines.

How is such a high-sounding objective to be carried out by frequent

inspections? Answers to this question will vary with commanders concerned. In the examples that follow you will find one approach. Courses of action should be adapted to local conditions. The local application is limited only by the imagination of the inspector.

In order to determine readiness we should work from facts. One source from which to draw indications of fact is conversation. We should take advantage of the opportunity for conversation while inspecting. Questions and answers should be exchanged. With little or no extra time required, beyond that of a normal weapons inspection, the interested officer or NCO can obtain a good indication of just how battle ready his Marines are. The price he must pay is preparation by thought and study into subjects upon which he wishes to be informed. In an "inquiring inspection" weapons are indeed examined—but so is knowledge.

How may a recently-commissioned lieutenant or newly appointed NCO determine battle readiness of a Marine armed with an M-1 rifle? Certainly the Marine must know how to aim and fire his rifle so as to hit a battle target. Questions follow: How do you use your battle sight? Quickly demonstrate your setting. With the battle sight where do you aim to hit an enemy soldier 200 yards away? Where do you aim when he is 150 yards away running across your line of fire? Your rifle has a stoppage in battle; demonstrate immediate action. What parts of your rifle should be kept lubricated? What is the proper range to that tree? How did you determine it? Give a proper fire command. When did you last conduct night firing on a target?

Inquiries, of course, should be expanded to cover other bits of basic knowledge. Can the BAR-man explain the correct adjustment of his gas cylinder and then demonstrate it? How much ammunition do you carry in battle? How? What subjects should a scout cover in a message showing location of an enemy weapon. How do you call for mortar or artillery fire? If a flamethrower man or "bazooka" operator becomes a casualty can you fire his weapon? Demonstrate. How do you get air support when it is needed? How many grenades do you carry in battle? Can you use a radio in an emergency? When did you last go through a gas chamber? How do you treat blisters? What is the first thing you do when fired upon?

The number of questions you can derive from possible battle situations is endless. The examples cited merely indicate approaches. If the Marine being inspected finds you have taken extra interest in his fitness, he will respond. He will discuss the subjects with others. He will be a better Marine—and the inspector will help create a better outfit.

What practical results can be obtained from searching inspections employing the techniques just presented? Of course, the small unit leader can take some steps on his level to remedy the weaknesses he may discover. High level commanders can also profit. As one example, I cite an actual account of what transpired after such an inspection:

A division commander, making an inspection of an infantry battalion, became dissatisfied with the answers he was receiving on several basic subjects. He summoned his ADC and instructed him to conduct a series of inspections to determine just how well trained the rifle squad members were in the fundamentals of weapons firing. The ADC arranged a series of inspections in which he, with local commanders present, inspected two men per squad in several battalions. He found that the men had indeed seen demonstrations of the use of every weapon a reinforced rifle squad in the assault might use. But, in too many instances, the men had not been permitted to fire the weapon or munition. They had forgotten the fundamentals. This information was passed to the Infantry Training Regiments. Result? Today you will find ITR graduates actually able to fire more weapons or munitions than they have for years. More thorough inspections produced better trained Marines.

We often hear that inspection is a powerful tool of command. It can be. It won't be, though, if we merely look for a show, correct movements in the manual of arms and spotless equipment. To be really useful, inspection must be used to determine whether the Marines we are inspecting are as ready as the United States expects them to be. USMC

BGen Hudson saw inspections used as a tool for building combat readiness while ADC, 3dMarDiv (1958-59). Since then, he reports, he has seen various other inspection procedures tried and discussed—some good, some not so good. Gen Hudson says the key lies in working with facts. One way to get the facts: ask the right kind of questions during troop inspections. He hopes through this article to arouse awareness of what can be accomplished with inspections of the right kind. The General is now DepAC of S, G-3, HQMC.

CHOSIN

By Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret)

THE SETTING AND CHARACTER OF the Chosin Reservoir Operation were entirely different from those of the Inchon-Seoul Operation. The mountains in the Chosin Reservoir area were forbidding. In late November the weather was bitter; the single road available to the Division was tortuous; and the enemy situation was ominous.

Early in November the 1st Marine Division had decimated one Chinese division near Chinhung-ni, then continued the northward advance in accordance with the general plan of the higher command to drive to the Yalu River. Two other Chinese divisions were known to be in the general area, but were like will-o'-the-wisps.

In late November, identifications of captured Chinese indicated the presence of additional fresh Chinese divisions. Somewhere, in the bleak mountains surrounding us and beyond the reach of our ground patrols, the Chinese were swarming. The excellent air discipline observed by the Chinese during daylight hours prevented our air from giving us any clear picture of what was in front of us.

In addition to the uncertainty as to the enemy, our situation gave us a feeling of isolation. There was a gap of 80 miles between the 1stMar Div and the 8th Army to the southwest. A small Army task force was on the east side of the Reservoir near us, but beyond was a gap of 125 miles to the nearest friendly unit to the northeast. To the south, it was 75 miles from Yudam-ni, on the western arm of the Chosin Reservoir, to the coast. This feeling of isolation took on a menacing aspect when the Chinese closed in around



us on 28 November to a depth of 35 miles.

Under such conditions Marines are at their best. Discipline, devotion, and loyalty are accentuated. The greater the danger, the greater their cohesiveness. Only an organization with these qualities could have made the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir.

The Chinese plan was to fragment our force and then destroy the fragments. By employing their great numerical superiority and by exploiting the gaps on our flanks, the Chinese did succeed initially in fragmenting the combat elements of the Division to a depth of 35 miles. For Korea, we were considered to be well concentrated for combat. Our combat elements, however, were disposed in depth, with the major part of the force in the most advanced position and garrisons at four other locations to the rear, protecting our vulnerable main supply road. Our plan, after we received the order to withdraw, was to gather our strength; hold firmly the intermediate garrisons to the rear; then, starting with the 5th and 7th RCTs at Yudam-ni, drive southward, successively rejoining the garrisons to the rear, and gaining strength as each garrison was rejoined. We succeeded in our plan—the Chinese failed in theirs.

Throughout the operation the action was sustained; yet, to my mind, there was a turning point. This came when the 5th and 7th RCTs fought their way from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri. At Hagaru-ri we had accumulated supplies, and our engineers had completed an airstrip capable of handling two-engine planes. With the airstrip we could bring in supplies and replacements and evacuate our casualties. Hagaru-ri was also a suitable location for the airdrop of supplies by the Air Force. To indicate some measure of the importance of the airstrip to us, in a period of six days more than 4,200 casualties, 3,100 of them Marines, were evacuated from this strip by the combined efforts of Air Force, Navy, and Marine planes, leaving us casualty-free for the breakout from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri.

Although the RCTs and the garrison at Hagaru-ri had been depleted by casualties, there was a net gain in strength. When the Chinese struck Yudam-ni on the night of 27-28 November, the combined strength of the 5th and 7th RCTs was about 8,200. When the breakout from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri was launched on 6 December, the breakout force comprised some 10,000 troops. These were 10,000 fighting men, for, until the column incurred new casualties, there was no train of wounded to burden the operation.

Furthermore, this was a very powerful force. It was well supplied with ammunition, fuel, and rations; was powerfully supported by Marine and carrier-based air; possessed, organically, artillery, tanks, and the whole gamut of infantry weapons; and had dedicated officers and men to carry the fight to the enemy. The Chinese strength consisted of their superiority in numbers and their habitual employment of night attacks—but these could not stop the advance.

The fight from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri cost us 500 casualties. These casualties were immediately evacuated by air and the advance was resumed the following day. Now, including the Marine battalion fighting up the mountain from Chinhung-ni, there were over 16,000 men to make the final successful breakout.

In this 13-day operation, fought mostly at elevations over 3,500 feet, with the thermometer dropping to 25 degrees below zero, the 1stMar Div outlasted and outfought the eight Chinese divisions it encountered. Throughout, the Division maintained its integrity and brought out its equipment, its wounded, and even its prisoners.

The enemy suffered staggering combat losses. In addition, the Chinese ineffectives due to the cold far exceeded ours. We had frostbite, but there was no delay due solely to exposure and only two deaths where exposure was a contributing factor. The Chinese, lacking tentage and having a rudimentary medical service, undoubtedly lost many of their seriously wounded due to exposure. The 1stMarDiv was well equipped with organic weapons and was ably supported by air, not only for close support, but also for airdrop and airlanding of supplies, and for the evacuation of casualties.

Yet, in the final analysis, the weapons and support would have been of no avail had not these Marines, in their 35-mile fight from Yudam-ni to Chinhung-ni, demonstrated to a superlative degree that physical obstacles, weather, and the enemy could not stop men who maintained their discipline, were professionally competent, loyal, devoted, and capable of self-sacrifice.

USMC

When Marines of 1stMarDiv launched their drive from Hagaru-ri on 6 Dec 1950, they had already been fighting south for nearly a week. Ahead lay steeper mountains, colder days and nights, many more of the enemy. Gen Smith was Division Commander, had led his men from the late summer assault at Inchon north to Chosin Reservoir. He directed the breakout from its beginning at Yudam-ni to its final goal—seaport of Hungnam—75 miles away. This article is the second of two by Gen Smith covering operations in Korea. His first, **The Inchon Landing,** ***appeared in Gazette: Sep '60. They are the first comments for publication on the Korean War ever granted by the author, and are part of more than 2,000 typed pages of material he prepared for Marine Corps archives. Purpose: to make sure the deeds of his men are preserved for the future.***

This is my rifle. There are many like it, but this one is mine. My rifle is my best friend. It is my life . . .

THIS IS MY RIFLE

By Capt Will A. Merrill

SO READS THE FIRST FEW LINES OF the Marines' creed, *My Rifle*. The words are memorized by every Marine in boot camp. They represent a fundamental concept of the Marine Corps—the Marine and his rifle.

Today's Marine rifleman inherits a rich history of traditional skill with rifles, one that began in the Revolutionary War. Since 1775, Marines have trained and fought wars with many muskets, rifles, and carbines.

Since Marine Corps organization and regulations were based on the Continental Marines as well as the British Royal Marines, and the arms industry was but an infant in Colonial America, the first standard arm of the American Marine was the British Long Tower Musket, more commonly known as the "Brown Bess."

Brown Bess was notorious for its short, effective range of 75 yards and extreme inaccuracy. As one user was heard to remark: "One went high and one went low and where in hell did the other one go?"

However, since it was the only weapon available in large quantities, the Brown Bess was the musket Marines were armed with when they landed in the Bahamas early in 1776. Under command of Captain Samuel Nicholas, the first Commandant, this successful pioneer amphibious operation was undertaken to capture badly needed ordnance material for use of General Washington's forces.

As the war progressed and the young country found an ally in France (more truly an enemy of England), the fledgling American government was able to buy the French Musket, Model 1763, better known by the name of the armory in France where it was first made, "Charleville." Under the guiding hand of Ben Franklin large quantities of this model were purchased. These muskets, because of their longer range, greater accuracy, and sturdier lock, were probably preferred by the Marines.

The Charleville served as the model for the first US government muskets made in a federal armory. The Springfield Armory, Springfield,



Massachusetts, was established by Act of Congress on 2 April 1794. However, it wasn't until the following year that production began. In 1795, total production was 245 muskets.

The Charleville and early US models served as the Marines' standard arm through the War of 1812. At the outbreak of hostilities, there were Marine detachments aboard just about every major ship of the fleet as well as at almost every Naval establishment ashore.

Some ship's detachments had in their arms chests the Short Tower Sea Service Musket, a slightly shorter version of the Brown Bess. Its shorter length made the musket easier to handle while in the ship's rigging. Using this arm primarily, and using it to great advantage, the Marine marksmanship played an important part in the defeat of HMS *Guerriere* in August of 1812. Marine riflemen aboard *Constitution* knocked out exposed enemy gun crews and deck officers with outstanding shooting.

On at least two occasions in the war, Marine marksmanship played an important role in the outcome of major clashes. Using the Short Tower Musket, Marines aboard USS *Chesapeake,* in her encounter with HMS *Shannon,* enabled Capt David Lawrence to utter the immortal words, "Don't give up the ship!" Two years later, on 8 January 1815, Marines were part of the 5,500-man American force under MajGen Andrew "Old Hickory" Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans. Here the American force faced 12,000 seasoned British troops, defeated them, and killed over 2,500—mainly because of superior American marksmanship.

First Breechloader

The next arm that played an important role in Marine Corps history was the US Rifle, Model 1819, the "Hall Breech Loader." This weapon brought about an evolution in the arms industry for several reasons. It was the first breech loading weapon to be adopted by the US for its armed forces. All its parts were manufactured for interchangeability. The outstanding feature of the weapon, from a Marine point of view, was its speed of reloading. Another feature, well received but little known, was an adjustable trigger that could be set for a hair pull.

M-14 Rifle—standard arm for Marines by 1963

British "Brown Bess" musket, standard arm in 1775

When the Hall was first produced in 1819, the Marine Testing Board turned thumbs down on it for one main reason: the action of the breech was not machined to a degree which would achieve a tight gas seal. This caused a loss of power. And, as can be imagined, the hot gases escaped, hitting the shooter in the face, which didn't prove conducive to a strong faith in the weapon.

More Firepower

By 1832, however, when the Marines landed in Sumatra, they were carrying the Hall which had been adopted by the Corps in 1825 following modifications that corrected the fault. During firing tests, using the Charleville as the base weapon, it was found the Hall could fire 100 shots to 37 fired by the muzzle loader. During the fight between the Marines and the Sumatra natives, the Hall showed its true worth in combat by virtue of its superior rate of fire and improved accuracy.

In the constant search for better small arms, the Indian Wars of the late 1830s in Florida and Georgia gave the Marines a chance to test a unique weapon. Young Sam Colt had designed and built the Colt Revolving Cylinder Carbine, better known as the Colt-Paterson. The unique feature of this carbine was a cylinder based on the same design as the Colt pistol cylinder.

In 1837 the Navy purchased 60 of these carbines from Colt after he had traveled to Florida to sell his weapon. The Marines carried some 25 of the Colt-Patersons during combat but found them unreliable. An article in the Saint Augustine (Florida) *News* relates this information:

> ". . . after the return of the Navy expedition from the everglades, the Marines who were armed with Colt's rifles, in discharging their pieces had five cylinders and two barrels burst, breaking the leg of one man."

After the Colt was loaded for several days, powder from one chamber would leak, making a powder train to another chamber. Thus when one chamber was fired, two and sometimes all six chambers would explode!

Although the weapon was never officially adopted by the Corps as a standard item, official records indicate at least one model of the Colt was still carried until 1853. On 8 July of that year, during Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan, an official account of the landing contains the following description:

> ". . . the column of escort Marines in front . . . two men over six feet high, each with pikes upon which American ensign were fastened, with revolving rifles slung across their shoulders."

In 1851, the US Percussion Musket, Model 1842, was adopted. Some improvements over prior weapons included a grooved barrel and the addition of rear sights. This was the last smooth bore weapon the Marines were to have as their standard shoulder arm. Although adopted in 1851 it wasn't until late in 1854 that all Marine units were armed with the Model 1842.

Marines were armed with this musket when they were called to Harpers Ferry in 1859 to recapture



Marines used smooth-bore shoulder weapons for the last time in combat at Harper's Ferry in 1859

the US Arsenal from the insurrectionist, John Brown. As a note of historical irony, an Army colonel was in command of the over-all operation—Robert E. Lee.

When the Civil War began, the Marine officer corps was split. Almost half left to join the Confederate cause. Those remaining with the Union saw action in just about every Naval action, as well as the First Battle of Manassas. They also made numerous amphibious landings—Hilton Head, Fort Fisher, Hatteras Inlet, etc.

During the Civil War, the Union Marines utilized a variety of shoulder weapons, only three of which will be discussed here. The first of these was the US Rifled Musket 1855, better known as the Maynard.

The Maynard was the first of the .58 caliber weapons adopted as standard caliber for all small arms on July 5, 1855 by the then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. The innovation in this weapon was the "Maynard Tape Primer" invented by a Washington, D. C., dentist of that name. However, the tape primer system of ignition proved to be too vulnerable to moisture under field conditions. Before the war weapons equipped with it were converted to the percussion ignition system, using the more dependable primer caps. An outstanding feature of this arm was its exceptional accuracy. In the hands of an average rifleman, a man on horseback was almost always a sure hit at up to 300 yards range!

Another of the Civil War shoulder arms used by the Corps was the US Rifled-Musket, Model 1861. This was a modified Maynard Tape Lock Model 1855 equipped with the tried and true percussion (cap) lock.

The final weapon of the Civil War era to be discussed was also the final percussion lock arm adopted as a standard item. It was also one of the more famous weapons of the century —the Sharps Rifle, Model 1863.

The innovation of the Sharps was its loading procedure, which was accomplished by lowering and moving the trigger forward. This action dropped the breech block and uncovered the breech, permitting the insertion of a linen-wrapped cartridge. Lawrence Disc Primers, fitted into the right side of the breech, supplied the ignition.

First Lt John Green, Marine Testing Officer, recommended adoption of the Sharps in a letter to the Commandant, Colonel John Harris, dated 6 February 1860. In part he wrote:

> ". . . results of the trials made as the comparative merit of Sharps' improved rifle and the rifled-musket now in use in the Marine Corps are completed. . . . The difference in rapidity of loading and firing was vastly in favor of Sharps' rifle, being 4 or 6 to one—and I also noticed what seemed to me to be a fact of great importance in actual service; that while the Marine who exercised the musket was giving unremitted observation to the arm during the process of loading, and remained in a fixed position, the operator having the Sharps' rifle could load instantly at a walk or run keeping his eye on other objects, the arm not requiring the least observation except at the instant of firing."

And perhaps expressing the underlying thoughts of all Marines down through the years, he wrote:

> ". . . and the Marine in battle, possessed of a gun that can be instantly reloaded, keeping his eye on the foe, confident of his powder and the strength (that he is always ready) naturally is inspired with courage and self-possession which are invaluable to the soldier!!"

The period following the Civil

War was relatively quiet on the international scene as far as the US was concerned. However, Marines continued their missions as the country's guardians—from the Aleutians to Sumatra and from Iceland to Egypt. They carried out many of these missions armed with the weapons of the Civil War period.

Not until 1870 were Marines provided with a new rifle, the US Rifle, Model 1869, Allin Conversion. The Model 1869 came about as the result of the genius of Erskin S. Allin, Master Armorer at the Springfield Armory.

When the Civil War ended, the armories had on hand hundreds of thousands of smooth bore muzzle loaders. These weapons were converted from .58 caliber to .50 caliber by the insertion of a steel tube brazed in the bore. They were further converted to breech loaders.

The Model 1869 found the ready and willing hands of Marines who were eagerly searching for a weapon they could reload quickly, thus increasing fire-power. The desire for the Allin conversions is indicated by the following excerpt from a letter written by Capt McLane Tilton, USMC, on 13 March 1870, just before he and his detachment of Marines sailed for Korea:

> "One man with a breech loader is equal to 12 to 15 armed men as we are and in the event of any landing, or even chasing Coreans armed with an excellent repeater, what ever could Americans do with a blasted old Muzzle Fuzzel!!"

In 1871 the Marines did chase "Coreans" and did accomplish their mission.

For almost 30 years the Allins or modified arms utilizing the Allin trap door were the standard weapon. In the mid-70's, Marines were armed with a limited number of the US Navy Rifle, Model 1870, better known as the Remington Rolling Block. Only about 22,000 of these were manufactured, of which more than half were found to have faulty rear sight placements. They were sold to France and subsequently used in the Franco-Prussian War.

Another arm that saw limited use was the Lee Repeating Rifle, Model 1882. The Remington-Lee, as it was called, was the first true bolt weapon that was a turn bolt. It utilized the standard .45-70-405 government cartridge.

Capt Merrill, OrdInstr to Haitian Armed Forces, was commissioned in June '53. An interest in firearms collecting, military history, competitive shooting, and lack of published information on rifles used by the Corps was incentive for his article. From July '57 to Apr '59, Capt Merrill authored a weekly column for the MCS Sentry, which covered all phases of weapons and marksmanship.

In 1897 a truly revolutional arm was adopted by the Marines. It was the Lee Straight-Pull U. S. Navy Magazine Rifle. In many ways this rifle was years ahead of its time. For one thing, it was the smallest (in physical size and caliber) standard military rifle made to that date. It was the first clip feed rifle, was 6mm (.236 inches), and utilized a rimless cartridge with a 122-grain bullet propelled at 2,550 feet per second.

The Lee Straight-Pull was far the best weapon, ballistically speaking, then in the world. For the first time, black powder was not used. The rifle's weight, rated as the lightest ever for a service rifle, was 8½ pounds.

A board of Marine officers approved the Lee Straight-Pull in 1895. The Winchester Repeating Arms Manufacturing Company began production of the contracted 10,000 Lees in 1896.

On 10 June 1898, armed with the Lee, Marines stormed ashore at Guantanamo, Cuba, in the face of stiff Spanish resistance, and for 12 days held at bay a numerically superior enemy force. Throughout the Spanish-American War, Marines found that the clip-fed Lee, in the hands of a well trained rifleman, was far superior to the arms used by the Spanish.

The U. S. Magazine Rifle, Model 1898, Krag-Jorgenson, adopted by the Marines in 1900, was the first .30 caliber weapon issued as a standard weapon in the Corps. Although adopted by the Army in 1894, the Corps held off until modifications were made on the 1896 model. These modifications were: (1) the bolt handle seat was made flush with the receiver; and (2) a new rear sight was installed. This sight contained a solid center leaf graduated to 2,000

By WWI, Marines had already combat-tested popular '03 Springfield.

yards and was capable of adjustment for windage. A total of 262,548 Model '98s were manufactured between 1899 and 1904.

While the Krag-Jorgenson was a bolt action, it was loaded with separate rounds through a side gate at the right of the receiver. It could be recharged while the bolt was closed, but this advantage was off-set by the nuisance of having to load separate, loose rounds.

Krag Pays Off

Following the War with Spain, Marines fulfilled many missions armed with the Krag. Marine Corps units fighting the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900) were still using the Lee when they defended the foreign Legation quarter in Pekin. The Philippines (1901), however, was the first battleground where Marine combat units were first armed with the Krag—and the smooth, rapid bolt action paid off.

As reports of the various combat operations were analyzed by the US Ordnance experts, it became apparent, from the relative performance of the Spanish Mauser action and the Krag action that a better rifle with a better cartridge could and should be developed. Many combinations were created and tried, all based on Mauser-type action. In 1903 it seemed the ultimate had been achieved with perfection of the "03"!

By the time the US Magazine Rifle, Model 1903, better known as the Springfield or simply '03, was issued to the Marines in 1906 numerous modifications had been added to the original model. Among them were: (1) the 30-inch barrel was reduced to 24 inches for easier field handling; (2) a knife-style bayonet replaced the pencil-slim ramrod bayonet; (3) a rear sight that was a slight modification of the Buffington (originally adopted for use on the .45 caliber Springfield during the 1880s); (4) a new front sight; and (5) most important of all, greatly improved ballistics.

The '03 is still a favorite weapon of sportsmen today over 50 years after its introduction to the military scene. The crisp, smooth bolt action still rates among the world's finest actions.

In 1906 it became apparent that the Marines' job needed expansion. The size of the Corps was increased to meet demands and its combat units became the forerunners of today's Fleet Marine Force. The "Banana Wars" found the Marines in Nicaragua in 1912, Mexico in 1914, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in 1915, and the Dominican Republic in 1916. In all cases they fought against rebel bandits. Also in all cases, they carried the '03, which proved to be a weapon of accuracy, dependability, and outstanding combat performance.

Marine units formed in the early days of WWI found themselves armed with an American version of the British .303. This was the US Rifle, Model 1917, Enfield. US armories were caught short when this country entered the war, but American private industry had been filling British contracts for the Enfields. When the call came for more arms, the manufacturers simply modified the British weapons to fit the American .30 caliber cartridge. The face of the bolt was altered to take the rimless .30-06 cartridge and the magazine was altered to accommodate the longer cartridge. During the emergency, these rifles were made by Eddystone, Remington, and Winchester. Enfields were used only for training, however, and were not carried into combat by Marines.

Orders sent Marines to fight in Europe as part of the AEF under Gen John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, USA, and MajGen John A. Lejeune, USMC. At Belleau Wood in June of 1918, Germans troops faced the '03-wielding, sharpshooting Marines, and learned first hand of their fighting spirit and deadly accurate rifle fire. The '03 once again proved to be an outstanding weapon in the hands of confident, well trained Marine riflemen.

Between WWI and WWII, the '03 reigned supreme. Marines found themselves again in China but this time with an improved weapon that allowed them greatly improved fire superiority in combat. The Marine with his '03 returned once again to Nicaragua in 1927 where he remained until 1934.

Soon after the '03's adoption in 1906, Marines became well known for their shooting ability throughout the nation. The Corps entered its first team in the National Matches at Camp Perry in 1911 and won first place in the team event. From that year until 1940, Marines and their '03's won the National Trophy, emblematical of the championship of the US, 15 out of the 23 times the matches were fired. They placed second five times, losing out to the U. S. Army Infantry Team by only a few points.

When WWI ended, the eternal search for the finest shoulder arm continued. By 1936 the prototype of the U. S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M-1, had been perfected. Mr. J. C. Garand, employed at the Springfield Armory, had developed the weapon, which was approved by the Army after field tests. Upon adoption, the M-1 was produced in limited quantities until the outbreak of WWII.

Unprecedented Firepower

Using the gas-operated principle, the semi-automatic rifle gave the Marine rifleman unheard of firepower. Its eight-round clip and simplicity in design, which provided outstanding field durability, made the M-1 a highly desirable shoulder arm.

The Marine Corps, however, entered WWII armed with the Springfield. The Corps' exploits in the dark days following the outbreak of hostilities are well remembered—the hopeless defense of Wake, the futile but heroic defense of the Philippines, and finally Corregidor. The Marine and his '03 helped the nation gain badly needed time to equip



British "Brown Bess," .75cal singleshot flintlock

French Charleville, .69cal singleshot flintlock

British Short Tower, .75cal singleshot flintlock

Hall Rifle, Model 1819, .52cal singleshot flintlock



Colt "Paterson," .52cal six-shot carbine

US Musket, Model 1842, .69cal singleshot

US "Maynard," Model 1855, .58cal singleshot



US Rifled Musket, Model 1861, .58cal singleshot

Sharps Rifle, Model 1863, .52cal singleshot

US Rifle, Model 1869, .50cal singleshot center fire

Remington Navy Rifle, Model 1870, .50cal singleshot



Remington-Lee, Model 1882, .45cal five-shot

US "45-70," Model 1884, .45cal singleshot

Lee Straight Pull, 6mm five-shot center fire

US Krag-Jorgenson, Model 1898, .30cal single shot

US Springfield, Model 1903, .30cal five-shot



US Enfield, Model 1917, .30cal five-shot

US Garand, M-1, .30cal eight-shot center fire

Johnson Semi-automatic, .30cal 10-shot

US Carbine, M-1, 20-shot center fire

and train the world's most powerful fighting force.

However, because of the scant supply of M-1s and a lack of training, the Marines were unable to equip the first offensive units of WWII with the M-1s. When Marines landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 they were armed with the '03. Shortly before the end of this operation the M-1 found its way into the hands of the front-line Marine.

During the remainder of the war, the M-1 and the Marine rifleman formed an unbeatable team, combining the fire power and accuracy of the M-1 with the fighting spirit and devotion to Corps and country inherent in the Marine rifleman. In the Pacific War, names like Tarawa, Bougainville, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, along with numerous other operations, filled another chapter on the U. S. Marine and the M-1—a perfect marriage.

The era following WWII saw Marines in all parts of the world. They continued to train for their mission as the nation's primary amphibious force in readiness. The constant training paid off in 1950. In August of that year, Marines clashed with Communist forces which had invaded South Korea.

M-1 in Korea

Once again, Marine riflemen formed the nucleus of a powerful fighting team and the M-1 again proved its worth in fire accuracy and dependability. More names were added to the rifleman's history—Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, Koto-Ri, Yongdok, Vegas, and many others. All came to know the Marine rifleman in the most intimate manner, the struggle of life and death. But in each case, the enemy learned to respect the efficiency of a well trained Marine firing a weapon he knew how to handle.

U. S. Rifle, Caliber 7.62mm, is the designation of the latest weapon to be used by the Marine rifleman. Al-

though the arm is not yet a standard issue item, it is entering into general use. As a study of its picture indicates, the M-14 is very similar to the M-1. However, it has a higher cyclic rate of fire, weighs less, and is by far the superior weapon.

A great many internal changes have been incorporated in the M-14, based generally on the M-1. Most of the changes were necessary to accommodate the shorter cartridge and the 20-round box magazine. The receiver, bolt, and firing pin are shorter. Except for a new housing and trigger guard, the trigger group is basically the same as in the M-1.

One Big Change

A radical departure from the previous operation is the M-14's gas cylinder. Unlike the M-1, it contains a hollow gas cylinder piston and is mounted on the barrel with the gas port approximately eight inches from the muzzle. A flash suppressor is used, with the front sight mounted on it, so designed to provide a moderate compensation for muzzle climb.

This new rifle gives the rifleman a degree of firepower unmatched in Marine Corps history. The magnitude of the increase is easily understood when the rate of fire of the M-14 is compared with that of Brown Bess, the first Marine shoulder weapon. Brown Bess had a sustained rate of fire of four rounds per minute. The M-14 modified can fire 120-150 rounds per minute.

It should also be noted, when making this comparison, that our weapons' ballistics and ease-of-handling have shown parallel improvement. Only one factor has remained the same—the individual rifleman. Today, as was the case 185 years ago, a Marine must show he is the master of his rifle to realize its full potential.

USMC

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The Big City

ILLINOIS TECH BUILT ITS CAMPUS by clearing one of the worst slum areas in Chicago. While buildings were still going up, the NROTC unit shared classrooms with the architectural drawing classes, which included life modelling.

A young ET3 from Tennessee reported the impact like this:

"Here I was reportin' to the armory with my seabag. I opens the door and this lady is coming down the stairs in a kimona. The wind blows in and she hasn't got anything under her kimona. And, you know, this is the first time I was ever in Chicago in my life!"

Anonymous ($15.00 to Navy Relief)

Mistaken Identity

AFTER THE KOREAN WAR, many of the supply and maintenance depots maintained by the U. S. Army in Japan were closed. In the process, a tremendous amount of gear was declared excess or not worth the cost of transportation back to continental U. S. All of it could be put to good use by the ROK Army. Consequently, it was shipped to Korea and stacked in a depot. When the pile never seemed to get smaller, a U. S. Army colonel was detailed to investigate.

The first thing the colonel asked was, "Is there an inventory?" Proudly, the Korean officer handed the colonel a bulky document. The inventory was page after page listing varying quantities of different sized boxes. The contents of all the boxes was "THIS SIDE UP."

$15.00 to Col W. F. Prickett

THE FREE RIDE IS OVER

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Marine Corps Gazette

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REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

PART ONE

MISSION: READINESS

THE OLD NAVAL HOSPITAL ON THE slopes of Halawa Heights is a busy place. Now known as Camp Smith, it is the command post of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and the Pacific Command. From its heights, one can see Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, and past Waikiki to Diamond Head. Every day men and women from all the US Armed Services, working at Camp Smith, have a much broader view. They see an area that encompasses two-thirds of the earth's water, one-third its land, and, given India, two-thirds its people. They see the stamping ground of FMFPac.

Camp Holland M. Smith is a dynamic tribute to the great Marine commander of WWII. His vision and resourcefulness converted the concept of FMFPac into reality. Today, the role of FMFPac in the defense of the United States is no less important than it was when Marines were storming beachheads under his leadership; it is a different role. FMFPac's job is to be ready. Ready to tackle any job assigned, from showing the flag in a foreign port to delivering nuclear weapons. It serves as a believable deterrent, or a retaliatory force-in-readiness.

Command Structure and Organization

LtGen Thomas A. Wornham is the Commanding General of this Force. His major combat commands are grouped in three air-ground teams. These teams are positioned in widely separated localities. The "WestPac" team, 3dMarDiv/1st MAW, is located in the Japan-Okinawa area facing the Red Orient across the narrow seas. The RLT/MAG which comprises the 1stMar Brig is the "MidPac" team. It is located at MCAS, Kaneohe on the beautiful Windward side of Oahu, Hawaii. The Brigade is unique in that it is truly an air-ground organization. This is its distinctive characteristic. Such a complete integration of air-ground units is found nowhere else in the Marine Corps or in the Department of Defense. The

"EastPac" team, 1stMarDiv/3d MAW, stands ready in the Camp Pendleton-El Toro area of Southern California. Each team is reinforced by Force type units such as service regiments, LVT's, tanks, and engineers. Out in the California desert, Force Troops, Pacific, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft units train at Twentynine Palms, ready to support any element of the Force with Terrier, Hawk, and Honest John missiles.

Two small but busy and important units complete the operating elements. The 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company at Camp Smith provides essential communications and control facilities for Army and Allied forces engaged in amphibious operations. The 1st Composite Radio Company at Kaneohe furnishes support to all Force units.

Camp Smedley D. Butler, located on Okinawa, completes the roster of FMFPac units. Camp Butler is not a locality but an organization. It performs base-type support functions for the 3dMarDiv. In addition to the uniqueness of its title, Camp Butler enjoys the distinction of being an FMF unit with a complement of civilian employees.

Such a wide-spread and diverse command requires control. There are three control agencies. Headquarters FMFPac at Camp Smith, the first control agency, performs the normal command and administrative functions, plus two more. It furnishes the personnel and equipment to establish the nucleus of a Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters. Its H&SBn also does the housekeeping chores for the CINPAC and FMFPac Headquarters at Camp Smith. As the CG, Gen Wornham performs the duties of a Pacific Fleet Type commander. These include supervision of training, administration, and logistical coordination.

Headquarters, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, located at El

Toro, is the second control group. Assisting Gen Wornham with type command duties relating to aviation matters and aviation units, this headquarters insures maximum effectiveness of assigned aviation units in FMFPac. Commanded by Maj Gen Samuel S. Jack, AirFMFPac is concerned with such matters as aviation supply and funding, aviation individual and unit training, squadron rotation, and flight safety. One of the most vital tasks performed is the maintenance of close liaison with Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet.

The third control agency is small but has the most imposing title. Located in Tokyo, Representative, CG FMFPac, Western Pacific (usually known as REP CG FMFPAC WESTPAC) is the CG's agent in the Far East. His beat includes every country where Marines have business. His organization coordinates such matters as supply, mail, transportation, and protocol for all WestPac Marines.

Command relationships in this force of some 60,000 Marines are complex. As indicated in Figure 1, the Force Commander exercises administrative control over all units. He has operational control over the majority of them. In the Far East, the division/wing team is known as Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet. This force is commanded by the senior Marine general officer stationed in WestPac. He is assisted by a very small planning cadre staff. FMF Seventh Fleet is under the direct operational control of VAdm Griffin, USN, Commander Seventh Fleet.

MajGen C. H. Hayes
Deputy Comdr

LtGen T. A. Wornham
CG, FMFPac

Col E. W. Johnston
Chief of Staff

In addition to FMF Marines, the Force commander also has administrative control of ten Marine Barracks manned by more than 2,000 Marines. These barracks make up the security forces assigned to the Naval Establishment in the Pacific Ocean Area. Three barracks are located on Oahu, three in Japan, two in the Philippines, and one each on Guam and Okinawa.

Command Philosophy

Reduced to its simplest terms, the basic command policy in FMFPac is "Keep Your Best Foot Forward." This is the driving force behind the many programs and plans that have been evolved to improve readiness. Readiness is a relative term. The posture of the aircraft wing in Japan, or the division on Okinawa, cannot be compared with the readiness of a Reserve unit to make its contribution to mobilization. Obviously, the term "readiness" in these cases implies a different kind of readiness. Similar differences exist among the many units in FMFPac. If not from mission, location implies a difference. The immediate problems of units stationed in the Far East cannot be compared to those on the West Coast. Rather than ignore the differences of mission and geography to achieve a theoretical equality of readiness for all units, these differences have been recognized. FMFPac has avoided the trap of readiness equality inherent in reducing all units to the lowest common denominator. A deliberate effort is made to maintain WestPac units at the highest possible readiness level, even at the expense of other units. This policy is paying dividends. Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet is maintained at a high peak, and the balance of the Force is not far behind. As assets increase, the readiness of the entire Force will increase, without sacrificing the high state that exists in the Far East.

Col S. L. Stephan
Deputy C/S

Col N. Morgenthal
G-1

Col D. M. Danser
G-2

Col A. Sutter
G3

Col E. S. Dew
G-4

Personnel Stability

Marines stationed in FMF units in the Far East are not accompanied (or encumbered) by dependents. Their tours of duty were 15 months. (Recently reduced to 13 months). As a result of this 80% annual turnover, until recent years, the pipeline was full of Marines going and coming every month. Even worse, there was a never-ending problem of training new replacements. No unit could reach its readiness potential. Progressive training was merely something that appeared on training schedules.



To improve this situation, various programs of phase training, unit rotation, controlled input, and unit replacement were developed and put into effect. Each of these programs required a deliberate decision. The combat readiness and efficiency of some units of a given type would be enhanced even though this necessarily implied the reduction of readiness and efficiency of other units at any one time. Based on the fundamental FMFPac command philosophy, the decision was made to accept reduction in readiness and efficiency of FMFPac units in the US in order to enhance that of units deployed in the Far East.

The aviation squadron rotation program was the first, instituted in 1957. This has been discussed in GAZETTE articles written by the two FMFPac Aircraft Wings. Both articles stress the fact that squadrons deployed from the two wings in the US are fully combat ready and remain so during the period of deployment.

There is a similar program for the Heavy Artillery Rocket Platoon assigned to the 3dMarDiv. There are only a limited number of such platoons. A sound unit rotation program is not possible, so replacement is necessary.

The 8" Howitzer batteries and the infantry battalions of FMFPac (except those in the 1stMarBrig) are in the controlled input/transplacement program. The batteries receive four months pre-deployment training at the extensive ranges of Twentynine Palms. They are combat ready upon arrival at Okinawa where ranges are limited. The infantry pre-deployment training period is six weeks, although it will eventually be two months. The GAZETTE articles written by the 1st and 3d Divisions describe how the infantry program functions. It has increased infantry combat readiness and efficiency in both divisions, and has eliminated a sizeable portion of the personnel pipeline.

Training

The personnel stability achieved in tactical air and ground units enabled the extensive and varied training effort throughout FMFPac to pay off. Progressive training became meaningful. Units spent less time at basic training levels. They became more proficient at advanced levels. Participants in schools and exercises remained in a unit long enough to contribute their proficiency to the unit's readiness.

Variety and intensity best describe training throughout FMFPac. Marines of this Force are seeing the world. They have sweated in the jungles of Borneo as well as the California desert. They have climbed the snowy slopes of the Sierra Nevada as well as Mt. Fuji in Japan. From Alaska to Taiwan and the Philippines they have made landings, operated from airfields, all to improve their readiness. They have mixed in fun, too, in Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore, to say nothing of Los Angeles and San Diego. Marines are made welcome.

The type of training has been as diversified as the location of training exercises. There has been training at various levels of every sort—Reconnaissance Exercises, Naval Gunfire Exercises, BLT and RLT Exercises, Helicopter Landing Exercises and Firing Exercises, Combat Support Landing Exercises and Air Defense Exercises. Most of these have been conducted by air/ground teams.

While supporting ground training of every type, aviation units were busy improving their own proficiency. In adition to flight operations from their home fields, squadrons continuously deployed to outlying desert fields at Fallon, Nevada, and Yuma, Arizona for weapons training. This training brought the squadrons to high levels of proficiency, a proficiency that was demonstrated during operation TOP GUN, the Naval Air Weapons competition. In this, the World Series of Naval Aviation, the 1stMarBrig's VMF-232 won top honors in Team Gunnery competition, and also provided the "top gun," Lt G. A. Davis.

In the Far East, many have been combined exercises with troops from the Philippines, Korea, Republic of China, and the United Kingdom. Each exercise has been conducted with the dual objective of improving the readiness of the forces involved, and developing or refining tactics, techniques and doctrine.

Each year, a division/wing team conducts an amphibious exercise. On this occasion, CG, FMFPac partici-



pates as the Marine Expeditionary Force Comander. Exercise "BLUE STAR" held in Southern Taiwan in March, 1960, was typical. Although this was a 3dMarDiv/1stMAW exercise, many other FMFPac units participated. The 1stMarBrig furnished aggressors. Personnel of the TEC and umpire group were drawn from every unit in the Force. The MEF staff was composed of Marines from H&SBn, FMFPac; AirFMFPac, 1st MarBrig; Force Troops; and the California air/ground team. The entire Force Communications Battalion was reinforced and lifted from California to participate. And to cap it all, the Chinese Marine Corps attached an RLT to the Landing Force. The highlights of BLUE STAR have already been described in the GAZETTE. When it was over, FMF Seventh Fleet had been fully exercised, and had culminated two years of progressive training. This Force was ready, and still is.

Far Eastern Facilities

It has never been suggested that Marines need plush camps in order to be combat ready. They can and do operate on a shoe string. Since moving to Okinawa and Japan, they have been doing just that. There is no doubt that over the long haul permanent, adequate facilities will do much to improve combat readiness. Despite many obstacles, fund limitations, weather, and just plain politics, the past year has seen considerable progress. Camp Schwab, a modern typhoon-proof RLT camp, is well underway as is Camp Hansen. Camp Sukiran is being augmented. A new Division CP at Camp Courtney is on the drawing boards. The most signal significant improvement has been the opening of MCAF Futema as the home of the 1stMAW's Helicopter Group (MAG 16). Helicopter training in the division can now proceed at an increased tempo. The opening of MCAF Futema represents the first step toward closing the WestPac division-wing team.

Logistics

The degree of readiness of a unit can be directly related to the logistical support that has been planned, is in being, and which will continue to be available in the future. FMFPac is actively engaged in many phases of this support. A plan is in being, although constantly being refined, whereby on signal, tailored quantities of material can be immediately shipped to deployed units throughout the Pacific Command.

There will be no period of days required for requisitioning. There will be no days of procurement lead time. There will be a limited number of days required for packing. With minimum effort, movement to a port is executed.

The material readiness of a unit is not static. Do nothing and the materiel will soon be inoperative or obsolete. Despite all maintenance effort, equipment wears out. This past year saw a new level of material readiness as a result of the FMF Rehabilitation and Evacuation Program. Equipment was phased into a rebuild program. The using unit received the replacement prior to evacuating the old item of equipment. This constant flow of new or rebuilt material into the operating units has enhanced readiness.

Exercise BLUE STAR was notable because it gave the 3d Force Service Regiment its first opportunity to go into the field in support of a division/wing team in an amphibious exercise. During the course of the exercise, the FSR assumed control of the Beach Support Areas, enabling division units to displace forward. This training provided the answers to many questions and raised as many new problems, yet to be solved. However, there is no longer any doubt about the capabilities of this major component of the FMFPac.

FMFPac has had a busy year and a profitable one. It is a much improved force. It has met every task assigned, both training and operational. There is no inclination to sit back and be content. Much remains to be done to continue this improvement. Part Two of this article will briefly describe some of the aspects of readiness improvement that will be prominent in the near future.

USMC

REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

PART TWO PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE READINESS

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC, like any fighter, must be able to react quickly. Readiness to go is not good enough. Preparedness to get there is what counts. In conjunction with the Pacific Fleet, FMFPac is constantly seeking ways and means to reduce reaction time. For example, in August, a floating BLT, long a component of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, became a reality in the Seventh Fleet. Rotating BLT's every two months from Okinawa, the 3dMarDiv can initiate reaction without waiting for ships, without the delays of loading. While embarked, this BLT will engage in amphibious exercises, good-will port calls, and learn more about an important segment of the free world. When LPH are available, the striking power of this force will include the capability of vertical envelopment.

Faced with the vast distances of the Pacific, FMFPac has long depended upon airlift to move high-cost and critical supplies. Timely logistical support is mandatory. Transport aircraft rapidly move personnel and supplies to deployed units. Plans have been made to airlift essential troop units from California to support WestPac operations. A provisional communication company has been organized in the Force Communications Battalion. This task-organized forward echelon of the battalion is poised to be flown to any location in the Western Pacific. It is capable of supporting a brigade expeditionary force, or to initiate the support of a larger force.

Throughout the Force, increased emphasis is being placed on training for air transport. With the co-operation of the Air Force, units are learning and refining the techniques of rapidly loading and unloading large transport aircraft. The object of this effort is to reduce reaction time.

HAVWIT

"Have Landing Field — Will Travel." With these words, MajGen Richard C. Mangrum, formerly CG, 1stMAW, described the capability of his command after the successful installation of SELF (Short Expeditionary Landing Field) during Exercise BLUE STAR. The 1stMAW's GAZETTE article vividly described that event. Despite this demonstration of expeditionary airfield installation, the problem of flying tactical aircraft long distances over water has been a limiting factor. FMFPac is improving its ability to get the planes to the area. In-flight refueling provides that ability.

The first trans-oceanic flight by Marine tactical aircraft was made in 1958 during the Taiwan crisis. Twenty-four FJ-4B "Furies" from MAG-13 flew from Hawaii to Japan. The flight was made possible only by the use of Navy and Air Force tankers. This feat demonstrated that fast deployments over great distances were both necessary and possible. Since then, FMFPac has sought to improve its in-flight refueling capability.

The next step was the "buddy tanker" system. Essentially a 300-gallon fuel tank equipped with a drogue which reels out, the "buddy" tank is carried on the bomb rack of attack aircraft. Tactical planes are equipped with a probe which plugs into the drogue of the "buddy" tanker. In 1959, MAG-13 again set the pace when a series of "buddy" flights was flown from Hawaii to California. These flights required only resources organic to the Marine Aircraft Group.

The final phase of this program will be reached when aviation units have the GV-1. This plane is a tanker version of the Lockheed "Hercules." FMFPac will then have the organic means for getting its birds rapidly into the objective area from any location in the Pacific. HAVWIT will be no idle jest.

Air Defense

The advent of high-performance aircraft has made war-tested air defense concepts and weapons obsolete. FMFPac units are receiving new weapons, new control and detection equipment. But more important, Force Troops units at Twenty-nine Palms, working with the 3d MAW at El Toro, are developing and testing new concepts. They are working on the integration of surface-to-air and air-to-air defenses. They are working on the integration

of shore and ship based defenses in the objective area. Although highly sophisticated equipment is being developed to assist them, they are not waiting. They are improving their capabilities with equipment now on hand. This is a basic function of a force-in-readiness. Exercises are scheduled for the near future designed to further develop and refine these concepts, and further train personnel in the intricacies of their equipment. (See Exercise LONG-HAUL, p. MCA–3, Nov.)

Mechanized Data Processing

Let there be no doubt about it. War gets more complex daily. The data required to keep a military unit functioning is increasing. The time available to prepare, analyze, and evaluate this data is contracting. FMFPac units have been provided Mobile Data Processing Platoons to prepare data quickly and accurately. These units are designed to take to the field and furnish machine accounting support. Personnel accounting, combat casualty reporting and supply accounting are immediately in the program. Plans are afoot to extend this capability to expedite the preparation of embarkation data and to maintain order of battle information. Machine accounting application is possible wherever large amounts of repetitive information must be recorded, stored, sorted, analyzed and printed. During the next year, FMFPac units will be active in field testing this equipment and extending machine accounting applications to other areas. Certain equipment design and operational concept changes are indicated, and these will be thoroughly explored.

Troop Test Program

How will new weapons and equipment, soon to be made available to FMF units, influence organization? What new tactics should be used to bring these new weapons into the battle? Answers to these and many other questions will be provided for the Corps during the next year. Working with other Marine Corps units, the Troop Test Program will take theories into the field wherever possible in order to determine their validity. The test program will include every type of unit from the rifle platoon to FMFPac Headquarters. This is an all-out program. Its results will be evident for many years to come. Regardless of what specific findings are made, this effort will result in increased FMFPac readiness.

Controlled Input

FMFPac has had ample proof that controlled input and unit rotation have resulted in significant increases in combat readiness. The stability has enabled training to reach new heights. Aircraft safety has been enhanced. Means are being sought to extend this program to other units. An immediate objective is to extend the program to VMO squadrons and to other ground units that make up a BLT. With all elements of a BLT in the program, it will be possible to move combat-loaded BLT's in Fleet shipping across the Pacific, with all equipment. This will mean that every other month another combat-ready unit will be at sea, available instantly for diversion to any scene of crisis.

The benefits of controlled input are not confined to the support of the deployed elements. California and Hawaii based units can enjoy the benefits of personnel stability as well. By insuring longer tours of duty in one unit, individual training requirements will be reduced, with resultant personnel and unit efficiencies. School quotas and overheads can be reduced. Progressive training can become a reality, not a term appearing on a piece of paper. It is recognized that many problems must be solved by the Marine Corps before complete stability through controlled input can be implemented. FMFPac is working on these solutions.

Readiness and the Man

No unit can be considered combat ready unless its personnel are mentally ready. FMFPac is an integrated, flexible, mobile striking force. Its integration is derived from air and ground units under common command. Its flexibility rests in its capability to tailor powerful forces to meet any one of a wide variety of combat situations and environments. Its mobility is not the result of its ability to march down to a dock and embark. Mobility is a state of mind. It is acceptance of the fact that movement is a normal way of life. The tempo of activity, bulwarked by years of Marine Corps tradition, keeps all hands in the mobility habit. Embarkation is routine, a way of life. It is accepted as the logical product of all other activity. FMFPac has the men, the weapons, the equipment, the know-how and the "can do" spirit of a combat capable force-in-readiness. USMC

Chinese and US Marines planning Blue Star Aggressor action

The Marine Reserve

BGen W. T. Fairbourn
Director, MCR

Six-month Marines are helping the Reserve retain its fighting shape in the air and on the ground.

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID AND WRITTEN about the Six-Month Training Program, its effect on the overall readiness of the Marine Corps Reserve, and the quality of individual trainees.

The fact is that the program, now in its fifth year, has proved to be the necessary shot-in-the-arm the Reserve needed to keep its fighting shape.

At this writing, more than 4,000 Marine reservists are undergoing six month training. This is a little more than nine per cent of total current strength of the Organized Reserve. Half of our Organized reservists—21,000—are "veterans" of the Six-Month program.

From the moment they start recruit training, these reservists become a part of the homogenous boot population at San Diego and Parris Island. There's no way of distinguishing reserves from the regulars at this point in the game.

Six-Month reservists fit into two categories, used primarily to distinguish their periods of military obligation. Those who enlist in the Reserve between 17 and 18½ years of age are in Category "H". Those from 18½ to 26 are in Category "K". The former enlist for eight years; the latter for six. Both "H" and 'K" reservists spend their entire periods of enlistment in the Ready Reserve, which means they are liable for mobilization at the discretion of the President in the event of a national emergency.

After recruit training, Six-Month trainees go in one of two directions, depending on the type of unit—air or ground—at which they initially enlisted.

Those who enlisted at Reserve aviation units are sent from recruit training directly to the Aviation Fundamentals and Screening Course, at NAS, Jacksonville, Fla. After completing this four-week course they are then generally assigned either to 1) Mechanical Fundamentals Course; 2) their parent units for on-the-job training for the rest of their six months of active duty.

On the other side of the coin, Reservists from Organized ground units are required to complete Individual Combat Training. At that point another parting of the ways occurs. Those from Reserve infantry units continue on through Advanced Combat Training. Those from other ground units spend the remainder of their six months of active duty under instruction with FMF or base units in occupational field training. Excepted from these policies are Reservists from infantry units who have been selected for training in communications. They are assigned schooling in that field.

A certain number of air reservists —there are 180 billets this year—may be accepted for additional formal training at Navy Class "A" Schools. Those selected must agree to extend beyond the initial six-month period of active duty. The lengths of these extensions, of course, depend on the duration of training.

Still other aviation reservists may be detailed to attend a Naval Air Mobile Training Unit course, where they receive instruction on a particular type of aircraft. These courses, unlike the formal schools, require no extension, and are completed during the normal six month active duty period.

Another avenue open to ground reservists is provided by a brand-new policy of assigning a limited number—50 this fiscal year—to extended technical training. Those selected will be assigned to schools only after they have successfully completed Individual Combat Training. As in the case of aviation reservists picked for formal training, extensions will be necessary.

The Reserve's two technical training programs, though relatively limited at present, will tend to make up shortages in ground and air units by furnishing necessary skilled personnel in junior NCO ranks.

The first group of ground reservitsts to undergo training under the new program will begin in March 1961, when they enter the Basic Electronics Course, at MCRD, San Diego. Others will attend a HAWK missile fire control course at 29 Palms. Still others will be receiving instruction in refrigeration mechanics, turret repair, electricity, machinery repair and construction electricity.

Of course, not all Six-Month trainees get a crack at technical training. Assignment depends first on the need for certain skills in particular units. Only 25 ground units, for example, will be sending reservists to extended technical training in the first increment starting next spring. Selections will be made from a group of three candidates for each billet. District directors are responsible for naming the candidates and making the final choice.

On the other hand, Six-Month trainees unable to attend technical training will not be left out in the cold. Once they return from their six months of active duty, they start on the continual round of unit training that is resulting in the excellent state of readiness the Marine Corps Reserve enjoys today. Whether they are infantry or amtrac, aviation or artillery, our Reserve units are constantly growing in stature and purpose—and our Six-Month trainees are growing right along with their units.

USMC

THE SALTY SKIPPER

Reads a Letter From a Friend

"FOR YOU, CAPTAIN."

"Thank you, Carmichael," I said, taking the letter from my clerk. I glanced at the return address. "From Grunt. Good" I said to myself slitting open the envelope. I unfolded the paper and started reading:

"Dear Salty,

You sure have come up in the world—a bona fide celebrity in the GAZETTE. Why, I can remember when you were sweating out your first guard mount.

"However, I didn't write to marvel at your fame or to sing your praises. On the contrary, I am a little concerned about your ideas of the duties of a first sergeant (GAZETTE: Aug '60).

"To put it bluntly, Salty, I think you forgot a few things!

"You know, it took a long time to get the first sergeant out of the company office. Many people say that we have problems because of it. In fact, I know a couple of company commanders around here who are trying to fix the problem by easing the first sergeant back into the office.

"For instance, at Happy Hour the other night, one of the adjutants was sounding off about company administration going to hell in a hand basket mighty fast and, according to him, all because the Top has been unleashed from his desk. My answer to this: each company has a sergeant administrative man. If he can't handle the company administration, he can't handle his rank either.

"There's another bunch around here who should know better but who say that once the Top steps out of the office, he is stepping on the Gunny's toes.

"The Top is the inside man; the Gunny is the outside man. Put them both outside and they are either in each other's way or neither is doing his job." There may be some truth here, but I can recall the Top and Gunny both outside in Korea—worked fine.

"Now, take my first sergeant, Salty. Here's what he does: He supervises the administration and the clerical work, working through the admin chief; he honchos the training and the operations of the company, working through the gunnery sergeant; and he supervises all the logistics—billeting, messing, transportation, and supply. The property NCO helps out here. The Top is my main contact with the troops. Much of "the word" is passed out through him; the rest is passed through the platoon leaders, but the Top is always aware of what they are told. He makes sure all my policies are carried out. This means that part of his time is taken up with inspections and investigations. In other words, Salty, the first sergeant assists me in supervising *all* the activities of the company.

"Now some of this may sound as though it conflicts with the gunnery sergeant. Not at all. In garrison, the Gunny coordinates the training schedule, arranges for training areas and classroom space, recommends the assignment of enlisted instructors, and observes and critiques training performed and conducted by other NCOs. He's also responsible for supervising and coordinating many of the housekeeping chores in the company area. There's no conflict in combat either (No pun intended). The Gunny assists me in coordinating fire plans and troop movement and positioning. The Top supervises administration, supply, CP organization, communications, and—the Gunny.

What I'm trying to say is that the Top is the chief enlisted honcho in the company. There is no conflict in duties with the admin chief, the property NCO, or the gunnery sergeant, because the Top supervises them all. He is the boss!

"So you see, Salty, I use the first sergeant differently than you. I realize everyone has his own ideas on the subject. Maybe some of your buddies back there would like to give me their opinions. We all might learn something. Let's hear from them. Regards.

Grunt McGinty"

Letters to Grunt

Ed: How about it readers? Any ideas on the subject? We'll forward your letters to Grunt McGinty. Send them in care of Gazette, PO 1844, Quantico, Virginia.

the SQUAD and the M-14

By Capt John H. Smith

THE WEAPONS SO MANY MARINES have come to know so well will soon be as much a thing of the past as the bow and arrow. The M-1 and BAR are about to be replaced. It doesn't matter whether you're glad to see them go or are violently opposed. Their replacements have been tested, found to be satisfactory, and accepted for use by the Marine Corps in the near future.

I talk of "their replacements" as if we were adopting two entirely new weapons. Actually, both the M-1 and BAR will be superseded by the same rifle. The M-14 when properly modified, is capable of both automatic and semi-automatic fire.

Since the fate of our present weapons has already been decided, I do not intend to dwell on the pros and cons of the M-1 and BAR versus the M-14. Rather, I propose to discuss the contemplated employment of the M-14. Specifically, does the adoption of a new weapon automatically mean we must change our tactics or rifle platoon TO? Before we can intelligently discuss employment, however, we must have a general idea of the M-14's characteristics.

The Rifle, Caliber 7.62mm, M-14, is quite similar to the M-1 in appearance and operation. It is air-cooled, gas operated and primarily designed for semi-automatic fire. Unlike the M-1, however, it is fed by a magazine having a capacity of 20 rounds and is chambered for the NATO 7.62mm cartridge. The biggest difference between the two rifles is that the modified M-14 will fire automatically. The necessary modifications include a selector switch, to allow the rifleman to switch from semi-automatic to automatic fire, a hinged butt plate and a bipod to steady the weapon, and a slotted hand guard to provide for more efficient cooling of the barrel. A final advantage of the new rifle is its weight—about 10 pounds. Although the weight of the M-1 compares favorably with the M-14, the latter is considerably lighter than the 20-pound BAR.

Ammo Problem

The prospect of having a relatively lightweight weapon capable of automatic fire and available to the entire rifle platoon appears to be advantageous. A platoon so equipped would have tremendous firepower. I seriously doubt, however, that any experienced commander would want to go into combat with such an outfit. Ammunition resupply and fire discipline would be difficult problems to solve. For this reason we must decide how we shall arm each man in our rifle squad.

I think everyone will agree that it would be desirable, if conditions were ideal, to give every rifleman the capacity for becoming an automatic rifleman when the situation made it necessary. We could retain our present fire team organization with one man actually designated as the automatic rifleman, fulfilling the mission of providing most of the firepower for that team. The other three team members would still provide security, leadership, and assistance for the most important weapon in that team. They would keep their rifles set for semi-automatic fire. In the event the automatic rifleman became a casualty (or for that matter, if both he and his weapon were destroyed) any other member of that fire team could take up his mission, simply by flipping his selector switch to the automatic position and aiming in the new direction.

Sounds good, doesn't it? But this is the ideal situation. To make the plan work we would need troops so

Why not arm the rifle squad entirely with M-14 (Modified)? The author tells why he doesn't think extra firepower is worth an all-out "switch."

well grounded in fire discipline that they would never fire automatically except when actually performing the duties of automatic rifleman or when ordered by competent authority to switch to automatic fire.

Fire Discipline Imperfect

If we could always be sure of having well trained, experienced troops, capable of maintaining proper fire discipline, it might be feasible to have every rifleman armed with the M-14 modified. Everyone will agree, I think, that this is unrealistic. Well trained troops are not always available.

It would be virtually impossible, then, to expect fire discipline to be anywhere near perfect. We could expect some panic firing when the going got tough. With everyone supplied with weapons able to fire several hundred rounds in a matter of a few minutes, ammunition supplies might be depleted before the battle really began.

Supplying ammunition, then, is a real problem. How much can a rifleman be expected to carry? Today's rifleman carries a cartridge belt with ten clips of eight rounds each and usually puts a bandoleer over each shoulder, giving him a total of about 200 rounds. Even if this load were doubled, think how fast each man could expend his supply when firing automatically. Since the M-14 is fed by magazines holding 20 rounds, all ammunition must be pre-loaded in magazines. Otherwise we will have the same problem faced by many BAR-men today—that of reloading magazines during a fire fight. In a fast moving situation we could conceivably spend more time loading than firing, causing unacceptable lulls. The problem of resupply would, I believe, defeat the prospect of arming everyone with an automatic weapon.

Looking at the problem of automatic versus semi-automatic arms as our basic weapon, and assuming we could lick the ammunition supply problem, let's see if the automatic rifle for everyone is tactically necessary. Will it give us any marked advantage over the semi-automatic?

I don't think it will. In an offensive situation, for example, if an assaulting squad were entirely armed with automatic rifles, the inclination would be for each man to fire out his first magazine in one or two bursts within the first second or two after leaving the assault position. It would take very well trained troops to stick to firing one round at a time. Such a burst of fire would make for a fearsome assult indeed—until the initial impetus died down and everyone began fumbling for a new magazine while still on the run. Semi-automatic fire, on the other hand, is easier to control and would give us more even coverage of the objective. We need steady, even fire with no lulls to keep the enemy down until we can reach his position and destroy him.

Let's take the same squad while operating as a base of fire. How much firepower is needed here? Not enough to require everyone to be armed with an automatic rifle. If it's going to be a particularly tough objective, at least one section of the

company's machine guns will probably be supporting the attack too. If the objective is small and lightly defended, the three automatic weapons already in the squad, together with the nine other rifles, should be enough to do the job. Once you get the enemy pinned down, it doesn't take many rounds passing over his head to keep him there.

In a defensive situation automatic weapons might prove advantageous, but they're still not essential. At night, when the rifleman can't see his target, more automatic rifles firing into an avenue of approach or firing flanking fire across the front would be desirable. During daytime, however, I don't think there would be much added advantage until the enemy reached the vicinity of your MLR. At greater distances well-aimed shots from rifles would be just as effective, would not prematurely divulge the positions of automatic weapons, and would save ammunition. The firepower gained by using all automatic rifles would not outweigh all the disadvantages.

Two Alternatives

If we decide not to arm everyone in the rifle platoon with an automatic weapon, we have only two logical alternatives. We must either leave the fire team the way it is, or change our TE and have more than one automatic rifle in each fire team. Suppose, for example, that we put two modified M-14's in each fire team, giving us twice as much automatic fire as before while still leaving two men free to be used for fire team leader, security, and ammo carrying. This could be done. I feel, however, that it would reduce the efficiency of the fire team unless one additional man were added to the team's TO.

As the fire team is presently organized each member has his assigned duties. The automatic rifleman must provide most of the firepower within the rifle platoon. This weapon must be protected and kept in operation at all times. Resupply of ammunition for such a weapon is an acute problem. The Marine Corps has found the use of the assistant automatic rifleman to be one way of effectively solving the supply problem. He carries about half the ammunition load. I submit that any additional automatic rifles would require additional assistants to keep them firing. This would swell the size of the fire team from four to five men, the squad by three men, and the platoon by nine.

Obviously, the size of a division would be greatly increased by adding one man to each fire team. It would be impractical to expect the other team members to do duty as assistant automatic riflemen in addition to handling their primary jobs. The fire team leader, for example, is there primarily to direct and control the fire and movement of each of the other three members. He is not merely a fourth rifleman, firing his rifle at every opportunity. He should fire only when necessary. He

plainly has no need for an automatic rifle. If given one he would be encouraged to forget his duties as a leader and be tempted to become another rifleman. While he could carry extra ammunition for the automatic rifles, he should not be utilized as an assistant for that weapon to the detriment of his more important duties.

The scout, too, has particular duties. These duties keep him in a vulnerable position, usually in front of the rest of the fire team. He must be able to move about freely and should be as unencumbered by excess gear and responsibilities as possible. He could not be expected to provide effective security for the fire team if he were also acting as assistant rifleman or automatic rifleman.

The trend in the Marine Corps has been to try to reduce personnel wherever possible. Granted, more and more responsibility is being placed on the small unit commander. However, we do not expect the rifle company to fight as a separate unit. Today's tactics dictate that the infantry battalion is the smallest unit capable of unit separation. If a company is required to operate alone, such as on patrol, the solution is to beef it up at that time for that particular mission. Therefore, I see no justification for an increase in the company TO without also increasing its responsibilities.

If extra automatic rifles are added, together with extra support personnel to keep them firing, a corresponding number of units, probably fire teams, would have to be eliminated in order to keep the size of the company constant. Such a reduction would remove one of the commander's maneuver elements, leaving him one less unit with which to influence the outcome of battle. This should not be done.

Retain Semi-automatic

The conclusion is that we should use the M-14 modified for what it is —a replacement for the BAR. If and when we can lick the problem of ammo resupply, that will be the time to think about putting an automatic fire selector switch on every rifle in the platoon. The semi-automatic rifle, which has served so well in the past, should be retained.

USMC

Capt Smith, Naval Academy Class of '53, graduated from Basic School in Jan '54, two months later held his first command: rifle platoon, 1/3/3. Since then his interests haven't strayed far from infantry weapons. He served twice as an aide (to ADC, 3dMarDiv and CG, ForTrps, Pacific), later taught tactics at Basic School where he was also a platoon commander. He is now Asst Secretary, MCEC.

WAKE ISLAND

"Knock it off and get back on the guns. What d'ya think this is, a ball game?"

Who said it?

The words are credited to old China hand, Platoon Sergeant Henry Bedell, USMC, who bellowed his advice to gunners of Battery L, 1st Defense Battalion, defending Wake Atoll 19 years ago this month. Gun crews, elated over sinking an enemy destroyer, had stopped their firing to cheer.

Recalled to action they proceeded to beat off two more destroyers, a light cruiser, helped send a highly touted invasion force back to Kwajalein licking its wounds.

About this action, naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, wrote: "The eleventh day of December 1941 should always be a proud day in the history of the Corps. Never again in this Pacific War did coast defense guns beat off an amphibious landing."

Later, in his final battle report two days before Wake fell, Maj Paul A. Putnam, CO of heroic VMF-211, whose pilots fought a losing battle in the sky, wrote: "All hands behaved splendidly and held up in a manner of which the Marine Corps may well tell."

Trouble is, in one respect, the Marine Corps is not telling the story of Wake very well. HQMC knows it, intends to do something about it but needs help.

Wanted: Ideas from Marines for designing a suitable monument commemorating the defense of Wake by Marines.

Actually, there is a Wake Island Memorial (see cut), a jury-rigged affair, recently renovated but still an eyesore to many. It is considered inadequate to recognize properly the achievements of 449 Marines who held on through 16 days of bitter struggle, who fought the enemy on land, sea and in the air.

What's needed is a lasting monument that tells a two-sided story: a tribute to Wake's gallant Marines—a legacy from them to Marines everywhere, now and in the years to come.

MARTCOM REPORT

By LtCol R. B. Moore, USMCR

Part II

This month's report covers Operation Vigil, 1960 Reserve summer training exercises

A pause while arming jets

ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING OF Marine Air Reservists saw some notable changes this year.

Of MARTCOM's 56 aircraft squadrons, 27 trained at central maneuver sites, 12 at reserve air stations other than their home bases.

Ten of the 12 Marine air control squadrons were deployed as were all 18 of the Marine Air Reserve groups. This was the highest percentage deployed in recent years and was accomplished primarily by using both MCAAS, Beaufort, and MCAAS, Yuma as maneuver sites, in addition to MCAS, Cherry Point, and MCAS, El Toro.

The overall designation for summer training exercises of Marine Air Reserve units was "Operation VIGIL."

Included were two air-ground exercises in which Marine Air Reservists flew in support of ground reserve units.

On the East Coast the air-ground exercise within Operation VIGIL was WHIPSAW. WHIPSAW was held at Camp Lejeune where the ground reserves conducted maneuvers in the Onslow Beach—New River area.

The air-ground exercise on the West Coast was CHARGER, held at MCB, 29 Palms.

During Operation VIGIL, reserve pilots trained in close air support, aerial gunnery (live and camera against drones and towed targets), helicopter operations, rockets, bombs, strafing, jet familiarization, ground controlled approach, aircraft control, jet instrument training, ground control, and night interception. This training was climaxed by the air-ground exercises.

Schools available to organized reserve personnel during active duty training were: ABC defense, low pressure chamber, seat ejection chamber, Sidewinder course, projectionist school, Staff NCO leadership course, operational flight trainer, combat swimming, APG-30, turbojet engine, survival training and NAMO trainer. Pistol and rifle ranges were fully utilized.

This year all MARTCOM squadrons were combined and assigned to Provisional Marine Air Reserve groups for operations. There were eight such Prov MAGs.

Prov MAG 1 operated out of MCAS, Cherry Point 16-30 July (Col J. Hunter Reinberg commanding) with the following squadrons:
MARG-13 Grosse Ile
VMA-236 Anacostia
VMA-341 Jacksonville
MARG-20 Norfolk
VMA-231 Grosse Ile
VMA-233 Norfolk

Removing sting from jet

Prov MAG 2 also operated out of MCAS, Cherry Point 16-30 July (Col Frank C. Drury commanding) with the following squadrons:
MARG-8 Atlanta
VMA-243 Atlanta
MARG-14 Jacksonville
VMF-113 Olathe
MACS-15 Atlanta
MACS-19 Grosse Ile

Prov MAG 3 operated out of MCAAS, Beaufort 2-16 July (LtCol T. S. Ferdinand commanding) with these units:
MARG-1 New York
VMF-131 New York
MACS-26 New York
MARG-25 Willow Grove
VMF-218 Willow Grove
VMA-322 South Weymouth

Prov MAG 4 operated out of MCAAS, Beaufort 16-30 July (LtCol H. C. Langenfeld commanding) with:
MARG-4 South Weymouth
VMA-217 South Weymouth
VMF-313 New York
MARG-25 Willow Grove
VMF-441 Willow Grove
MACS-21 South Weymouth

On the East Coast for exercise WHIPSAW, Marine Air-Ground Task Force 57 (MAGTF-57) was created, comprised of the 5th Staff Group (Washington, D. C.) and MARG-7 (Anacostia). Col V. M. Davis was CO.

MAGTF-57 operated 16-30 July at Camp Lejeune with units of Prov MAG 1 together with MACS-15 (Atlanta) and MACS-19 (Grosse Ile) in support.

During the winter and spring, MAGTF-57 wrote the administrative and operational plans governing the training of attached squadrons. COMART reviewed and ap-

proved the air plan of Operation WHIPSAW while CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune was responsible for the overall concept and direction of the operation. Prov MAG 1, with four aircraft squadrons, simulated a carrier group in support of WHIPSAW units. Together these air-ground forces secured a beachhead at New River.

Thus reservists at all levels planned and executed their own exercise. This gave them valuable training in all phases of Marine air-ground operations.

Meanwhile, training in squadrons not participating in the exercise, along with those taking part, ranged from gunnery, rockets, and bombing to hand-to-hand combat; from electronics to jet engine repair; from air-to-air missiles to the M-1 rifle.

Squadrons at Beaufort concentrated on live ordnance training, consisting of air-to-air gunnery and air-to-ground rocket and bomb practice. The final two days of each period were devoted to competitive exercises conducted in accordance with the Fleet Exercise Manual.

Operation VIGIL on the East Coast, with its accompanying air-ground exercise (WHIPSAW), was highly successful. Pilots averaged 38 hours flight time per pilot. More important, this time was accrued in actual operational exercises, not merely to earn flight time per se. Approximately 50 per cent of FY 1961 syllabus hours were flown.

Immediately on completion of the Eastern phase of Operation VIGIL, MARTCOM moved out for its Western operation. Training on the West Coast was similar to that on the East.

Prov MAG 5, operating 13-27 August at MCAS, El Toro (LtCol C. Bernard commanding), was comprised of:
MARG-18 New Orleans
MARG-23 Seattle
VMA-143 New Orleans
VMA-216 Seattle
MARG-21 Oakland
VMF-244 Oakland.
VMA-213 Minneapolis
VMF-244 Oakland

Prov MAG 6, operating 16-30 July at MCAAS, Yuma (LtCol J. W. Lang commanding), comprised:
MARG-22 Olathe
VMA-611 Glenview
MARG-16 Memphis
VMF-124 Memphis

Adjusting ejection seat gear

Prov MAG 7, operating from Yuma 30 July-13 August (LtCol C. C. Myre commanding), comprised:
MARG-3 Minneapolis
VMA-543 Glenview
MARG-11 Denver
VMF-221 Memphis

Prov MAG 8, operating from Yuma 13-27 August (LtCol E. Ochoa commanding), comprised:
MARG-2 Los Alamitos
VMF-215 Olathe
VMF-241 Los Alamitos
VMF-534 Los Alamitos
MARG-5 Dallas
VMF-111 Dallas
VMF-112 Dallas

As at Beaufort, squadrons at Yuma concentrated on air-to-air gunnery and air-to-ground rockets and bombs. Again, the final two days of each period were devoted to competitive exercises.

At MCAF, Santa Ana, four Marine air control squadrons underwent training. MACS-18 from Los Alamitos trained 16-30 July; MACS-23 from Denver trained 30 July to 13 August. From 13-27 August, two squadrons — MACS-16 of Minneapolis and MACS-25 from Oakland— were organized into Provisional Marine Air Control Squadron 31. MACS-31 furnished the air control and interceptor work for all reserve aircraft.

Also training at Santa Ana was Helicopter Transport Squadron 767, New Orleans. This squadron, less aircraft, was integrated with HMR-361 of the regular establishment, which augmented MARTCOM units during Operation CHARGER at 29 Palms. This gave HMR-767 an opportunity to train in troop and logistical lifts, and to become familiar with up-to-date helicopter doctrine.

Engine check before takeoff

Operation CHARGER was similar to WHIPSAW in the East. Running this operation was MAGTF-21, Col Douglas Peacher commanding. The task force consisted of Marine Staff Group 9 (Chicago) and MARG 12 (Glenview) with Prov MAG 5 in support.

As in WHIPSAW, Operation CHARGER was planned and executed by the reserves, while COMART reviewed and approved the plans. CG, MCB, 29 Palms, was responsible for the overall concept and direction of the exercise.

Air Reserve personnel participating in CHARGER were augmented by an HMR squadron, a detachment of VMA, a detachment of VMR, a Marine air support squadron, and a TACC from the regular establishment

Prov MAG 5, in support, controlled all air operations while MACS-22 (Glenview) remained at 29 Palms to function as Combat Air Operations Center for the exercise.

Evaluation of Operation Charger and the West Coast phase of Operation Vigil was not completed at this writing. The West Coast operation, however, is expected to be fully as successful as the East Coast phase.

During the period 22-24 August, MajGen Arthur F. Binney, Director of Aviation, and BGen William T. Fairbourn. Director of Reserve, visited the operations at El Toro, Yuma, and 29 Palms. Both said they were impressed by the training and state of readiness of air and ground reserves.

The success of Marine Air Reserve summer training was best summed up by the Commandant in a statement to the press. Said Gen Shoup:

"The Reserves are ready!" USMC

OBSERVATION POST

This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment at regular rates on publication.

SNCO Warrant—A Teaching Degree?

By GySgt John F. McAllister

AT A MARINE BASE NOT TOO LONG ago, about 50 of us enlisted men sat engrossed as an instructor, a SNCO, conducted a general military subjects class. Our rapt attention was occasioned solely by the instructor's habit of continually jamming his trigger finger into his right ear as he read from a manual. The finger seemed to penetrate deeper and deeper each time. Every time he withdrew it we expected to hear a pop —like a cork coming out of a bottle.

We left that class with only one thing—a profound respect for the ruggedness of the human ear. Military subject-wise the instruction was about as useful as a vacation travel folder in a prison library.

This particular SNCO was obviously trying his best. The results, however, proved only one thing. Any idea that the SNCO warrant automatically brings with it the ability to instruct adequately is as false as a solemn expression on an undertaker at a $50,000 funeral.

This same SNCO isn't qualified to operate a jeep in the boonies unless he has passed a driving test and holds a government driver's license. A 15-year accident-free civilian driving record cuts no ice. Yet he's qualified to teach Marines something they'd need to know in order to save their lives in combat—with no license to teach except that he happened to be in position to be "captured" for the assignment.

When he goes to the rifle range, be it for the 10th or 12th time, he's still required to attend school range classes for instruction in something he probably knows by heart before he can crank off a round—SNCO or no SNCO. But, as a staff, he's expected to be able to assume a teaching assignment with no instruction save the dates and times of the classes, where reference material can be found, and where the key to the classroom can be picked up.

This is not to say that all SNCO-conducted classes are poor. By and large they range from adequate to excellent. It's the sub-standard periods of instruction, the steady drone of someone nervously reading from a manual, to which exception is being made. If it's important enough to have a number of men leave their regular duties to attend a class, it follows that adequate instruction is equally important.

Wouldn't it pay everyone concerned, especially SNCO's, to have short-course instructor schools at Marine installations? A one or two-week course, while not producing finished instructors, would provide the student with a working knowledge of the more important do's and don'ts of the teaching process. Attendance by the majority of SNCO's

at a given base could be arranged by having the schools convene on a regularly scheduled basis.

No individual grading would be necessary. Like a familiarization course, the basic idea would be to give each student some experience in presenting short periods of instruction under controlled conditions. Distracting habits, or other mistakes, would be pointed out and corrected as they occurred. Some men can face murderous fire in combat and not get too shook, but put them in front of a class and they get as nervous as a pickpocket at a policeman's ball. In most cases this nervousness can be overcome with a little expert help and the opportunity to practice in front of a group. Personal experience at Instructor Orientation Courses and at SNCO Toastmaster Club meetings has often shown this to be the case.

No doubt many Staff NCO's won't buy the instructor school idea. This is SOP. They're secure in the knowledge that they'll never be "fingered" for instructor duty—until the bubble bursts and they find they have been scheduled to hold a class on the .45 or the BAR. When you get the assignment you're generally on your own. You can break out the ol' SNCO warrant and tack it on the classroom lectern but your instruction will only be as effective as you are yourself. You can remind the class that you're a SNCO, therefore qualified to teach, but what they get from the instruction will still depend solely on just how adequately prepared you are to give it.

The Corps' Annual Technique of Instruction Competition proves that we have some fine instructor material available. Unfortunately, only a minute percentage of SNCO's enter. The previously mentioned Toastmaster Clubs are fine training grounds for anyone subject to teaching assignments. Yet, not too long ago, at a base having well over 1,500 SNCO's, a SNCO Toastmaster Club was forced to secure the butts simply because there weren't 10 staff to be found who were interested in attending regularly. Since it's impossible to have every SNCO enter the instruction contest, or require them to form Toastmaster Clubs, something like an instructors school is needed if all SNCO's are to be expected to instruct with any degree of success.

With the world situation what it is today, weekly or monthly classes are vital for insuring that Marines of all ranks are the well-informed, combat-ready troops they'll have to be should an emergency arise. This alone means that ALL instruction should be adequate at ALL times. Anything less is not only a waste of time—it could be fatal.

USMC
Hq, 6th MCR&RD
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New T/O for M60's

By Maj Fred Grabowsky

WITH THE ADVENT OF THE M60 machine gun we must concern ourselves with the T/O that is required to support this new weapon.

Capt Thomas C. Edwards recommended an increase in the number of men per machine gun squad in *Your New M60 Machine Gun* (GAZETTE: Sept '60). This recommendation, if accepted, would mean a machine gun squad of six men. To keep a two-gun section in action we would need 13 men.

I offer another solution to the problem of how to exploit the firepower of our new M60. Let's make our machine gun units triangular in organization, as we have done with other small units, and try to save personnel.

The machine gun presumably will be used as an assault weapon. If this is so, then the machine gun should operate with or near the assaulting squads. Why not have one MG available for use with each of our rifle squads? On occasion there might even be a requirement for attaching a machine gun to a rifle squad.

Here is the organization recommended:



The gunner can now carry the bipod-equipped weapon with a 100-round magazine in most situations. The team leader is the logical person to carry the tripod whenever there is a requirement for this item. He can also carry the spare barrel. When assigning a mission, what is better than having the team leader emplace the tripod for the initial lay of the gun? Another possibility is to have the team leader carrying extra ammo for the gun without over-burdening him. The assistant gunner is missing in this organization. His duties, however, can effectively be carried out by the team leader.

Two ammo carriers are sufficient to keep this gun supplied in all offensive situations. On defense there is no problem. In a moving situation the ammo carriers should carry about 500 rounds each. The gunner will have 100 rounds in his magazine and the team leader can carry an additional 100 or 200 rounds.

With the increased reliability of the M60 machine gun there is no longer any need for using two guns on one mission. Each gun can now carry out a mission. We no longer need to employ our guns in pairs. With the proposed organization, the rifle company can fire nine separate missions.

By eliminating the assistant gunner, only four men are needed to keep a gun in action and to fire a mission. This four-man organization resembles our present day fire team to such an extent that it should also be called a "team." Three of these teams with a leader comprise a machine gun squad of thirteen men.

There are those who advocate that we make one of these machine gun squads organic to the present rifle platoon. Should we do this, we would reduce the flexibility of the rifle company and increase the difficulties involved in supplying the guns and training the personnel. The company commander would lose one of his most potent forces for influencing the action.

A section of nine guns in the company weapons platoon would give us the flexibility required and would make for better and more uniform training of machine gun personnel. With an ammo sergeant at section headquarters the resupply problem would be somewhat diminished. This ammo sergeant need not be in the section, but could easily be in weapons platoon headquarters. His job would be resupply of ammo for all weapons in the platoon.

In Captain Edwards' organization we employ two machine guns with 13 men. Our present T/O calls for 11 men. In this recommended T/O we get three guns for 13 men. With a personnel increase of two men over our present T/O, and no increase over Captain Edwards' recommendation, we gain another gun.

Is there a better way to get more out of our M60's? USMC

Basic School, Tactics Sect
MCS, Quantico

For Want of a Firing Pin

By 2nd Lt Allan R. Millet

MARINE MACHINE GUNNERS ARE NOT now authorized to take any, I say again, *any* spare parts with them into the field. True, they are issued spare parts kits. But no parts. Any replacement of parts must be made by the battalion armorer as second echelon maintenance.

If a company were suddenly deployed, where would the battalion armorer be? Only about 1200 miles to the rear. Pretty long walk for a new firing pin.

Suppose repairs were needed in what is now third echelon maintenance. It might be a little difficult to find the Service Battalion shops in the fast moving situations Marine Corps planners are always envisioning.

A machine gun out of action benefits only our enemies. Just so much can be done by the troops themselves to keep their weapons going with first echelon maintenance. And who is naive enough to believe that gunners are not capable of properly replacing parts they handle every day?

I may be a still-wet-behind-the-ears 03 type who doesn't understand the intricacies of our supply system. I do understand one thing, though: Marine machine gunners are not getting any more fight from their maintenance plight.

The only recourse is to resort to extra-legal foraging for spare parts—a rather inefficient method of supply. Occasionally some units, as in the 3dMarDiv, use some initiative and make up sketchy spare parts kits for their machine gunners. This keeps more guns on the firing line and out of the overworked armorer's shop.

Let's put some basic spare parts in those empty kits. Let's hold a little school in ordnance repair for our 0331 people. Let's make it possible for battalion armorers to do the less-complicated third echelon work like replacing fiber discs in buffer tubes.

The demand for speedy response to international crises has outstripped the capabilities of our under-manned maintenance organizations. The front-line troops will have to take up the slack.

For want of a firing pin a small war could be lost. USMC

"F" Co, 2dBn, 2d Marines
2dMarDiv, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

OBSERVATION POST CONTINUED

How to Organize An NROTC Battalion

By Maj David G. Girard

"YOU WILL PROCEED AND REPORT TO the Commanding Officer, NROTC Unit, Blank University, for duty on his staff."

Every year officers receive similarly worded orders. The new MOI (Marine Officer Instructor) gets his initial briefing at an orientation course at Northwestern University.

While at Northwestern, Marines with NROTC experience will brief him on his new job. One topic discussed is "how to organize your battalion of Midshipmen."

Generally, the new MOI is assigned additional duty as Midshipman Battalion officer. This duty usually holds the responsibility for organizing and supervising battalion drills and parades.

NROTC Regs (Navpers 15034F) will give some aid, but may not fit the particular situation at every school. Here is a method, used at Vanderbilt University, based on personnel strength which has varied from 200 to 240 men. We have used ideas from MOI's at other schools. Some were developed independently, and others the product of our students' imagination and initiative. The important thing is that this system works.

A good starting objective for the new MOI is to place the burden of all Midshipmen where it belongs—on the Midshipman Battalion Commander and his staff.

Second goal: give every Mid'n 1/c a chance to operate in a command billet. In order to carry this idea out we established two sets of officers and petty officers, one for each semester.

The "off-duty" officer group acted as a planning staff. This group was responsible to the Battalion Commander for such activities as the Midshipmen's Ball; revision of "Guidelines," our unit handbook; and the intramural athletic program. They also attended the Senior Seminars conducted by the unit Executive Officer and staff. The unit 1/c instructor acted as adviser to the Planning Staff.

In order to strengthen the Battalion Commander's authority and to assign him more responsibility we established a system of Battalion Commander's Mast. All offenses by 4/c, 3/c, and 2/c Midshipmen are handled by the Battalion Commander. Offenses by seniors (1/c) are taken care of by the unit XO or CO. Punishment for class and lab absences is a combination of demerits and enforced study table time. Supervised study, such as "5 and 50," really means 5 demerits and 50 minutes. The respective instructors assign extra work so that the study table means production of a written paper in fulfillment of the assignment. Extra duties are assigned for non-absence offenses. University approval was secured for the conduct of such discipline. In fact, the supervised study aspect had great appeal to them.

The effect of Battalion Commander's Mast, assignment of authority and responsibility to Midshipmen, and improved supervision may be seen in these figures:

	'58-'59	*'59-'60**
Absence from class	127	98
Absence from drill	64	23
Absence from Lab	31	5
Out of uniform	22	32**

**Mast initiated in '59-'60.*

***Increase because uniform was required all day on Lab/drill days rather than only at Naval Science Class as previously required. An appeal system is available to those Midshipmen who feel that any punishment is imposed unjustly.*

Our Battalion organization includes a band, drill team, and three letter companies of two platoons each. All juniors (2/c) are in "A" Co, sophomores (3/c) in "B" Co, and freshmen in "C" Co. The 1/c acts as a platoon petty officer or officer. Company XOs are not used as the CPO is considered to be sufficient. Squad leaders are selected from the respective units. Retaining class identity from year to year helps build competitive spirit. Marine option students are normally assigned as 4/c platoon leaders. Returning from a summer at Quantico, they are ready, willing, and able to pass on their knowledge to freshmen "boots."

Midshipmen officers make out aptitude reports on their subordinates. These are used by the unit staff as additional evidence in their own reports of students' aptitude.

We finance all Midshipmen activities—Annual Ball, unit newspaper, athletic equipment, trophies, etc.—by means of a $5 assessment at the beginning of each school year. This gives the Battalion staff adequate financial support for their operations.

This system has proved to be reasonable, workable, and effective for us. It may help you. USMC

NROTC Unit, Vanderbilt Univ
Nashville, Tenn.



Midshipmen responsibilities shouldn't be limited to drill field activities

Updating The Red Rifleman

By Capt H. C. Bergmann

LT JACKMAN'S ARTICLE, "THE RED Rifleman Today" (GAZETTE: June '60), contains good historical background material, but has many misleading statements which could easily cause the reader to draw a totally untrue picture of the *Soviet* soldier.

First, the Soviet rifleman's initial training consists not of a boot camp as we know it, but a period of quarantine which lasts from two to four weeks. During this period medical examinations are held and basic military training, consisting mostly of drill with and without arms, military regulations, history and organization of the military unit, is conducted. During this period at least two hours a day are devoted to political indoctrination. After quarantine, recruits are sent to units for training. The training cycle lasts about one and one-half months.

Although the training time on Saturday may be a few hours less than the other days, it should be pointed out that at least a couple of hours daily are devoted to inspections and cleaning of equipment.

It is true that summer training is the practical application period, but Lt Jackman failed to point out that during this period organizations and units usually move out of their kasernes and bivouac in the field for the entire training period.

The statement, "Zampolits are attached . . . . sometimes even down to companies," could easily present an entirely false interpretation of the zampolit and his role. The position of zampolit is an assigned T/O officer billet found in battalions and higher; rarely, if ever, found in units lower than the battalion. In company size units there is a political worker or leader (Politruk), who can be an officer or NCO. This position is an "aditional" duty type assignment. In passing, it should be noted that the zampolit is charged with creating the proper *political* attitude not only in the soldier but in the officer as well.

The Soviet noncommissioned officers' schools to which the author refers are not NCO schools as we know them. The members of this school are rarely NCO's, usually being privates, some even with less than three month's service. These schools are normally conducted on the regimental level, although NCO schools exist on the division and "okrug" (military district) level when highly specialized or technical training is to be conducted. The Sovet private earns thirty rubles a month, the junior sergeant earns twice that, and the senior sergeant earns about a hundred rubles a month. Although some soldiers do not want to become noncommissioned officers for the reason the author stated, many do not want to become NCO's because of the repugnancy of military service and because becoming an NCO could easily mean "voluntary" reenlistment.

Lt Jackman states that the infantry division is not motorized. Marshal Zhukov announced before the Twentieth Session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1956, that the Soviet Army was fully mechanized and motorized. At the present time there are 950 motor transport vehicles in an infantry division.

Whole articles could be written on the Soviet military education system. Briefly, it is divided into seven levels: the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools, which accept boys from about 12 years of age; the Preparatory Military Schools, for youths at least 15 years old; the Military Schools for the 18-23 age group, (this is the first school where the students are officially referred to as "cadets"); Higher Military Schools for Officers; Military Institutes and Academies; Voroshilov Higher Military Academy, and the Military Institute of Postgraduates. There is at least one branch school in almost every large city west of the Urals. True, the military academies exist only in Moscow and Leningrad. The reader should not be confused into thinking that the Frunze Academy is only for infantry officers, for it is open to officers of all command type fields. In fact the mission of this school is clearly stated in its name, The Combined Arms Military Academy Named Frunze.

USMC

H&S Co, SDT
MCS, Quantico

That's a Marine?

By Capt John J. Keenan

ALL OVER THE WORLD, the Marine on the street is a fine, well-dressed example of a military man. He is proud of his uniform and the service it represents.

But how many times have you seen a dirty utility cap on a filling station attendant's head? Or a field jacket on the back of the trash collector? Or a utility jacket, still showing the stripes of a long since promoted corporal, covering the shoulders of the man who picks up and delivers the Dempster-Dumpsters?

The usual reaction to this sight is a shrug of the shoulders and a comment, "Well it's obvious he's no Marine, look at that haircut." If you happen to be inquisitive enough to ask the man if he knows it is against the law for him to wear the uniform, your answer is that they don't have that regulation in his shop. It must have been some other Base where it wasn't allowed.

Each of us has dug into Chapter 49, MCM at one time or another, to settle a bet or to check on the trouser length requirements just before IG Inspection. All of us have passed Section H, entitled "Laws Pertaining to the Uniform." In it, for all to see, are two sections of the United States Code in which Congress has been quite explicit: "It shall be unlawful for any person not an officer or enlisted man of the United States . . . Marine Corps to wear the duly prescribed uniform of the United States . . . Marine Corps or any distinctive part of such uniform or a uniform any part which is similar to a distinctive part of the duly prescribed uniform of the United States . . . Marine Corps . . ."; and, "Whoever, in any place within the jurisdiction of the United States . . ., without authority, wears the uniform or distinctive part of the uniform of any of the armed forces of the United States . . . shall be fined not more than $250 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both."

I do not advocate that every time you see a stray utility cap on a civilian, he should be apprehended. He is usually not to blame; he just doesn't know. What I am advocating, however, is that we clean our own house first, and then ask for the cooperation of the local law enforcement agencies. Marines in organizations employing civilian workers must insure that all of their employees are well aware of the provisions of law. Then the law must be enforced! When we have rid our bases of the half-uniformed civilians, we can then request the local police to enforce the Federal law in town.

We can inform Joe, who pumps our gas, that he is unwittingly violating the law. We know that Joe is a civilian, but to our neighbors or the driver passing through, Joe is a Marine. "He had a Marine Corps emblem on his jacket!"

Whose uniform? Our uniform! Let's make sure that we, Marines, are the only people who wear it! USMC

I Co, 3dBn, 6th Marines
2dMarDiv, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK

This department aims to present briefly ideas of wide or lasting use. We want: professional tips, quotes, reprints, digests of articles from professional journals, translations—all of interest to Marines. We'll pay for your help in finding old, new or original material of professional value.

The Defense of Duffer's Drift

How a young British platoon leader learned too late some bitter lessons about small unit actions during the Boer War (1899-1902). Reprinted and condensed from *Infantry Journal,* April, 1905.

It was just 3 o'clock, and here I was on the banks of the Silliaasvogel river, left behind by my column with a party of 50 men. My orders: to hold Duffer's Drift at all costs.

It was an important ford, because it was the only one across which wheeled traffic could pass for some miles up or down the river.

I decided to pitch my small camp just south of the drift, because it was slightly rising ground; there would be no need to place the camp in a state of defense until the following day. No enemy were known to be within a hundred miles.

Lesson number one: *Do not put off taking your measures of defense . . . as this is more important than the comfort of your men or the shipshape arrangement of your camp. Choose the position of your camp mainly with reference to your defense.*

Having issued my immediate orders I decided to explore the neighborhood . . . directing my steps towards the Dutch farm nestling under the kopje to the northeast. I was met by the owner, a tame or surrendered Boer farmer, and his two sons. They asked and got permission from me to sell eggs, milk, and butter in the camp. The three of them strolled about the camp showing great interest in everything, asking most intelligent questions about the British forces and the general position of affairs.

Lesson number two: *Do not in wartime show stray men of the enemy's breed all over your camp, be they ever so kind and full of butter—nor at once to confide in them.*

After writing out my orders for next day . . . I saw the two guards mounted, one at the drift, and the other some little way down the river. It was almost comforting to hear the half-hourly cry of the sentries—"Number one-all is well." By this sound I was able to locate them, and knew they were at their proper posts.

Lesson number three: *Do not let your sentries advertise their positions to the whole world, including the enemy, by making much noise every half hour.*

We started making our trenches as soon as I had marked off a nice squarish little enclosure which would about contain our small camp. The soil was hard. We were only able to make quite a low parapet and shallow trench. Two guards were mounted close by the object I was to watch, namely, the drift. They were placed down the river bank, just high enough to see over the top.



Lesson number four: *With modern rifles, to guard a drift does not necessitate sitting on top of it (as if it could be picked up and carried away), unless the locality is suitable to hold for defensive reasons. It may even be better to take up your defensive position some way from the spot, and so away from concealed ground, which enables the enemy to crawl up to very close range, concealed and unperceived, and to fire from cover which hides them even when shooting. It would be better, if possible, to have the enemy in the open, or to have what is called a clear "field of fire." When fired at by an enemy at close range from nearly all round, a low parapet and shallow trench are not of much use, as what bullets do not hit the defenders on one side hit those on another.*

Next morning dawned brightly and we had about an hour's work improving details of our trenches. Just as breakfast was over the sentry on Waschout Hill reported a cloud of dust away to the north, by Regret Table Mountain. This was caused by a large party of men with wheeled transport of some sort. I had quite forgotten the possibility of guns being used against me, though I do not know what difference it would have made to my defensive measures.

Lesson number five: *Do not forget that, if guns are going to be used against you, a shallow trench with a low parapet some way from it is worse than useless, even though the parapet be bullet-proof ten times over. The trench gives the gunners an object to lay on, and gives no protection from shrapnel. Against well-aimed long-range artillery fire it would be better to scatter the defenders in the open, hidden in grass and bushes, or behind stones or ant-hills, than to keep them huddled in such a*

trench. With your men scattered around, you can safely let the enemy fill your trench to the brim with shrapnel.

As I was focussing my glasses there was a boom from the hill, followed by a sharp report and a puff of smoke up in the air quite close by. Another boom. This time the shell burst well and the whole ground in front of the trench was covered with bullets; a few men were hit, whose groans were unpleasant to listen to. We could not sink into the earth fast enough.

Lesson number six: *Though to stop a shrapnel bullet much less actual thickness of earth is necessary than to stop a rifle bullet, yet this earth must be in the right place. For protection you must be able to get right close under the cover. As narrow a trench as possible, with the sides and inside of the parapet as steep as they will stand, will give you the best chance.*

At this moment rifle fire began on Waschout Hill. In about a quarter of an hour we had five men shot through the head. Suddenly the noise of firing became much more intense. At the same time the men seemed to be dropping much oftener, and I was impressing them with the necessity of keeping up a brisker fire to the front.

Lesson number seven: *For a small isolated post and an active enemy, there are no flanks, no rear, or, to put it otherwise, it is front all round. Take care, when placing and making your defenses, that when you are engaged in shooting the enemy to the front of your trench, his pal cannot sneak up and shoot you in the back.*

Suddenly we heard, far away out on the veldt, a sound as of some one beating a tin tray, and a covey of little shells whistled into the ground close by the trench; two of these burst on touching the ground. How had they managed to hit off so well the right spot to go to enfilade our trench? I at once diagnosed the position—we were now enfiladed from both flanks.

Lesson number eight: *Remember that though you may arrange matters so that you cannot be enfiladed by rifle fire, yet you may be open to it from long range, by means of gun or pompom fire. There are few straight trenches that cannot be enfiladed from somewhere, if the enemy can only get there. You can sometimes prevent being enfiladed by so placing your trench that no one can get into prolongation of it to fire down it, or you can wiggle it about in many ways, so that it is not straight, or make "traverses" across it, or dig separate trenches for every two or three men.*

At first we got it very hot from the north, where the guns had been all along. Then suddenly a gun was opened on us away from the southwest, and we were shelled for a short time from both sides. After this the guns ceased, and the rifle fire also gradually died away.

After a little we discovered the riverbed was deserted, but the Boers had not retired. They had discovered the dead ground, and under the mutually supporting fire of their guns, which had kept us to our trenches, had all *crossed the drift* and trekked south.

I had failed in my duty.

During the next few hours we buried the dead, tended the wounded, and took some well-earned rest, and I had ample leisure to consider my failure and the causes. More lessons derived from the fight were:

- Beware of convex hills and dead ground. Take care to have some place where the enemy *must* come under your fire.
- A conspicuous "bluff" trench may cause the enemy to waste much ammunition, and draw fire away from the actual defenses.
- A hill may not, after all, though it has "command" be the best place to hold.
- As once before—cover from sight is often worth more than cover from bullets.
- To surprise the enemy is a great advantage.
- If you wish to obtain this advantage, *conceal* your position. For promotion it may be sound to advertise your position, for defense it is not.
- To test the concealment or otherwise of your position, look at it from the *enemy's point of view.*

Ed: Platoon leaders, how would you defend Duffer's Drift (see map)?

Soviet General Says

Quoting from an official Russian foreign affairs publication *The New York Times* for 13Oct60 reported these views of a highly placed member of the Soviet general staff:

- There is "practically no possibility of averting a nuclear rocket attack."
- A nuclear war would be global and would result in the death of half of the population of the world.
- It would be impossible to keep local nuclear wars from spreading, and they would be "nothing but a prelude to a universal nuclear rocket war."
- A surprise attack might gain a momentary advantage for an aggressor, but with the present level of nuclear stockpiles the conflict would eventually culminate in the destruction of the aggressor as well as the victim of the attack.

The author is MajGen Nikolai A. Talensky who, *The Times* said, is regarded internationally as one of the top Soviet military theoreticians.

The report further said that Gen Talensky took note of efforts by Western military theoreticians to promote the idea of limited wars. He described this as being merely a propaganda move in which NATO generals were "seeking less dangerous forms" of war while continuing plans for all-out aggression.

IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK, BUT...
by Sherman & Crook
MARINE OF THE WEEK
...Cleaning the rifle... a toothbrush is for.
It'll brush away dirt and also do more.
'Bone the Stock' the Old Timers say,
Sandpaper, oil....with a bone rub-away.
Try the toothbrush handle instead of a bone,
And for inspection you'll stand alone
THANKS AND FIVE TO:
Sgt. Joseph R. Phaneuf
Officer Selection Office
Des Moines, Iowa

PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



Anti-Guerrilla War in Greece

By LtCol E. E. Zacharakis, Royal Hellenic Army

Extracted from Revue Militaire Generale, July, 1960

Guerrilla tactics in Greece followed three main principles.

- Attain local superiority against the target. Based upon surprise and the element of forces.
- Accomplish mission prior to reinforcement of target.
- Avoid contact with enemy while in the escape. Escape took place immediately after completion of the mission, or when position was dangerous.

Description of principles:

- Strategic surprise in all situations. Detailed intelligence obtained regarding routes available for unobserved approach to target. Tactical surprise in situations with regard to the strength of the enemy.

For the guerrillas the collection of information was easy because each newly-converted communist acted as an agent for the party. Accurate and detailed information collected by agents enabled the guerrillas to select targets which were isolated and subject to strategic surprise. They moved by night, and remained hidden during the day.

At night they would attack. First, encircling the target, then attacking all positions simultaneously, with fire primarily from automatic weapons. Infiltrating through gaps in the defense or attacking in force at one point, they forced the use of the reserves of defenders. By passing the bulk of the attacking force through the breach, they reached their objective.

To obtain isolation of the objective, the guerrillas simultaneously attacked flanking units. This caused a delay in movement of reinforcements. They also ambushed approaching reinforcements, and laid mines in their approach routes.

Guerrilla action took place primarily at night. Ambushes were set up along routes of withdrawal. Security units protected the intended withdrawal route. They were established prior to the attack. The main body, at times, would neglect security of the withdrawal. While in actual withdrawal, they would set up an ambush in hope of destroying the entire enemy force pursuing them.

Destroying the guerrilla, and not the capture and holding of land, was the purpose of operations during the anti-guerrilla war. Occupation of area was confined to those areas having strategic and tactical importance for accomplishing the purpose. Passive defense does not serve the purpose of anti-guerrilla warfare. Capturing ground which did not serve to destroy the guerrillas resulted in purposeless bloodshed.

Aggressiveness took the initiative out of the hands of the guerrillas. There were many ways of developing an offense against the guerrilla bands.

- The Iron Ring—Surprise encirclement of a guerrilla-held area and the annihilation of those found within. Required: Surprise and sizable forces. The guerrillas did not attempt to breach the ring. They broke up into small groups and used well hidden ravines for their unobserved escape.
- Entrapment—A detachment, with strong fire-power, enters a guerrilla-held area. Mission: Cause the enemy to move to avoid destruction. Other detachments wait in ambush along the probable routes of escape. Their mission: Destroy the enemy by ambush. Required: Detailed study of the guerrilla habits and accurate intelligence information.

Guerrilla bands dispersed while in flight because they:

1) Had set up ammo and food supply points.

2) Had organized an intelligence network concerning movement of the Army.

3) Knew the terrain in detail.

4) Had instilled fear within the inhabitants. They were afraid of retaliation if they assisted the Army.

- Raid—The most successful action in the anti-guerrilla war was the raid. Advantages over other ways of developing offensives were:

1) Small force relying more on surprise.

2) Insured invisibility until the moment of contact.

3) Through surprise and fire superiority, heavy casualties were inflicted.

4) Had a deteriorating influence on the guerrillas' morale. It forced them to take strict security measures and to be constantly on the alert. Caused nervousness and fear which lead to a defensive psychology, rather than offensive.

Don't Write 'Em

By Col W. F. Prickett

The immediate reaction of most commands when they discover errors in the performance of subordinate units is to put out an order. **Resist that impulse!**

The error you find is an error because an existing order or directive has been violated. What makes you think that another order will correct the situation?

Marines don't make errors on purpose. They're proud, and rightly so. Pride is stressed from the very first moment he dons a Marine uniform. Isn't it slightly ridiculous to believe that a breed specializing in pride would make mistakes on purpose? It rarely if ever happens.

Nevertheless, mistakes do occur. Why? In 99 percent of the cases, mistakes happen because the individual is not properly trained or he has misunderstood the order. Will the publishing of another order correct either of these reasons for errors? NO!

What will correct both? An explanation of how to correct the error already made and instructions in how to prevent like errors in the future.

It isn't the function of orders to explain and instruct. Therefore, don't write an order when errors occur. However, do send a qualified individual to visit the unit. Have him explain how to correct the existing errors and instruct in preventing future errors. Don't write orders! Visit and instruct!

MCLFTU
Coronado, Calif.

A Better Way

To Install Field Phones

By Capt R. O. Ritts

HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU HEARD a field telephone ring in a crowded tent and wondered which one was ringing? Today's operations centers and fire direction centers have many communication channels, especially "hot" lines, terminating in field telephones. Placement of these phones is a problem, primarily because they must be separated in order to tell which one is ringing.

This small light which glows when the phone rings solves that problem and enables all phones to be placed together if desired. A rack may be built to accommodate the phones and a pre-wired cable made up to facilitate quick installation. The net effect is much quicker installation and, best of all, much greater convenience for using personnel.

The lamp consists of a Lamp, Glow: NE-51 (FSN: 6240-223-9100, 14¢ ea.) which is readily available as it is used in the AN/GRA-6 and AN/TCC-14; a resistor (as shown in the accompanying schematic); and two short lengths of single conductor electrical wiring; plus a short length of Scotch electrical tape for insulation purposes. As the drawing shows, the wires should be bent into



an "L" shape about one-half inch from the end so they may be inserted into the binding posts on the field phone at the same time the phone wire is connected. USMC

Headquarters Battery
2/11, 1stMarDiv
Camp Pendleton, Calif

A Better Way . . .

To Prepare For Instruction

By Capt Carl R. Venditto

MANY MARINES HAVE BEEN SEEN hunting for hours in periodicals for information to enhance a lecture or briefing. Some try the public libraries, others dig through old issues of magazines, and some even use their old school geography books. There is an easier method of finding accurate, up-to-date information, however.

Marines who are looking for information on foreign countries can do so with ease by checking their intelligence area studies.

The purpose of an area study or brief is to give Marines a handy reference on foreign nations at a moment's notice. Our early experiences in Korea proved a need for such a stockpile of accurate and timely intelligence material.

To clear the air, an area study is a concise report on a nation covering such particulars as the military organization, terrain, weather, ports, cities, health, and history. Some briefs will also contain maps and photos. The pages may range from 10 to the hundreds, but the average is about 40.

To give you an example of how it is used, let's take Indochina. If you are interested in the height of mountains in the northwest part of that country, turn to the section on topography. Curious about fog conditions? Check your brief again; the answer is there. Parts of the north are socked in 57 percent of the year. Fact is, in all areas flying conditions are least favorable during the summer.

Another interesting bit of information: If you have a fear of snakes, brother, keep away, as the brief I reviewed claims there are 38 species of poisonous land snakes.

A file of area studies should be kept in your intelligence office. A word of caution—many of the area studies are unclassified, but some are not. It is wise to check the clearance of those men who will attend your lectures. USMC

833 Slater Road
New Britain, Conn.

New Books

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WWII—VOLUME XIV—VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC. S. E. Morison (*Little, Brown & Co.*, $3.50)

Concluding volume deals with the heroic capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

AMERICANS AT WAR. T. H. Williams (*Louisiana St. Univ. Press*, $3.50)

A historical survey of the system by which the US government has sought to organize and direct our military forces from past to present.

DETERRENT OR DEFENSE. B. H. Liddell Hart (F. A. Praeger, $4.95)

Summarizes our current strategic situation, and suggests sweeping revision of NATO defense policies.

KOREA AND THE FALL OF MACARTHUR. T. Higgins (*Oxford Univ. Press*, $5.00)

Examines the political background of the Korean conflict, and points out the effects of this background on military decisions.

AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE. W. F. Hahn and J. C. Neff (*Doubleday & Co., Inc.*, $1.45)

Answers to pertinent questions concerning our national security and the world situation today.

THE MARCH TO GLORY. R. Leckie (*World Publishing Co.*, $3.95)

A gripping account of the greatest fighting withdrawal in modern times. The story of the Chosin Reservoir operation, and the courage and endurance of Marines involved.

POLARIS. J. Baar and W. Howard (*Harcourt, Brace & Co.*, $4.50)

The weapon, traced from its conception through development to operational use.

PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. American Heritage Magazine (*American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., distributed by Doubleday & Co., Inc.*, $19.95)

A fast-moving pictorial narrative covering both the military and political aspects of the war.

Quote of the Month

. . . "Cuba's answer to aggressive plans with or without the OAS is a people armed to the teeth. . . Any Cuban peasant could whip any US soldier or Marine."—*Fidel Castro*

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 8)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precis), SM (Supplementary Material), and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

1 (c) Reference: FM 7-10, paragraph 173. To deceive and resist the enemy, one rifle squad in each platoon area and approximately one half of the machine guns in the company area are left in contact. The squad moves to cover dangerous enemy approaches and to protect the crew served weapons. Normal firing patterns and activity help deceive the enemy and resistance in key spots repels him.

2 (c) Reference: MCS 3-33, paragraph 38b (5). The general location of the combat outpost is prescribed by the regimental commander. Control is exercised through either the regimental reserve battalion commander or the forward battalion commanders. However, the latter is preferred. If reserve battalion troops compose the combat outpost and control is to be by the frontline battalion commander, they will be attached to forward battalions.

3 (a) Reference: Marine Rifle Squad, paragraph 86c; MCS 3-30, paragraph 35h. A principal direction of fire is assigned to single weapons to cover dead space in a machine gun FPL, likely avenues of approach, or to ensure coverage of an entire front efficiently during periods of low visibility. BARs are always given a PDF and a sector of fire. M1s are given a sector of fire, and a PDF only when necessary. Machine guns are not assigned a PDF, though the squad or section leader may stake out likely targets.

4 (d) Reference: LFM-13, paragraph 202a. LFM-13 states that Navy personnel are responsible for breaching obstacles below the low water line and that landing force units are responsible for breaching obstacles above the high water line. Further, it states that the responsibility for breaching obstacles between these two lines (tidal range) is resolved during the planning phase of the operation by the landing force and amphibious task force commanders.

5 (d) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 807d. Periodic Intelligence Reports (PIR) are summations of the enemy situation at the end of a given period and of the intelligence produced during that time.

a. The Unit Report is a distractor and not an intelligence report.

b. The Intelligence Annex is an annex to the Operation Plan or Order and assigns missions, intelligence tasks, and disseminates intelligence information.

c. Intelligence Estimates are an analysis of characteristics of the area of operation and the enemy situation which affect the accomplishment of a mission.

6 (b) Reference: LFM-3. (a) is wrong in that collection of information is done by many different agencies and the information they collect is then evaluated and interpreted. (c) is wrong as the Collection Plan does not deal with the dissemination of information, and (d) is wrong as we deal with enemy capabilities, not intentions.

7 (a) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 1001c. Counterintelligence is that phase of intelligence covering all activity devoted to denying the enemy any type of information concerning our forces and at the same time attempt to deceive or mislead him. This is a command responsibility.

8 (a) Reference: TIP(EC)2, paragraph 14f. This decision is made at this level because there usually are factors that must be coordinated between aviation and ground units of the landing force and units of the amphibious task force.

9 (a) Reference: LFM 00 (Tentative), paragraph 748a(4). When the landing force commander establishes the necessary facilities ashore, responsibility for the control of naval gunfire may be passed to him. He is then authorized to assign naval gunfire support missions directly to the ships and to supervise the execution of these missions.

Merry Christmas!

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General Officers

Transfers

Leek, F. E. 9903
Fr COMART WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Robertshaw, L. B. 9903
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To NAS Glen

Colonels

Temporary Promotions

Amerine, R. R. Nov
Myking, B. G. Nov
North, R. F. Nov

Transfers

Anderson, N. J. 9907
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To HQMC

Calhoun, O. V. 9907
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To Colorado Springs

Cortelyou, S. G. 9907
Fr Ofc of CNO WDDec
To 1stMAW

Culhane, T. A. 9906
Fr Argentina WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Heimer, W. R. 9906
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To The Pentagon

Honsowetz, R. E. 9906
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To FMFPac

Layer, W. F. 9906
Fr FMFLant WDDec
To MB Bklyn

Smith, K. N. 9908
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Retired

Weinberger, A. H. 9907
MCAS CherPt 31Jan

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Axtell, G. C., Legal Off, 2dMAW
Carneal, W. B., Inspector, 3dMarDiv
McNicol, P. B., Comptroller, MCSC Barstow
Moore, L. S., Asst Cmdr, 2dMAW
Robertson, E. B., C/S, MCSC Barstow

Lieutenant Colonels

Permanent Promotions

Hudock, J. C. Nov
Martin, V. R. Nov
Miears, W. D. Nov
Nolte, W. L. Nov
Roscoe, A. J. Nov
Shenaut, D. L. Nov

Temporary Promotions

Aynes, J. P. Nov
Barber, B. H. Nov
Barney, I. J. Nov
Bell, R. T. Nov
Blakely, J. A. Nov
Blankenship, C. P. Nov
Booker, J. V. Nov
Brandon, L. H. Nov
Campbell, C. I. Nov
Canan, C. M. Nov
Carlock, R. O. Nov
Ciampa, E. R. Nov
Cloud, G. M. Nov
Cordes, A. M. Nov
Crapo, W. M. Nov
Crew, C. E. Nov
Davis, S. Nov
Daze, L. R. Nov
Dimond, N. Nov
Doty, W. C. Nov
Dupre, P. J. Nov
Gallagher, B. R. Nov
Gallo, J. A. Nov
Gibson, J. A. Nov
Gourley, N. W. Nov
Hall, H. K. Nov
Hickey, T. R. Nov
Hopkins, D. S. Nov
James, W. C. Nov
Jefferson, J. M. Nov
Kleberger, D. V. Nov
Knauf, R. C. Nov
Kositch, A. Nov
Lauer, S. R. Nov
Leland, H. E. Nov
Lewis, E. L. Nov
Limberg, R. D. Nov
Long, E. B. Nov
Mackel, E. H. Nov
Mayer, H. Nov
McPartlin, C. E. Nov
McRobert ,P. P. Nov
Miller, W. T. Nov
Moore, H. R. Nov
Morel, O. J. Nov
Ostby, J. L. Nov
Page, L. L. Nov
Peevey, N. B. Nov
Pippin, F. N. Nov
Poppe, E. G. Nov
Prestridge, J. G. Nov
Redmond, W. L. Nov
Reece, J. I. Nov
Ronald, R. C. Nov
Ruffner, P. M. Nov
Rupp, G. R. Nov
Seibert, K. D. Nov
Shields, R. F. Nov
Shook, F. A. Nov
Stahlstrom, H. A. Nov
Stanfield, J. C. Nov
Stephenson, L. S. Nov
Stingley, E. J. Nov
Stirling, H. H. Nov
Turner, B. C. Nov
Victor, J. E. Nov
Waltz, H. R. Nov
Watson, P. B. Nov
Yerkes, R. W. Nov
Young, F. R. Nov

Transfers

Bigelow, K. K. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To Monterey Calif

Bowers, M. B. 7332
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To MCAS Beaufort

Brumley, R. H. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

Chambers, J. S. 0302
Fr ComPhibGru One WDDec
To AFSC NorVa

Crossfield, C. C. 1802
Fr England
To CinCUSNavEur By31Jan

Danowitz, E. F. 0302
Fr Madrid Spain WDDec
To AFSC NorVa

Fairfield, R. J. 0302
Fr Wash DC WDDec
To Nav Miss Brazil

Ferguson, C. D. 0302
Fr 2dMAW WDDec
To Ofc JCS

Flynn, M. E. 1302
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCS Quant

Garber, C. D. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
Tod 2dMAW

Henley, P. B. 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

Henley, P. B. 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To AirFMFPac

Hughes, F. E. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS Kaneohe

Johnson, F. M. 0302
Fr Stf Ofc JCS WDDec
To AFSC NorVa

Marston, C. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Marston, C. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

McDaniel, J. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Moses, E. P. 1302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Short, J. C. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To CinCLantFlt

Tatro, L. F. 7307
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 2dMAW

Taylor, S. M. 7333
Fr ComSeventhFlt WDDec
To 3dMAW

Thobe, B. G. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD SDiego

Deaths, Retired

Bloedel, G. F. 27Oct
San Fran Calif

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Barker, E. L., CO MABS-12, 1sMAW
Gregory, W. E., ISO, 1stMAW
Hillam, B. F., C0 3dBn, 11thMar, 1stMarDiv
Horner, R. D., ExO, 1stFSR, 1st MarDiv
Johnson, R. W., MABS-16, 1stMAW
Munday, J. R., CO 3dAmTracBn, 1st MarDiv
Turner, W. W., Exchange Off, MCAS CherPt
Weidner, W. D., CO 4thInfantryBn, NOrleans
Zastrow, H. E. L., CO 1stLAMB, 29 Palms

Majors

Permanent Promotions

Adams, W. C. Nov
Baker, C. Nov
Bittick, W. C. Nov
Buskirk, W. K. Nov
Clegg, F. . Nov
Coffey, S. R. Nov
Cunha, U. F. Nov
Fleetwood, W. W. Nov
Frank, E. W. Nov
Gardner, W. E. Nov
Hilgart, V. F. Nov
Lamoureux, W. D. Nov
Menjes, J. H. Nov
Persons, H. D. Nov
Sedora, S. Nov
Swisher, C. R. Nov
Thomas, W. E. Nov

Transfers

Barber, N. E. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD SDiego

Caridakis, G. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Clemens, H. T. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Cox, L. J. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDNov
To MCS Quant

Deckard, M. H. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Devol, A. O. 7333
Fr 2dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Farrell, W. 7302
Fr MCAS CherPt WDDec
To 1stMAW

Fay, C. D. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

Foltz, H. R. 7331
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

Freeman, T. R. 3002
Fr NAG Korea WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Grimes, D. 6402
Fr 2dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Hastings, L. D. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAAS Yuma

Hickman, W. T. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

Howie, W. O. 7307
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Kelley, D. D. 2502
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Klingman, R. R. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Knack, F. J. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Livingston, C. R. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

McElhoes, S. I. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To FMFLant

McKitrick, R. D. 7335
Fr USS Boxer WDDec
To FMFLant

Middleton, A. B. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To HQMC

Mixson, W. J. 7331
Fr MCAS Beaufort WDDec
To 1stMAW

Paris, E. P. 0302
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Poppa, C. J. 7333
Fr. 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Rann, L. A. 0302
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To AFSC NorVa

Schiweck, K. W. 1803
Fr Taiwan WDDec
To MCS Quant

Seipp, L. A. 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Sharkey, H. L. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Smith, R. I. 7331
Fr NAS Pncla WDDec
To 2dMAW

Vickers, E. K. 3302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Retired

Skeit, E. P. 1302
1stMarDiv 30Nov

Deaths

Bosma, O. A. 3502
MB Bklyn NY 27Oct
Malone, C. B. 7302
Moffett Field 11Nov

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Buckingham, C. W., Provost Marshal, MCAF Iwakuni
Davidson, E. E., CO MABS-27, 2d MAW
Gordy, J. C., ExO 4thInfantryBn, NOrleans
Moore, R. N., ExO VMA-533, 2d MAW

Captains

Permanent Promotions

Adamczuk, R. W. Nov
Bruce, F. H. Nov
Collins, G. L. Nov
Houder, C. H. Nov
Schneider, L. A. Nov
Ullom, T. H. Nov
Weiler, F. V. Nov

Permanent Promotions Reserve

Bade, C. R. Nov
Clark, S. M. Nov
Coward, J. K. Nov
Gregory, R. O. Nov
Hurd, R. V. Nov
King, J. P. Nov
Stewart, C. L. Nov

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Boyer, W. D. Nov
Cody, D. W. Nov
Collier, W. R. Nov
DeBold, L. E. Nov
Grant, R. D. Nov
Heyer, K. Nov
Holland, D. E. Nov
Johnson, H. D. Nov
Kearney, C. P. Nov
Kelly, W. D. Nov
Roddey, J. C. Nov
Rothell, G. E. Nov
Shockley, C. E. Nov
Shohfi, A. E. Nov

Transfers

Albert, R. H. 0302
Fr ComPhibRON 1 WDDec
To MCAS Kaneohe

Allemann, J. G. 6402
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMAW

Austin, C. L. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Bacher, L. J. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Bates, W. G. 1302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

Bowman, D. W. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCSC Barstow

Branen, W. E. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMAW

Brening, J. W. 6402
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Bujan, C. D. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Burton, G. F. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

Capatosto, R. P. 0702
Fr Tengan Okinawa WDDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

Caprara, J. A. 3510
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Carr, G. 0130
Fr HQMC WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Chapman, C. T. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MB LBeach

Chapman, R. L. 1803
Fr MCRD SDiego WDDec
To MCS Quant

Christian, L. 3010
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To Tengan Okinawa

Cochran, J. R. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Cooley, D. J. 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

Cox, J. D. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Craig, R. W. 3002
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To MCSC Barstow

Davis, J. W. 0302
Fr USS Little Rock WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

DeLaTorre, G. F. 0202
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To FrTrps FMFLant

Donnelly, T. E. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Doss, J. G. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Dyson, F. W. 3090
Fr MCRD PISC WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Eaton, H. M. 1302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Enderle, R. R. .. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To Port Arthur Tex

Fitzsimmons, R. F. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Flanagan, L. J. 7335
Fr 2d MAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Fogt, D. E. 3302
Fr 2dMAW WDDec
To FMFPac

Gibson, C. R. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Gildersleeve, L. A. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To Ft Holabird Md

Grover, R. G. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Hall, B. R. 7332
Fr NAS Pncla WDDec
To 3dMAW

Hallam, W. J. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Halvorsen, M. J. 0115
Fr HQMC WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

Hawthorne, R. W. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Hayes, J. L. 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To NATTC MFS

Hennessy, J. A. 0202
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Hodge, W. K. 2025
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Hoekstra, J. R. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Irish, J. F. 3010
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDDec
To MB Bklyn

Irons, M. E. 2502
Fr MB NB BSN WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant

Koesterer, A. G. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Koppenhaver, H. M. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Kramer, W. K. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To LOSA

Lafser, R. C. 3030
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Lemoine, L. P. 3502
Fr 1st MAW WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Levy, N. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Lutzenzurg, T. 0130
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Machado, L. E. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Macklin, D. K. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Marello, J. C. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To NAS Weymouth Mass

Martin, L. E. 0130
Fr NAS Bklyn WDDec
To 1stMAW

McKenna, C. X. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD SDiego

Miller, J. H. 7333
Fr Miss S College WDDec
To 2dMAW

Moeller, A. L. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Moreau, P. L. 7335
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Newton, C. O. 1320
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Niesen, P. W. 7335
Fr MCAS Beaufort WDDec
To USS Boxer

Nolan, J. W. 3302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Oerly, S. H. 7335
Fr USS Boxer WDDec
To 2dMAW

Olds, J. H. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRS LRock

Overcash, B. G. 0302
Fr MB WashDC WDDec
To USS Little Rock

Palmer, R. E. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRS StL

Pattillo, E. F. 3010
Fr MCB CamLej WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Petty, J. D. 6702
Fr MCAAS Yuma WDDec
To 1stMAW

Radzavage, R. G. 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Robinette, J. A. 1320
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMar Div

Russell, R. A. 0302
Fr MCB CamLej WDDec
To MCS Quant

Saitta, F. H. 3090
Fr MCB CamLej WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Saucier, F. W. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To COMPHIBRON ONE

Schmidt, L. D. 3010
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To MCB 29 Palms

Stephens, A. C. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Stone, J. L. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Taylor, J. R. 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

Thompson, W. A. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Tolle, D. S. 2502
Fr 1stMarBrig WDDec
To MCS Quant

Weaver, C. G. 3010
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMAW

Weiland, G. A. 0302
Fr MCB CamPen WDDec
To MCS Quant

White, W. C. 0310
Fr MCAS El Toro WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Whitmer, J. A. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

Wood, W. O. 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Worden, P. R. 7332
Fr NAS Pncla WDDec
To 3dMAW

Released from Active Duty

Fulladosa, V. J. 7305
NAS CorpC WDDec

Retired

Douglass, W. E. 3302
TI SFran 30Nov

Douville, C. G. 0130
MCAAS Yuma 30Nov

Green, H. A. 2715
MB SFran 30Nov

Langley, J. F. 3102
MCASCherP 30Nov

Lee, H. J. 0130
1stMarDiv 30Nov

Deaths

Maitland, P. R. 7333
1st MAW 17Oct

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Farnsworth, F. W., Adjutant MCAS Kaneohe

1st Lieutenants

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Barris, V. E. Nov
Brenan, R. P. Nov
Hart, G. R. Nov
Pleasants, J. V. Nov
Wilson, J. A. Nov

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Gravelle, W. J. Nov
Lasher, H. F. Nov
Losey, J. L. Nov
Perry, G. E. Nov
Schwenkler, R. G. Nov
Shields, J. M. Nov
Webb, J. R. Nov
Weidemueller, E. O. Nov

Transfers

Amidon, A. L. 1302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Bailey, R. T. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Bailey, D. B. 0302
Fr MCRD PISC WDDec
To Monterey Calif

Baker, C. W. 1802
Fr ForTrpsFMFLant WDDec
To USS Saratoga

Beamer, H. G. 0802
Fr MCB CamLej WDDec
To HQMC

Beckman, J. W. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Bond, W. H. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To USS Bonhomme Richard

Buchanan, J. H. 7333
Fr NAS CorpC WDNov
To 3dMAW

Campanella, F. B. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To MB WashDC

Carew, F. R. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 2dMAW

Carlson, C. J. 0130
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To HQMC

Cassity, J. E. 3030
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCSC Albany

Caton, J. R. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Chandler, J. R. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Clites, D. D. 6406
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Collins, C. G. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To NATTC MFS

Corn, C. P. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To MB WashDC

Dorsey, J. J. 9901
Fr USS Hancock WDDec
To MCS Quant

Dunn, J. L. 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDDec
To MCS Quant

Earls, K. W. 0702
Fr MCB CamPen WDDec
To Ft Holabird Md

Ellefson, D. C. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD SDiego

Ellis, G. L. 7305
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To Univ Omaha

Esposito, R. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Felcyn, D. R. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Garrett, P. L. 0185
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCRD SDiego

Jorgensen, C. B. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Kilday, T. P. 1302
Fr MCB CamLej WDDec
To Ft Holabird Md

Kostesky, R. M. 0802
Fr MB NorVa WDDec
To MCS Quant

Krebs, J. F. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDDec
To MB WashDC

Lewis, C. W. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Lewis, S. P. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDDec
To 1stMAW

Mackey, R. P. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCAS Beaufort

Maeser, E. S. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Marler, J. S. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

McCarthy, P. J. 7307
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To Air FMFPac

Milner, T. R. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Mink, J. W. 3015
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamPen

Mixson, J. G. 0302
Fr USS Boston WDDec
To MB NB BSN

Monson, C. L. 9901
Fr 3dMAW WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

Morgan, L. L. 0302
Fr USS Macon WDNov
To USS Boston

Murphy, I. M. 0130
Fr MCRD PISC WDDec
To MCS Quant

Murray, J. W. 6502
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

Ott, M. N. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Paden, D. D. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Pederson, R. J. 7302
Fr 1st MarBrig WDDec
To 1stMAW

Peterson, D. B. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

Roberts, C. P. 4302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Schmidt, D. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Simms, J. Y. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Sinclair, D. K. 9901
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Snyder, J. H. 7331
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

Solomonson, C. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

Soomre, R. 1302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To Roanoke Va

Southwick, J. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Spiegel, F. H. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
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Talbot, W. N. 6708
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Trout, J. K. 0302
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Vaupel, M. C. 6709
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Westmiller, P. B. 7333
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Wilson, H. E. 0802
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Youngman, T. L. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

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Bradshaw, E. L. Jul61
Dawdy, J. A. Jun61
Gallagher, F. Jan61
Gallagher, F. Jun61
Seward, W. H. Jan62

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To MCB CamLej

Bennett, E. A. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Biggerstaff, B. A. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Carman, J. E. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Cavaleri, C. R. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Creed, M. L. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Dorsey, J. J. 9901
Fr USS Hancock WDDec
To MCS Quant

Filkins, E. E. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCRD PISC

Fox, D. D. 9901
Fr NAS Pncla WDDec
To MCS Quant

Holtzapple, R. A. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Link, G. L. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

Mackie, N. J. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To FMFLant

Moore, P. L. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Phipps, C. A. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCAS CherPt

Powell, F. F. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

Sheetz, W. O. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

Sherwood, S. H. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To MCB CamLej

Snodgrass, C. R. 9901
Fr 5thMCRRD WDDec
To MCS Quant

Sparrow, R. W. 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To FMFLant

Stone, D. M. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

Warrant Officers

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Permanent Promotions To W3

Oliver, W. M. Nov

Permanent Promotions, Reserve To W3

Davis, B. S. Nov
Dixon, B. F. Nov
Gibson, P. R. Nov
Hood, H. Nov
Pifer, K. C. Nov
Shelton, O. H. Nov
Slattery, R. A. Nov
Studt, N. C. Nov
Throckmorton, R. E. Nov
Writer, H. A. Nov

Permanent Promotions To W2

Bryks, L. J. Nov
Mihalak, S. J. Nov
Winship, L. F. Nov

Temporary Promotions To W3

Dawson, R. F. Nov
Elliott, B. L. Nov
Kulakowski, F. A. Nov
Mills, H. V. Nov
Oliver, C. R. Nov
Pasley, R. E. Nov
Pettley, W. F. Nov
Slavin, P. L. Nov
Starks, H. A. Nov
Stephens, H. S. Nov
Ward, R. I. Nov

Transfers

Connell, J. J. 2715
Fr MCB CamLej WDDec
To MB GLakes

Delacqua, R. J. 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

NOTHING NEW HAS BEEN ADDED

This is the Marine Corps Association Newsletter.

If you haven't seen it before you have been reading a Troop copy of the GAZETTE. Every month these special pages of last-minute news on your changing Corps are bound into each Member's GAZETTE . . . they have NOT been going into Troop copies. The Newsletter is in Troop copies this month for a very special reason . . . we want you to see what you have been missing.

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FIRST SQUAD AREA WEAPON

The FMF ends its test of future T/O and TE this month. The chart on the opposite page shows the variety of choices and changes possible. Tests will fit together one of three rifle platoons and one of two weapons platoons. The object: make best combat use of the new M14 rifle, M14 (Modified), M60 MG, and the just-declassified XM-79 grenade launcher.

Details of the XM-79 are shown above. Summed up, it's the first area weapon a squad (or fire team) can carry—a form of shoulder-fired artillery.

Phase I tests also look at regimental and division organizations. Here are a few more highlights of the proposals:

- Infantry Battalion and Regiment may get an organic helicopter.
- Pioneer Battalion may add an engineer company; it would hold heavier gear for use by three helicopter-liftable pioneer companies.
- The Artillery Regiment Hq could get back meteorological, flash-range, countermortar, and (bigger) survey sections.
- Artillery battalions get back: six-gun batteries, the old names of 'direct" and "general" support.
- Tank Battalion (possibly organic to MarDiv) is slated for two 90mm, one 120mm companies.
- MarDiv gets many more "over-the-beach" items—tractors, 2½-T and 5-T trucks, water trailers, wreckers, and—possibly—tanks, amtracs, LVT (H), and SP artillery (155mm How, 8" How.)

As Phase I ends for the FMF, Phase II (Combat Support, Intelligence) steps up action, while Phase III (Aviation) gets underway. Final results of Phase I won't be available soon. FMF recommendations must still be collated and analyzed by MCLFDC, then staffed through Quantico and HQMC.

When all the ideas are in shape, the "hardware" will be bought as rapidly as possible. It won't all be available under current production for three to five years.

TROOP TESTS:

The Infantry Battalion

How many Marines and weapons?



Co "1" WPNS RECAP

Pistol—35	81mm—3
SMG—16	M60 MG—6
LAW—27	3.5 RL—3
M14—134	Red Eye—6
M14(Mod)—18	DemoKit—3
XM79—9	FlameThr—3

Co "2" WPNS RECAP

Pistol—40	SMG—16
M14—90	M14(Mod)—18
XM79—18	81mm— 3
M60 MG—6	3.5 RL— 3
Red Eye—6	FlameThr— 3
DemoKit—3	AT Mines— 6

Co "3" WPNS RECAP

Pistol—44	3.5 RL— 6
SMG—9	M14(Mod)—18
M14—105	M60 MG— 9
81mm—2	106 RR— 2
XM79—18	

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

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



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